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The Vicious Circle: Weak State Institutions, 
Unremedied Abuse and Distrust
Introduction
B y  E d w i n  R e k o s h 1
For most citizens, local administrative agencies serve 
as the primary point of contact with the government. 
Whether applying for a license, seeking information, 
or requesting a social beneﬁt, these experiences shape 
public opinion. In order to instill public trust in state in-
stitutions, administrative procedures should be simple, 
clear, fair, and predictable. If an individual is dissat-
isﬁed with the result he or she received, an eﬀective 
remedy should be available. The availability and eﬀec-
tiveness of remedies is essential to ensuring good gov-
ernance and eﬃcient administrative functioning.
With these concerns in mind, Columbia Univer-
sity’s Public Interest Law Initiative and the Local Gov-
ernment and Public Service Reform Institute (LGI) of 
the Open Society Institute engaged in an exploration 
of the functioning of remedies for administrative abuse 
in practice. The results of four separate investigative 
projects, implemented in Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
and Poland, are published herein.
The authors of these studies executed individualized 
research plans within a common conceptual framework 
developed to deﬁne administrative abuses and remedies. 
While each study emphasizes diﬀerent aspects of this 
framework, all examine the relationships among public 
trust, client satisfaction, and the eﬀectiveness of rem-
edies.  Each study proposes a set of recommendations 
for improving remedies to abuse. 
1. THE CONTEXT
One of the cardinal features of a state governed by the 
rule of law is that there is a legal remedy for every 
conceived wrong, including those that may be com-
mitted by agents of the state. Remedies are provided 
through the institutions, norms, and procedures creat-
ed by constitutions, as well as by ordinary legislation 
and other normative acts.  In limited circumstances, 
remedies are also provided under international law.2 
While both rights and remedies for violations of those 
rights have developed rapidly within the changing 
legal systems of the post-communist context in East-
ern Europe, their application within the framework of 
public administration has been slower to evolve.3  
A key obstacle to administrative reform has been 
the large scale and scope of the state infrastructure 
developed under the socialist system in order to 
implement party policies, subject primarily to the 
control of party discipline. This presents a two-fold 
challenge: on the one hand, the sheer size of the 
administrative infrastructure leads to diﬃculties in 
bringing about signiﬁcant changes; on the other hand, 
the administrative infrastructure retains by inertia a 
culture of internal political responsibility, with little 
or no common understanding of responsibility on 
the basis of professional norms, duty to the general 
public (taxpayers) or the rule of law. In other words, 
administrative agencies in Eastern Europe often fall 
short of their supposed overriding goal: to work in the 
public interest.4
Within this context, the question of abuses of 
administrative authority5 and the development of 
adequate remedies for those abuses take on signiﬁcance 
beyond the technicalities of state administration, reach-
ing the core of what it means to be a state governed by 
the rule of law and the very nature of the relationship 
between the citizen and the state.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE ABUSES DEFINED
Administrative abuses can include actions which are 
illegal (such as taking a bribe), which violate normal 
procedures (such as the preferential processing of 
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paperwork), or which involve impermissible exercise 
of discretion (based on, for example, nepotism, 
cronyism, partisan politics, or discrimination).6
In order to consider remedies for such abuses, it is 
useful to categorize administrative actions according 
to a conceptual framework. I will rely on a framework 
informed largely by the work of Denis Galligan et al.,7 
based on two sets of opposites: individualized actions 
versus actions of a more general eﬀect; and decisions 
versus other forms of action. 
Examples of individualized actions used by the 
Galligan team in its multi-country study include: 
1) deciding on the grant of a license to operate a 
private school; 2) the process for enforcing standards 
on the discharge of eﬄuent into waterways; and 
3) investigating the health and safety standards in 
restaurants. These examples diﬀerentiate actions that 
aﬀect particular, individual physical or legal persons 
by: 1) conferring beneﬁts; 2) imposing burdens; or 3) 
intruding into the private sphere of an individual or 
company (through investigation). 
Examples of actions of a more general nature, 
aﬀecting larger number of physical or legal persons, 
include: 1) deciding where to site a waste disposal plant; 
2) making formal rules for the grant of maternity beneﬁts 
where such powers are conferred on an administrative 
agency by legislation; and 3) making informal rules by 
the police for random checks of drivers or of alcoholics 
on the streets (Table 1).
In the case of individualized actions, when the 
administrative action concerns a beneﬁt, the most 
common administrative abuse would be the withholding 
of the beneﬁt because of an inappropriate exercise of 
discretion. Galligan uses the granting of a license to a 
private school to illustrate.  But, there could be many 
examples: granting a construction permit, issuing a 
permit for a public assembly, providing a document 
pursuant to a newspaper’s freedom of information 
request, or a variety of decisions relating to beneﬁts for 
individuals—providing a maternity beneﬁt, a pension, 
or a license to drive a car. 
In all of these cases, the conferring of the beneﬁt 
depends upon the discretion of an oﬃcial. In some cases, 
the exercise of discretion is contemplated by the law. 
For example, legislation might require a local oﬃcial 
to take into account criteria such as traﬃc patterns, 
public safety and other factors in considering a request 
for a permit to use a public space for an assembly at a 
particular time and in a particular manner. Or, freedom 
of information legislation might require a local oﬃcial 
to determine whether a speciﬁc request for information 
must be rejected because it falls under an exception 
to the rule of automatic disclosure for reasons such as 
national security or privacy. 
Discretion
“Discretion means some degree of latitude regarding 
the decision to be taken within an area of power deﬁned 
by law. Discretion connotes an element of choice where 
one or more possible decisions or courses of action are 
open. Discretion does not mean unlawfulness; on the 
contrary, legal discretion is a legitimate exercise of 
authority within a given context. Discretion should not 
be seen as entirely subjective; there is inevitably an 
element of subjective judgment, but the exercise of 
discretion must also meet certain legal requirements. It 
must be reasonable, it must take into account relevant 
considerations and avoid irrelevant ones, it must be 
conducted for the purpose set out in the governing law, 
and it must be exercised in good faith following relevant 
procedural requirements.” 
 Galligan, Langan, and Nicandrou (eds.). 1998. Ad-
ministrative Justice in the New European Democracies: 
Case Studies of Administrative Law and Process in Bul-
garia, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine. Budapest: 
Centre for Socio–Legal Studies, University of Oxford 
and Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute. 
p.14.8
In addition to areas of discretion anticipated by 
legislation, local oﬃcials exercise discretion in informal 
and less overt ways in applying what might otherwise 
appear to be technical procedural requirements.
A hypothetical example might reveal how in-
appropriate considerations can operate in administrative 
decision-making, even when there appears to be no 
discretionary action contemplated by the law. Imagine, 
for instance, a Romani woman who has migrated 
without papers to a neighboring country and seeks 
childcare beneﬁts from the local government oﬃce in 
that country, where her baby was born. If the country’s 
law provides that any baby born on its territory is a 
citizen, and that childcare beneﬁts are available to any 
child who is a citizen regardless of the citizenship of 
his/her parents, then there should be no obstacle to 
the woman’s claim. 
A N  I N T R O D U C T O R Y  S U M M A R Y
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Yet, it is easy to also imagine a local oﬃcial who is 
prejudiced against Roma and especially unhappy about 
Romani migration refusing to grant the beneﬁt because 
of a technical reason, such as the absence of the mother’s 
identity card number or permanent address. It is even 
easier to imagine the oﬃcial discouraging the applicant 
in more subtle ways, through brusque or intimidating 
behavior, by providing false or incomplete information, 
or withholding advice on how to ﬁll out the paperwork 
appropriately.
The example above describes an abuse presumably 
based on discrimination against an ethnic minority. 
But the phenomenon of administrative abuse is by 
no means restricted to cases of discrimination against 
vulnerable groups. On the contrary, mistreatment by 
civil servants is commonplace and even expected by 
the general public.9 In part, this is a phenomenon 
related to corruption. As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 
writes: “Corruption is commonly deﬁned as the grease 
of commerce. The evidence . . . is that it is the grease, 
not of business, but of public service.”10 In this context, 
bribes become a “supplementary tax” to pay for “normal 
public service.”11
Arbitrariness
“Abusive treatment by the various state administrations 
is not universal. It is simply arbitrary and unpredictable 
. . .  One never knows what treatment to expect from an 
administration; usually it turns out badly if you do not 
have a personal connection, and a bribe will be required. 
But even a bribe does not ensure that the services sought 
will be made available. Then again, it may work even 
without bribing, if you are lucky. The state of aﬀairs is 
like the weather or God’s will: one never knows where 
one stands. And arbitrariness gives the civil servant 
power over the citizen, even more so than in communist 
times.” 
A. Mungiu-Pippidi. 2002/2003. “Culture of Cor-
ruption or Accountability Deﬁcit?” East European Cons-
titutional Review. Fall 2002/Winter 2003. p.83.
This phenomenon is perhaps even more pro-
nounced in the Russian context. According to Vladimir 
Pastukhov, Russian bureaucratic procedures are often 
so complex and lengthy that they require hiring an 
“internal ﬁxer” to move the process along: “[I]n an 
overwhelming majority of cases, it is necessary to pay 
not to obtain something contrary to the law, but in 
order to defend one’s lawful interests. It is not the 
violation of the law but its fulﬁllment that is paid for 
in Russia.”12
So ingrained is this practice of paying a “supp-
lementary tax” for public services, that it sometimes 
results, in Pastukhov’s words, in the desire to express 
“gratitude” in the form of small payments to civil 
servants even after a service has been rendered.13 The 
author of the present article witnessed one such example 
recently at the Serbian border checkpoint on the road 
from Hungary: a motorist who had a longer than 
average discussion with the border guard concerning 
his travel documents attempted to hand him a 10 Euro 
note upon getting his passport back. The border guard 
made a clear indication that no money was expected 
or desired, but, undeterred, the motorist thrust the 
bill through the guard’s window, saying something in 
Serb that translates roughly to “collegiality” before he 
drove oﬀ.
3. BEYOND BENEFITS
The foregoing analysis relates to just one particular 
kind of administrative abuse: a refusal to confer a 
beneﬁt according to proper practices. Going back to 
the conceptual framework for administrative actions, 
there is similar potential for abuse in the context of an 
individualized decision relating to a burden, as in the 
case of a company that must meet certain conditions 
regarding the discharge of eﬄuent into the waterways. 
Here, the most common form of abuse might be in-
appropriate leniency in setting the conditions, rather 
than withholding of a beneﬁt. 
There is similar potential for abuse in the context 
of an individualized action to conduct an investigation 
as well. One distinction, however, is that in addition 
to abuses prompted by inappropriately favorable or 
unfavorable treatment of the subject of investigation 
(including through the solicitation of bribes), there is 
potential for abuse at the behest of a third party. 
For example, a company owner could use inﬂu-
ence or bribery to induce civil servants to investigate a 
competing restaurant for a violation of health and safety 
standards, or in the context of tax administration, to 
audit the accounts of a competing company. Initiating 
an investigation can also be the product of partisan 
politics. Government agencies might investigate the 
18
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ﬁnancial dealings of particular companies because of 
their formal or informal aﬃliation with opposition 
political formations rather than for politically neutral 
reasons. In some countries, authorities might initiate 
investigations of NGOs motivated by a perception that 
they are working in opposition to the government.
When it comes to implementation of policies hav-
ing more general eﬀect, abuses are of a diﬀerent nature. 
In such cases, whether the abuse relates to a decision 
such as where to locate a waste disposal plant or to the 
development of formal or informal rules, the abuse will 
have an impact on a large number of persons. Like any 
policymaking process, these actions require a balancing 
of competing interests. 
The potential abuse lies more in the breach of an 
appropriate process for balancing legitimate interests 
than in the actual result. (In the case of police checks, 
some rules might conﬂict with human rights guaran-
tees, but this article will not address that situation, as 
developed human rights remedies would apply.) Poli-
cymaking processes which are closed and non-partici-
patory tend to exclude the consideration of legitimate 
interests which are not well understood or accepted by 
public oﬃcials, lead to gaps between state interests and 
the public interest, and are conducive to administrative 
actions motivated by partisan politics and cronyism. 
Policymaking under such circumstances could in itself 
be considered to be an abuse.
Standards of Abuse in Policymaking
“In a society that is based on democratic principles and 
that respects the rights and interests of individuals and 
groups within it, two . . . fundamental standards are 
readily identiﬁed. One is that policymaking is not just a 
matter of the administrative authority imposing its own 
preferences, but rather, while the authority must ﬁnally 
decide the best course of action, it should do so for good 
reasons and should take account of the interests and 
views of those aﬀected. Consideration of these interests 
and views becomes an essential element in determining 
the public interest. A second fundamental standard fol-
lows from the ﬁrst. If the views and interests of those 
aﬀected are essential elements of good policy, then the 
best way of ascertaining what those interests and views 
are is to allow the parties to participate in the process. 
These two standards are buttressed by a third. If the pol-
icy process is to be acceptable and legitimate, especially 
to those whose interests are not served by it, it ought to 
be open and transparent, based on evidence and reason, 
and generally accompanied by an adequate explanation 
as to why the particular decision has been reached.”
 
Galligan, Langan, and Nicandrou (eds.). 1998. Admin-
istrative Justice in the New European Democracies: Case 
Studies of  Administrative Law and Process in Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine. Budapest: Centre 
for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford and 
Constitutional and Legislative Policy Institute. p.349.
Taking into account the analysis above, a work-
ing deﬁnition of “administrative abuse” might be the 
following:
Administrative abuse is:
• an act of enforcement, 
• promulgation of a norm, 
• taking of a decision, or
• denial of a beneﬁt, 
by a state oﬃcial, which is:
• illegal, 
• a result of inappropriate exercise of discretion, or 
• procedurally improper, irregular, or erroneous.14
Within the context of formal and informal rule-
making (promulgation of normative acts and issuing 
of less formal guidance), an expansive deﬁnition of 
administrative abuse would further deﬁne “procedur-
ally proper” to always require a transparent and open 
process involving public participation.
4. REMEDIES TO ADMINISTRATIVE ABUSE
In order to rectify administrative abuses—wrongs 
committed by state oﬃcials—there need to be reme-
dies. In considering how to strengthen these remedies, 
it may be useful to think of them in several categories: 
internal remedies, external remedies, and preventive 
remedies.15 
In considering these types of remedies, it is im-
portant to note that there is a strong conceptual 
overlap with notions of accountability: the internal 
remedies discussed below overlap with accountability 
within government (horizontal accountability); the 
external remedies below overlap with accountability 
outside government (vertical accountability).16 The 
preventive remedies described below overlap with 
“transparency,” which is distinct from accountability, 
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but is one of the preconditions for it and, according to 
Derick Brinkerhoﬀ, combines with accountability and 
responsiveness to form the three core components of 
good governance.17 
A reason to reformulate notions relating to 
accountability in terms of remedies is that it shifts the 
focus to the individual and his or her legal rights. A 
focus on remedies answers the question: what are the 
mechanisms available to the individual in order to 
have some recourse after suﬀering an administrative 
abuse or which provide a means for avoiding abuses? 
Remedies do provide a means of holding state oﬃcials 
accountable for their actions, but there are many other 
important means of improving accountability, which 
do not necessarily provide individuals with remedies 
to speciﬁc wrongs committed against them. Examples 
of the latter might include elections, inter-agency 
oversight and auditing, internal performance reviews, 
user surveys, and so on.
4.1 Internal Remedies
There are usually a variety of internal remedies avail-
able to individuals who have suﬀered an administra-
tive abuse in the form of an individualized decision 
withholding a beneﬁt or imposing a burden. The 
individual’s ﬁrst recourse might be to complain to 
the supervisor of the civil servant who committed the 
abuse, often through a formal, written process. 
The primary diﬃculty with this remedy in practice 
is that it depends on: 1) the supervisor having a good 
understanding of his or her own responsibility to the 
general public; 2) a supervisor who is not complicit 
in the abusive practices of his or her subordinate; 3) a 
willingness to challenge the behavior of a subordinate 
based on a “customer” complaint; and 4) the absence 
of a culture of “collegiality” favoring the status quo.
Other internal remedies might include an appeal 
to an internal, quasi-judicial process or to a supervisory 
board, such as an ethics panel. Such mechanisms oﬀer 
the possibility of overcoming the diﬃculties outlined 
above because they are more removed from the day-
to-day collegial environment, but they are somewhat 
susceptible to the same drawbacks.
Since the key obstacles to the eﬀectiveness of in-
ternal remedies relate to the attitudes and behaviors of 
staﬀ, eﬀorts to strengthen internal remedies should rely 
primarily on reforming personnel policies. While there 
is no easy recipe for doing this, some of the elements 
might include: 1) transparency in the appointment 
process (advertising of openings, publishing lists of 
candidates, etc.); 2) training of new employees that 
includes practical exercises relating to public service, 
ethics, the duty to disclose information, privacy, con-
ﬂict of interest, conﬁdentiality, exercise of discretion, 
documentation of reasons, due process, etc.; and 3) 
performance evaluation based on clear job descriptions 
that includes criteria relating to respect for the general 
public, client satisfaction, etc.
4.2 External Remedies
In cases of administrative abuses in the conferring of 
beneﬁts and imposing of burdens through individual-
ized decisions, there are external remedies as well, the 
strongest of which is judicial review. Sometimes there 
is a formal requirement to seek an internal remedy 
before a court will hear a complaint about an ad-
ministrative abuse. Often, it is not within the court’s 
purview to examine the merits of the administrative 
decision, but only to determine its “legality”: whether 
the proper procedures were followed and whether the 
decision was consistent with the law.
Among the obstacles to the eﬀectiveness of judicial 
remedies are procedural barriers, such as high court 
fees, along with the complexity of the proceedings and 
relevant law, insuﬃcient public understanding of how 
to initiate legal proceedings, lack of legal assistance for 
persons who can’t aﬀord to hire a lawyer, and low public 
trust in the courts.
The establishment of ombudsman’s oﬃces as an 
alternative external remedy has helped to overcome 
some of the limitations of judicial remedies in many 
countries. The application procedures are generally in-
formal, usually requiring nothing more than a simple 
letter of complaint, but the remedy is a bit “softer,” since 
an ombudsman’s oﬃce usually does not have any power 
of enforcement, but rather uses its standing and inﬂu-
ence to negotiate solutions to administrative problems 
directly with the relevant agencies. 
The actual eﬀectiveness of ombudsman oﬃces de-
pends a great deal on the characteristics and reputation 
of the individual holding the oﬃce as well as the overall 
political culture. Unfortunately, this remedy tends to 
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function least eﬀectively in countries where govern-
ance problems are the most pronounced, and where 
administrative abuses are often at their worst. 
Eﬀorts to strengthen external remedies might 
include supporting the activities of NGOs that assist 
individuals in bringing legal complaints about admin-
istrative abuses. NGOs often have the necessary knowl-
edge, sophistication, and access to professional expertise 
to make eﬀective use of judicial remedies. Further, they 
usually have the resources to publicize their successes, 
promoting public trust in the remedy and enhancing 
understanding of how to make use of it. Similarly, legal 
aid programs, including state-funded ones, could target 
the provision of assistance on administrative matters. 
The organized bar has a role to play in providing such 
legal assistance and in advertising its availability. NGOs, 
courts, state agencies, and the organized bar could pro-
duce plain language explanations of the legal remedies 
available and the most common legal arguments that 
might be made.
4.3 Preventive Remedies
In abuses relating to administrative actions of more 
general eﬀect, the principal remedies are preventive 
ones:  transparency, freedom of information, and pub-
lic participation. In the environmental context—such 
as a decision on the location of a waste disposal plant 
(or even the imposition of conditions on a factory 
discharging eﬄuents into waterways)—a principal 
means of providing for public participation is to allow 
NGOs and individuals access to, and an opportunity 
to contribute to, environmental impact assessments. 
Holding a public hearing to allow all points of view 
to be expressed is another eﬀective means for allowing 
public participation.
In the case of formal rule-making, transparency 
and public participation might include publicizing 
draft rules, receiving written comments from interested 
members of the public, and holding public hearings. 
In the case of informal rule-making, less formal means 
of communicating with particular representatives of 
the public, such as NGOs and academic institutes, 
might be employed.18
One possibility for strengthening this kind of 
transparency and public participation is to use Internet 
technology to more widely disseminate draft normative 
acts and policies. Another means of promoting 
transparency is to promulgate and implement eﬀectively 
a comprehensive freedom of information law.19 
But securing eﬀective implementation of a freedom 
of information law most likely requires, in turn, the 
strengthening of both internal and external remedies. 
At the same time, transparency is also one of the 
means for strengthening other remedies: for example, 
making the hiring of civil servants more transparent, 
making complaint mechanisms more transparent, 
etc. In general, the various types of administrative 
remedies tend to have reciprocal relationships with 
each other, which if strengthened, have the potential 
to be positively reinforcing.
One ﬁnal note on remedies: abusive investigation 
by administrative authorities—one of the categories of 
abuse deﬁned earlier—exempliﬁes an abuse with few 
remedies. When it involves the solicitation of a bribe or 
other forms of extortion, some of the remedies relating 
to corruption (an ethics complaint, a police complaint) 
would at least theoretically pertain. However, one of 
the most common forms of abuse relating to this kind 
of administrative action, the abuse of discretion in the 
decision of whether to investigate, does not generally 
have adequate remedies at law. 
A key obstacle to ﬁnding an abuse of discretion in 
the decision to investigate would depend on proving an 
inappropriate motive on the part of the individual who 
ordered the investigation—for example, whether the 
motive was discriminatory, or based on partisan politics. 
There would probably be a legal remedy if such proof 
was available, but a motivation is a fact particularly 
diﬃcult to prove with legal certainty. The decision to 
launch an investigation is an area of discretion with 
few limitations. 
5. STUDY FINDINGS ON PUBLIC 
 PERCEPTIONS
In each of the four countries—but perhaps less so in 
Poland—citizens are generally dissatisﬁed with the 
quality of administrative services, distrust state agen-
cies, and have little conﬁdence in remedies for abuse.
According to an opinion poll concerning public 
perceptions of government accountability carried 
out by the Romanian Academic Society in Slovakia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, low public trust in the state 
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administration correlates with low “civic competence” 
and “insuﬃcient participation on the part of the 
governed.”20 
According to the survey, 16.5 percent of Romanian, 
15.1 percent of Bulgarian, and 25.9 percent of Slovak 
respondents believe that “civil servants and/or central 
government work in the public interest”; the numbers 
concerning local government are not very much 
higher, at 33.8 percent, 18.4 percent and 34.2 percent 
respectively.21 In the same poll, when asked their reaction 
to mistreatment by a civil servant, a signiﬁcant number 
of Romanians said they “oﬀer him/her something for 
fairer treatment” (23.0%) while signiﬁcant numbers 
of Bulgarians and Slovaks said they would “complain 
to the proper authorities” (25.4% and 35.2%). But 
the largest group in all three countries said they would 
“let it rest” (39.3%, 40.4% and 41.7%).22  In sum, the 
surveyors conclude, one of the key underlying problems 
in governance is the low “civic competence” among 
the governed.23
The ﬁndings of the studies included herein 
corroborate this analysis. According to the Bulgarian 
study, only 15.4 percent of survey respondents believed 
that administrative appeal procedures were eﬀective. 
Further, in Armenia, only 36 percent of respondents 
declared that they were “interested” in the activities 
of local government. The principal reason given by 
those who said they were not interested was “I don’t 
believe I can inﬂuence local government decisions” 
(57% in urban areas; 35% in rural areas). (Other 
common reasons were that local government is “weak 
and dependent on central government” and “I am not 
interested in politics at all.”) In responding to a question 
about the main means for inﬂuencing local government 
oﬃcials, the most common answer (38%) was through 
“meetings and demonstrations.” The second most 
popular answer was “there is no way” (35%). Twelve 
percent of respondents mentioned bribes, while only 
2 percent mentioned courts and other legal instances. 
In Georgia, despite high levels of dissatisfaction 
with local government services (92% to 100% of re-
spondents in the four cities studied), few individuals 
ﬁled administrative complaints (4% to 7%). The most 
prevalent reason given for not ﬁling a complaint was 
that “it does not make sense,” meaning that no out-
come was expected (42% to 100% of respondents). 
The second most common reason was the “diﬃcult and 
time-consuming process” (0% to 35% of respondents). 
Furthermore, Georgians seek court review of adminis-
trative matters even less frequently. Only two out of the 
386 respondents surveyed had appealed an administra-
tive decision to a court.
Public trust in local government is high in Poland, 
but perception surveys cited in the Bulgarian and Geor-
gian studies ranked trust for local government toward 
the middle of a range of public institutions. Although 
courts are in theory a principal provider of external 
remedies for administrative abuse, they are even less 
trusted in Bulgaria than local government, ranking 
third lowest in the survey. Similarly, in Armenia, per-
ception surveys rank the judiciary as the second most 
corrupt institution, and overwhelming majorities of 
survey respondents do not believe it is independent 
from the state (96%) and think it cannot be trusted 
(88%). 
The low levels of trust for courts appear consistent 
with the other results; indeed, they may oﬀer a partial 
explanation for the infrequency of court appeals of 
administrative decisions.  What may be surprising, 
however, is that Georgians exhibit a great deal of trust 
in the courts even though court actions are similarly 
rare. Following extensive reforms begun in the mid-
1990s, the Georgian judiciary ranks as third most 
trusted institution out of 10 institutions. Moreover, 
survey results show only community initiative groups 
and NGOs receiving higher levels of public trust than 
the courts. Taken together, these facts suggest that 
supporting a greater role for NGOs and the courts in 
remedying administrative abuse may prove particularly 
eﬀective in Georgia.
6. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
 IMPROVING REMEDIES
The studies provide a wide range of recommenda-
tions on how to improve remedies to administrative 
abuse, each one emphasizing a diﬀerent aspect of the 
problem.
In a country like Armenia, where trust in the judici-
ary—the principal mechanism for providing external 
remedies—is extremely low, the study’s recommenda-
tions focus especially on preventive remedies. In par-
ticular, the study recommends improving decentraliza-
tion and establishing greater transparency: publicizing 
policy targets, using focus groups to help set policy, 
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and engaging the media. The Armenian study also em-
phasizes the potential role of NGOs through projects 
designed to improve both administrative practices and 
civic competence. 
One innovative approach, which has been partially 
implemented in Georgia, is to establish Legal Infor-
mation Centers that: 1) serve as resources (as walk-in 
centers and through websites) for individuals to obtain 
information about available services, eligibility criteria, 
procedures, and standards; 2) support participatory 
procedures by disseminating information about public 
hearings, council meetings, and budgetary procedures 
to the media and the general public; 3) collect citizen 
feedback and provide it to local government; and 
4) promote partnerships among local government, civil 
society organizations, and the private sector. The Cent-
ers’ functions combine facilitation of more eﬀective 
internal remedies with strengthening of preventive rem-
edies such as transparency and public participation.
The Georgian study also recommends the de-
velopment of Central Referral Bureaus, as either an 
alternative or supplement to the Legal Information 
Centers. Central Referral Bureaus provide a single local 
government oﬃce for receiving individual requests for 
services and information as well as for receiving com-
plaints and other feedback, performing a coordinating 
role for the various state agencies that are involved. A 
similar system has been initiated in Bulgaria, under the 
name of “one-stop-shops,” in order to streamline the 
provision of services by the state administration. One-
stop-shops have to date focused primarily on providing 
information about administrative services, rather than 
facilitating the services themselves. In order to realize 
fully the beneﬁts of an integrated approach to provid-
ing services, the author of the Bulgarian study suggests 
that such a system would require a re-organization of 
administrative competencies and procedures. 
As the Georgian study suggests, Central Referral 
Bureaus or one-stop-shops also oﬀer the promise of 
creating a capacity to collect data systematically about 
the administrative needs of the population. Such data 
can assist in troubleshooting problems of administra-
tive eﬃciency and can provide an evidentiary basis for 
policymaking. This is especially helpful in a country 
such as Georgia, which does not otherwise have a 
centralized computer system at the disposal of local 
administration. 
 Legal Information Centers function most eﬀec-
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tively as NGOs—according to the Georgian study
—because they are less subject to political pressure, 
enjoy a high level of public trust, and can beneﬁt from a 
diversity of funding sources. Non-governmental Citi-
zens Advice Bureaus in Poland perform a similar role. 
In Bulgaria, however, NGOs are ranked last among 
institutions trusted by the public, an attitude stem-
ming from the beginning of the transition to the mar-
ket economy when high levels of fraud and abuse were 
associated with NGOs. As a result, the Bulgarian study’s 
recommendations focus more on improving the legal 
framework for administrative appeals and increasing 
communication between government and citizens.
In Poland, where public conﬁdence in local govern-
ment is high, the study’s recommendations emphasize 
internal remedies, including: developing more detailed 
performance standards; providing greater transparency 
and objectivity in hiring and procurement decisions; 
and separating executive functions from decision-mak-
ing procedures. The study also emphasizes the need to 
improve the elaboration and enforcement of ethical 
standards for ﬁghting corruption, principally through 
establishing mechanisms to better enforce require-
ments for public oﬃcials to make asset declarations, 
and developing regulations more clearly limiting the 
acceptance of gifts.
7. CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the outset, an essential problem in 
improving good governance and reducing corruption 
in Eastern Europe is the diﬃculty in overcoming the 
inertia of a deeply ingrained, inward looking, and po-
liticized sense of responsibility among civil servants. 
Another essential obstacle, which is both a product of 
and contributor to the ﬁrst problem, is the low “civic 
competence” of the general public, generated in large 
part by low expectations. 
One way out of this vicious circle would be to 
strengthen the remedies available to the governed and to 
encourage their use, through measures recommended in 
the studies contained herein and through other means. 
If successful, such eﬀorts will gradually build up the 
public trust essential to a well functioning system of 
governance.
NOTES
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1 The author is the Executive Director of Columbia University’s Public Interest Law Initiative (PILI).
2 The European Court of Human Rights, for example, provides remedies for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. But these rem-
edies, like most international remedies, are available only after domestic remedies have been exhausted.
3 See, for example, Denis J. Galligan, Richard H. Langan and Constance S. Nicandrou (eds.). 1998. Administrative Justice in the New European Democra-
cies: Case Studies of Administrative Law and Process in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine. Budapest: Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Uni-
versity of Oxford and Constitutional  and Legislative Policy Institute. pp.17–19. Galligan uses the term “administrative justice” to capture a concept 
similar to what the author is referring to as “administrative remedies.”
4 See, for example, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. 2002/2003. “Culture of Corruption or Accountability Deﬁcit?” East European Constitutional Review. Vol. 11/
12, No. 4/1. Winter 2002/Spring 2003. p.80 (referring to “failure of politicians in these societies [Romania and Bulgaria] to construct a public-interest 
space, a failure that leaves blatant partisan interests to reign over every aspect of life, from privatization to the regulation of public broadcasting.”)
5 This article will address those abuses that may occur at the local level, either by local governmental authorities or by local representatives of central 
authorities. Abuses can and do occur at the central level as well, but they are generally of a diﬀerent nature, as the interaction of the citizen and the 
state—a primary theme of this article—most often occurs at the local level.
6  General standards for determining the permissible boundaries of discretion have been formulated by the Council of Europe in Recommendation No. 
R (80) 2 Concerning the Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities (1980).
7 Galligan, et al., op. cit. 31–32.
8 The Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (80) 2 Concerning the Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities deﬁnes “dis-
cretionary power” as “power which leaves an administrative authority some degree of latitude as regards the decision to be taken, enabling it to choose 
from among several legally admissible decisions the one which it ﬁnds to be the most appropriate.”
9 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit. p.83. 
10 Ibid. p.80.
11 Ibid. p.81.
12 Vladimir Pastukhov. 2002. “Law under Administrative Pressure in Post-Soviet Russia.” East European Constitutional Review. Summer 2002. p.68 (in-
cluding many rich examples of how the complex Russian bureaucracy invites abuse).
13 Ibid.
14 This deﬁnition was developed collaboratively by the author and the project team that produced the studies contained herein.
15 The framework was developed by the author for the PILI/LGI project on Administrative Remedies and revised based on discussions with the project 
team.
16 See Derick W. Brinkerhoﬀ. 2003. “Accountability and Administrative Abuse: Deﬁnitions, Options and Dilemmas.” Local Governance Brief.  Summer 
2003.
17 Ibid.
18 The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (1998), 
which entered into force in 2001, guarantees through treaty obligation many of these practices in the environmental ﬁeld.
19 See Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (2002) 2 on Access to Oﬃcial Documents, for some of the important features 
of a freedom of information law.
20 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, op. cit. p.83.
21 Ibid. p.81.
22 Ibid. p.83.
23 The author of the study deﬁnes “civic competence” as “a citizen’s awareness of his or her rights and a correspondingly active attitude in ensuring those 
rights are respected.” Ibid.
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Administrative Remedies for Abuses 
in Local Government: Armenia
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralization and the formulation of a local gov-
ernment system are both parts of the broader reform 
process in the Republic of Armenia. The current 
status of the decentralization of power and, more 
speciﬁcally, of local governance in Armenia is a result 
of the political, economic, and social factors of transi-
tion. For the purposes of this study, decentralization 
is broadly conceived of as a comprehensive, radical 
process related simultaneously to structural economic 
and administrative reforms, and to changes in society 
and the state. Local self-government is understood as a 
form of governance by interested citizens, rather than 
by state or centralized powers. 
The previous (pre-transition) system was hierar-
chical, with local councils functioning as units of the 
central administration. Local activities were vertically 
connected to centralized ministries, and local planning 
functioned more as a lobbying tool for central subsidies 
than as a governance activity. Recent reforms have made 
management at the local level possible, while endow-
ing local governments with the capacity to design and 
implement strategies independently. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia has 
established the principle of direct democracy at the 
local level. As a result of accession to the Council of 
Europe, the government of Armenia is now undertak-
ing a complete restructuring—including the eﬀective 
distribution of powers to the local level. In this con-
text, the government has made a public commitment 
to initiate purposeful and complex reforms for the 
purpose of creating a new administrative system—
by outlining a modern vision of the distribution of 
government powers and the role of public participation, 
trust in local governmental bodies, transparency, access 
to information technologies, client satisfaction, and so 
on. A problem that will require particular attention in 
coming years is the promotion of “good governance,” 
which might be achieved by administrative remedies 
against existing administrative abuses.
This chapter is based on a project conducted in 
Armenia. Based on this project, the following sections 
explore existing administrative abuses at the local go-
vernment level, and possible remedies for eﬀective 
local governance—by building a legal framework for 
participation, increasing local government capacity, 
and stimulating grassroots mobilization in Armenia. 
1.1  General Objectives
This study presents a framework for examining the 
consistent involvement of the public sector in the 
process of decision- and rule-making in local govern-
ment, based on analysis of factors inﬂuencing public 
trust and client satisfaction. It identiﬁes existing inef-
ﬁciencies of practices, such as how to bring the public 
closer to the “core” of decision-making, and how to 
make greater use of controlling and redressing mecha-
nisms.
For the purpose of analysis, a set of indicators is 
used. This set concentrates on the political perform-
ance of local governments, their relationship with the 
environment, and the state of local civil society (media 
and NGOs).
Other than traditionally examined legal, institu-
tional, and election characteristics, the research project 
discussed here aimed at developing a framework for 
evaluation, gathering data, and drawing a picture of 
the quality of Armenian local governance and public 
administration.  As such, it uncovered existing prob-
lems and obstacles in restructuring the relationship 
between local government and citizens, and promotes 
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the development of administrative remedies and 
methods to overcome these shortcomings.
1.2  Methodology
The focus of the research project was the study and 
analysis of standards for delivering administrative 
services by local authorities—the performance of 
internal and external control—through the juridical 
system and the public. Since administrative serv-
ices delivered by local authorities vary and aﬀect both 
personal and business interests, it was necessary that 
the focus of the research was detailed and the study 
centered on a particular type of administrative service. 
This ensured project feasibility, as well as the possibil-
ity to summarize the results.
Each of the main administrative services, deliv-
ered by the local authorities, was studied—namely, 
services for economic agents or social services pro-
vided to individual citizens. Research covered the 
working cycles, ﬂows, and mechanisms (including the 
administrative and operative functional structure) of 
local administrations, especially legal and normative 
regulations; internal and external systems of control, 
information and communication; and the availability 
and accessibility for the monitoring and assessment of 
organizational, technical, and other resources.  
Consultations and discussions on organizational 
and legislative policies were held with managers and 
representatives of local institutions and with NGOs—
particularly those that have expressed interest in the 
improvement of the service delivery system.
The analysis of laws pertaining to the ﬁeld of local 
self-government administrative policy comprised the 
most important aspect of this project. This research 
covered not only the legal sphere (regulating mutual 
rights and obligations of local authorities and public 
representatives), but also included ratiﬁed treaties, 
intended to promote more eﬀective governance.
 Analytical, informational, and statistical materials 
were collected that pertain to local administrative 
service delivery and client satisfaction. Publications 
on local government and theoretical literature were
also used, few of which dealt speciﬁcally with 
Armenia. Comparison and cross-analysis helped to 
design objective conclusions, policy options, and 
recommendations.
In order to conduct a more objective, practically 
oriented project, a survey in select urban and rural 
areas was conducted: Yerevan (the capital of Armenia, 
population 1.2 million), Artashat (35,000) and Vedi 
(14,000), Abovyan (61,000), and the villages of 
Agav-nacor (1,000) and Areni (1,500). This survey 
involved 285 respondents and focused on perceptions 
and knowledge of current administrative procedures 
at the local government level. Respondents included: 
community activists, representatives of local and volun-
tary sector organizations and NGOs, businessmen, 
local government oﬃcials, politicians, senior public 
service managers and practitioners, policy-makers, 
and academics. Questionnaires were designed within 
the framework of the project with the aim to generate 
an “objective” view “on the ground” of the main aspects 
of local government development. Results of previous 
surveys and information from various sources also 
contributed to this analysis. 
Indicator data are based on following variables:
• size of the municipality (number of inhabit-
ants);
• geographical position (region, distance from the 
capital);
• legal status of the local government (village, town, 
city with county rights, capital district);
• heterogeneity of local society (social, ethnic, and 
religious divisions); and
• level of socioeconomic development (composed 
of statistical data).
1.3 Administrative–Territorial 
  Background of Armenia 
According to the Constitution and the Law on the 
Administrative-territorial Division of the Republic of 
Armenia, Armenia is divided into ten regions and the 
capital city of Yerevan, which is accorded regional sta-
tus. Regions are further divided into rural and urban 
communities.
A marz is an administrative subdivision that has 
some characteristics of a Local Governmental Unit 
(LGU), but is not classiﬁed as such because there is no 
provision for marz oﬃcials to be elected by local con-
stituents. The executive head of a marz is the regional 
governor, or marzpet. The Government of Armenia 
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appoints marzpets to carry out diﬀerent duties with 
the assistance of regional administrations. Regional 
administrations, or councils, are advisory bodies, 
composed of a governor and all community heads 
from the region. The functional responsibilities of the 
marzpet are limited to the coordination of activities 
of government ministries conducted within the marz. 
However, technical knowledge, combined with the 
informal political power of an individual marzpet, 
may increase his or her eﬀective authority far beyond 
its purely legal basis.
According to the Constitution and legislation of 
Armenia, regional governors (marzpets):
• coordinate activities of territorial representation 
of the central government;
• implement territorial policies of the government; 
and
• supervise of the activities of local self-govern-
ments.
Yerevan has regional status, and the local self-
government and state administration possess special fea-
tures. The twelve city districts function as units of local 
government. The districts themselves vary greatly with 
respect to territory, population, infrastructure, public 
parks, and other characteristics.  
In Armenia, local self-government is exercised 
only within the  community unit. Each urban or rural 
community may consist of one or more settlements; 
there are 1,000 settlements in Armenia, but only 930 
communities. Of these communities, 47 are urban, 871 
are rural, and 12 are Yerevan districts.  
Within a community, a council of elders and a com-
munity head comprise the local decision-making body. 
Community elders act collectively as a representative 
body, providing guidance on community development, 
improvement of community life, public service delivery, 
and other issues. Communities vary widely in regard 
to population, territorial size, property, and social and 
economic structure. 
A city or village is a corporate and political body 
(legal entity) with jurisdiction over a deﬁnitive geo-
graphical territory. It is an LGU under Armenian law, 
and has speciﬁed powers and responsibilities. Executive 
authority in Armenian LGUs is vested in the mayor and 
his or her appointees. Legislative authority is vested in 
the Council, which may range in size from ﬁve to ﬁfteen 
members, based upon the population of the respective 
community (Figure 1).
Figure 1.
Public Administration Structure in Armenia 
President Parliament
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Governmental 
Agencies
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Governments
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Source: South Caucasus Regional Program 2003.
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 Current administrative and territorial divisions 
have both negative and positive aspects. New divi-
sions have increased the role and importance of local 
self-government as the basis for the development of 
democratic institutions. They also have provided rele-
vant redundancy measures in public administration. 
Negative aspects have become apparent over the last 
decade, for example:1 
• The enlargement of administrative units (creation 
of marzes) was not supported by the allocation of 
a larger scope of authorities to local self-govern-
ments;
• Numerous communities were created, which are 
small, weak, and incapable of rendering services 
to their population; and
• The declarative nature of the powers attributed to 
marz administrations accompanied an absence of 
implementation mechanisms and legislation on 
territorial administration. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Armenia 
(1995) initiated the formation of a local government 
administration system. Further development of the 
decentralization process was grounded in a number of 
important documents:
• The Treasury Law contains elements of devolved 
power consistent with the Law on Local Self-
government. It refers to the powers of the local 
governments to allocate their own resources. 
• The Law on Local Self-government (July 22, 
1996) delegates certain powers of the state to 
local self-government bodies, with the right to 
carry on activities related to the interests of the 
community. The list of property transferred to 
local governments was published in Government 
Decree 51, March 1997.
• The Budget Law (July 21, 1997) deﬁnes the pro-
cedures of the budgetary system. The Law con-
ﬁrms the State Budget and the process of imple-
mentation of the Budget for speciﬁc ﬁscal periods. 
Community budgets are deﬁned as those admin-
istered by the self-government bodies of urban or 
rural communities.
• The Financial Equalization Law (November 24, 
1998) promotes harmonious development by re-
ducing ﬁnancial disparities between communi-
ties and enabling the implementation of their 
mandates. However, the Law does not encourage 
local governments to maximize revenue collec-
tion. Subsidies and subventions are allocated to 
local governments that are least well-oﬀ and tar-
gets for revenue collection are not set.
• The Law on Territorial Administration (Decem-
ber 1995) describes the regional marz system and 
the appointment of marzpets.
The principles in the Law on Self-government fulﬁll 
the commonly recognized requirements of a modern 
(Western) system of territorial administration. In ad-
dition to mandating transparency, the Law upholds 
the notions of autonomy from the central government 
and accountability and democracy through the election 
process. However, there are some practical deﬁciencies 
that adversely aﬀect an LGU’s ability to perform as a 
signiﬁcant provider of public services.
Armenian legislation on local self-government 
is largely based on the European Charter of Local 
Self-government. In its Report on Local Governance 
in Armenia, the Bureau of the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of Europe (CLRAE) noted that 
“the chief requirements of the Charter are thus fulﬁlled 
by Armenian law, which does not contain any provision 
conﬂicting outright with a principle of the Charter.” 
However, the report goes on to mention that “the fact 
remains, as the Armenian authorities are themselves 
convinced, that the functioning of local government 
at present is not without defects and shortcomings that 
will have to be rectiﬁed” (2002).
2. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND 
 PARTICIPATION
2.1 Public Perception of Local 
  Governance 
There is no single, widely accepted deﬁnition of “gov-
ernment performance” in the social sciences. Con-
sensus on the measurement of local government per-
formance, in particular, is conspicuously absent in the 
relevant literature. Performance has been identiﬁed 
with several concepts and conﬁgurations, for instance: 
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eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, productivity, economy, appro-
priateness and accessibility of services, smoothness of 
decision-making processes, service quality, client sat-
isfaction or satisfaction of the strategic constituency, 
responsiveness, and respect for political freedoms.
Agreement on three core principles of local govern-
ance and administration can be deduced:
• “liberty” (autonomy), referring to the existence of 
local government to prevent the concentration 
of political power in one center, and to allow for 
making political choices in diﬀerent locations;
• “eﬀectiveness,” regarding the ability of local go-
vernments to deliver various services more eﬀec-
tively; and
• “participation,” meaning that the existence of local 
government allows for wider inclusion of citizens 
in self-governance.
As Swianewicz writes, “One may expect that in 
countries in which more attention is paid to both 
territorial representation and the democratic values 
of local government, the type of relationship between 
municipal authorities and local citizens will be diﬀerent 
than in countries that concentrate on eﬀectiveness and 
eﬃciency values” (2001) (Figure 2).
In light of decentralization and development, the 
current social, economic, political, civil, and cultural 
situation of Armenia cannot be seen as separate from 
active public participation in the public administration 
system.
2.1.1 Public Participation in Decision-Making 
Important factors for evaluating “good governance 
at the local level” are public participation in deci-
sion-making and rule-making, and representation of 
all population groups at the local government level. 
Citizen participation in governance is a fundamental 
right that enables individuals to contribute to the de-
velopment of their society. At the same time, citizen 
participation guarantees that governance objectives 
are indeed the objectives of a society or community. 
It is an essential factor of successful governance, as it 
makes governance more legal, transparent, eﬃcient, 
and democratic.  
Figure 2.
Interactions among Local Authorities and Citizens
Source: Swianewicz 2001.
Main Values of Local Government 
(eﬀectiveness versus 
territorial representation)
 Mode of Citizen Interaction and Participation:
 • Interaction with local authorities
 • Turn-out in local elections
 • Level of trust in local government
 • Interest in local public aﬀairs 
 • Turn-over among local politicians
 • Willingness and ability of local governments to
establish direct contacts with citizens
Territorial Organization
(defending consolidation versus allowing the territorial fragmentation of local governments)
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Democratic performance is understood here as 
the capability of a local government to be open and to 
include citizens in the decision-making process. It is 
measured by several indicators:
• Citizens: number of forums and public hearings 
(2002–2003). The number of such meetings with 
local citizens indicates the openness of local gov-
ernment and the willingness of local leaders to 
involve citizens in the decision-making process;
• Civil organizations: number of civic organizations 
involved in local government decision-making; and
• Media: frequency of initiation of contacts with 
journalists and media representatives.
Apart from electing local government representations 
and the mayor, the Law on Local Government deﬁnes 
three ways to foster the expressing of the interests of local 
government constituencies: local referenda; public hear-
ings and discussion forums; and popular initiatives.
Table 1.
Citizens’ Participation in Local Government 
Guarantees for 
Participation
Types of Participation
Based on the 
Constitution of 
Armenia
• Local elections
• Right to organize meetings
• Participation in parties’ activities 
• Legal defense
Opportunities 
provided by law
• Meetings 
• Discussion hours
• Right to complain
Oﬀered by local 
governmental 
bodies
• Informative work of local bodies
• Questions and answers, advises
• Civil experts, public functions
Source: Gevorgyan 2000.
The most fundamental legal principles for govern-
ment/citizen relations are provided by the Constitu-
tion of Armenia. On this basis, a new quality of legal 
regulations should be achieved to ﬁx a precise and clear 
understanding of the function(s) of local governmental 
organizations, as well as to elaborate on their relation 
with citizens. This is a very complicated task in Ar-
menia; thus far, it has proven to be less democratic 
than bureaucratic. Under an extremely centralized 
system of governance, the main indicator of success 
is understood often as authoritativeness. Oﬃcials’ 
responsibilities are very often described in a rather vague 
and unclear way. 
However, in terms of legal regulation of govern-
ment/citizens relations, one should not underestimate 
the weight of laws. Any oﬃcial act of a local govern-
mental unit is accepted as a “legal” act. This means that 
any governmental organization is “above the law” in its 
relations with citizens. Amending this requires depriv-
ing most local governmental units of their power to 
issue regulations governing government/citizen relations 
and/or concerning citizens’ rights and freedoms. 
Citizen willingness to participate in public activities 
is an important factor in the public’s ability to inﬂuence 
local government. It can also serve as a measurement 
of the eﬀectiveness of citizens’ inﬂuence, and of the 
multiplicity of opportunities to exert such inﬂuence. 
Attendance at local council meetings by the public and 
involvement in decision-making processes are essential 
when citizens’ interests are to be protected.
Our recent research focused on the level of inter-
est of community members toward local governmental 
units. This survey indicates that during the last year, 
interest in local governmental bodies has increased. 
Generally, evidence suggests that during election years, 
interest in politics and governmental activities grows 
(IFES). Interest in local governmental bodies is lower 
than interest in politics and governmental activities. 
Place of residence (rural/urban) appears to aﬀect inter-
est in, or intention to learn more about, politics and 
governmental activities (Figure 3).
Of note, interest in central governmental activities 
was high in 2002, when the President of Armenia and 
members (deputies) of Parliament were elected.
A main reason for disinterest in the activities of 
local governmental bodes is the lack of trust in oﬃcials. 
Among the 64 percent of respondents not interested in 
local governmental issues the following reasons were 
given:
• I don’t believe that I can inﬂuence LGU decisions 
(57% urban, 35% rural);
• LGUs are weak and depend on the central govern-
ment (24% urban, 2% rural); and
• I am not interested in politics at all (19% urban, 
26% rural).
The general assessment of local governments is 
much better in smaller communities. The level of 
trust varies from 38 percent in cities to 62 percent 
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Figure 3.
Questionnaire: Are You Interested in Local Government Activities? (Answer “Yes”)
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Figure 4.
Questionnaire: Reasons for Disinterest in Local Aﬀairs (January–July 2003)
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Figure 5.
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in rural localities. When asked to consider the main 
means to inﬂuence local political oﬃcials, 35 percent 
of respondents believed that “there is no means.” Just 
over 40 percent thought meetings and demonstrations 
were eﬀective means of inﬂuence, while 8 percent 
mentioned the media and other means of distribut-
ing information. Interestingly, 12 percent pointed to 
bribery as a way to inﬂuence on local oﬃcials.  Only 
2 percent mentioned the court and other legal measures. 
Finally, only 4 percent suggested letters to oﬃcials and 
oﬃcials meetings (Figure 5).
This research found that current developments 
in internal politics create a less favorable situation 
for citizen participation in local governmental bodies’ 
decision-making. Citizens do not believe that their 
opinions are taken into consideration. 
According to the survey, for almost 75 percent of re-
spondents, community heads do not organize meetings, 
hearings, and surveys. Only 3 percent of respondents 
participated at least once in council meetings, and 14 
percent mentioned that they voluntarily participate in 
activities  (benevolent, social, political) aiming to sup-
port community aﬀairs. Among respondents, men tend 
to be more active then women, and the inhabitants 
of Yerevan more frequently participate in such civic 
activities than those in rural areas. Respondents also 
complained that governmental oﬃcials rarely commu-
nicate with their constituents: 92 percent could not re-
member a single case when their local self-governmental 
body attempted to gauge community opinion about 
their work. Only 2 percent answered that they had, at 
some point, been asked to complete a questionnaire 
on these matters; 4 percent had participated in public 
hearings; and 1 percent had participated in meetings 
with experts for advice about particular problems in 
their community (Figure 6).
Another survey of 18 oﬃcials of local self-govern-
mental bodies in Kanaker-Zeytun, Malatia-Sebastia, 
and Shengavit districts and in the towns of Vedi and 
Artashat indicates that community members do partici-
pate (and willingly) if a problem concerns communal 
services (water distribution, electricity)  or the local tax 
rate and methods of collection. According to this survey, 
public administrators are convinced that citizens are 
either not interested in community aﬀairs at all, or only 
engage in contact with authorities to oﬀer criticism. 
According to oﬃcials, most citizens are interested 
in the following activities: voluntary organizations 
Figure 6.
Questionnaire: Participation in Select Activities (%)
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providing public services, voluntary free-time activi-
ties (sport, culture, exchange of cultural groups among 
communities), and religious activities.
Finally, in regard to citizens’ participation in local 
budgeting processes, one-third found the topic unin-
teresting.  A respondent’s willingness to be informed 
about municipal ﬁnancial activities aﬀects participation 
levels. The level of involvement of citizens in the local 
budgeting process is high among community members 
with a high educational background.
2.1.2 Voter Turnout 
In 1996, the National Assembly of Armenia adopted 
the Law on Elections to Local Governments and the 
Law on Local Self-government. The ﬁrst local elec-
tions were held in November of that year. Based on 
the European Charter of Local Self-government, the 
Law on Local Self-government established general 
principles of local self-government as well as the spe-
ciﬁc division of powers within local governments. Lo-
cal government powers refer to responsibilities funded 
by the local budget, and responsibilities delegated and 
funded by the state. Local governments have some 
ﬂexibility in implementing voluntary community-
related activities within the framework of the law.
Heads of communities and councils are elected 
through direct, general, equal, and conﬁdential elec-
tions for three-year terms. The number of members 
in a council depends on the size of the electorate. 
A community council is a representative authority, 
while the executive body of the local self-government 
serves as the community head.
Participation in elections is correlated with the 
size of the community and level of government; this 
has been true for local as well as presidential elections 
(recently held in February and March of 2003).  Analy-
sis of  turnout in local elections suggests a gradual rise 
in electoral participation. Turnout in local elections 
in 2002 reached 53 percent of the electorate, up 
from 31 percent in previous elections. Interestingly, 
although citizens usually trust their local governments 
more than the central government, they do not see 
local politics as being as important as national politics. 
During both the ﬁrst and second rounds of the presi-
dential elections, nearly 60 percent of the electorate 
participated. 
2.2 Client Satisfaction with 
  Public Services 
2.2.1 Service Delivery and Level of Satisfaction 
Under the Law on Local Self-government, services are 
divided into three categories: mandatory, delegated, 
and voluntary (Appendix 2). One area in which the 
allocation of functions between central and local 
government remains particularly vague is social pro-
tection. Responsibility for this function is not usually 
assigned to local governments. However, as principal 
providers of certain services, local governments may 
become responsible for the payment of need-based 
allowances, such as housing, which are rational conse-
quences of policies aimed at cost recovery. The intro-
duction of such allowances is not discussed in the Law 
on Local Self-government.
More local services in Armenia are now delivered 
by organizations with largely or entirely non-elected 
boards: private educational facilities, colleges and 
universities, voluntary organizations, and primary 
care groups. An issue of growing importance is the 
need to develop a more responsive and better quality 
public administration for citizens. The overall goal 
is therefore to set out clear deﬁnitions of the roles, 
responsibilities, and accountability of local govern-
ment in providing services.
In many communities, a large number of respond-
ents were simply interested in better quality services, 
and not in answering surveys or expressing their own 
opinions on policy issues.  This was more the case for 
larger urban centers (24%) than for smaller com-
munities (15%). Although public opinion regarding 
local government is usually better than public opinion 
regarding central government institutions, there is, 
generally, a modest level of satisfaction among citizens 
regarding local government activity.
Empirical investigation has been conducted in 
several main ﬁelds of inquiry, namely: 
1. the provision of services to citizens; and
2. the development of a supportive administrative 
framework for citizens.
In general, respondents were not completely aware 
of whom to approach in case of need for services—water 
supply, waste disposal, electricity, telecommunication, 
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reconstruction of roads, and so on. Most  (68%) would 
apply directly to a water supply organization, and only 
24 percent to public body—such as a mayor, head of a 
rural community or council. This indicates confusion, 
as the water supply previously was the responsibility 
of the municipality, while now, in many communi-
ties, it is provided by private entities. Similarly there 
is confusion over the level or institution that a citizen 
or organization should confront: to ask for assistance 
reconstructing a road, 50 percent address the mayor, 
council or community head. Only 10 percent suggested 
they should apply to the governor. 
Applications to oﬃcials vary according to locality. 
Results from this survey were compared with an IFES 
survey (2001).  In the latter, 17 percent of inhabitants 
of rural areas and 6 percent in urban areas had applied 
to one of their elected bodies (the mayor, community 
council or head). Current research reveals that this 
number has grown, as a result of more information 
about citizens’ rights and responsibilities.  Also, during 
election years, politicians and oﬃcials tend to be more 
responsive to the needs of community members. As 
a result, people often use this opportunity to solve a 
number of problems they previously could not. When 
asked if they had applied to an elected oﬃcial during 
the election year (2002), 58 percent gave an aﬃrmative 
answer; 36 percent of these were rural inhabitants, and 
22 percent were urban (Figure 7).
A number of indicators were used for this study to 
determine overall levels of satisfaction with local self-
government. These dealt with: general satisfaction and 
contentment; the performance of councilors and oﬃ-
cials; and the level of satisfaction with local services.
In general, respondents voiced their dissatisfaction 
with local self-governmental bodies’ activities. Dis-
satisfaction increased compared with previous years 
(2000, 2001, and 2002): 73 percent of respondents 
answered that they were very dissatisﬁed with their 
local council or mayor, compared to 48 percent in 
2000, 54 percent in 2001, and 64 percent in 2002. 
The level of citizen satisfaction with local police 
performance is indicative of this distinctly negative 
trend.  According to an IFES questionnaire, only 18 
percent expressed satisfaction with their administra-
tion, compared to 38 percent the year before. The 
number of satisﬁed respondents was much higher in 
rural areas (38 percent) than in urban centers (23%) 
(Figure 8).
For this study, it was of particular interest to in-
vestigate especially problematic areas, issues, positions 
or individuals, and levels of administration and service 
provision. Questionnaires included diﬀerent types of 
services in both rural settlements and cities. Respond-
ents were mainly interested in services that are the 
responsibility of local governmental bodies.
Local government proﬁles and types, isolated 
through proﬁling, can be dependent variables even in 
quantitative studies. The components of local govern-
ment performance proﬁles can also serve as dependent 
or independent variables in research designs. For ex-
ample, the satisfaction rate of local citizens can be the 
dependent variable, explained by several independent 
variables (such municipality size or wealth) or other 
types of performance (the eﬀectiveness or transparency 
of local governments). These research questions address 
both the proﬁle and its components as dependent vari-
ables.
In general, the level of satisfaction with local coun-
cils is closely related to community size. A questionnaire 
was distributed in ﬁve localities (Yerevan, Artashat, 
Figure 7.
Questionnaire: In 2002, Did You Apply to Your Local Elected Oﬃcial? (Answer “Yes”)
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Figure 8.
Questionnaire: Satisfaction with the Performance of Local Council or Community Heads
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Figure 9.
Questionnaire: Percent Satisﬁed with the 
Performances of Councilors and Oﬃcials
 Figure 10.
Questionnaire: Percent Satisﬁed 
with Local Services
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Vedi, Noraduz, and Areni) of diﬀerent sizes. In each, 
20–26 citizens were asked about their satisfaction with 
their local government (Figures 9, 10).
Respondents were particularly dissatisﬁed with 
issues connected with community infrastructure; social, 
economic, and educational spheres; and health pro-
tection.  Mostly, respondents stressed unemployment 
(25%), and waiting for new administrative methods 
from the local bodies regarding direct investments. As 
well, there was signiﬁcant mention of the need to en-
able local self-government with the powers to improve 
the social situation of pensioners, large families, and 
disabled people (16%).  The lack of water supply and 
irrigation systems were of considerable concern for 
rural settlements, particularly in villages dependant 
on agriculture (13%). The respondents living in sub-
urbs of Yerevan mentioned water  supply  as the most 
prominent “unsolved” problem, about which they often 
apply to local oﬃcials. Energy is of particular concern 
in several areas and districts;  in some, it is a “resolved” 
issue. Finally, respondents were generally satisﬁed with 
educational, leisure/sport and cultural activities (12%), 
and with the construction of schools, kindergartens, 
cultural centers, and sport facilities (7%). 
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Asked whether various public institutions act in the 
interest of the whole society (rather than only in the 
interest of a small group), citizens in all 14 communities 
assessed activities of local governments as being much 
better than central institutions, such as the Parliament. 
In rural regions, citizens were much more positive about 
their local government than were inhabitants of urban 
areas (Figure 12).
Data suggests that the smaller the administrative 
unit, the more positive the opinion of citizens con-
cerning local authorities’ activities. In smaller commu-
nities, the more often citizens meet local councilors, 
the better citizens know their representatives, and the 
more active they are in local politics and civic events. 
In Armenia, over 30 percent of respondents believed 
that government at the local level improved in recent 
Figure 11.
Questionnaire: For Which Issues Have You Applied and Remain Unsatisﬁed?
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Figure 12.
Questionnaire: Local Self-governmental Bodies Act in the Interest of What Part of the Population? 
(By Community Size)
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Figure 13.
Questionnaire: Is Corruption More Prevalent at the Local or Central Level of Government?
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years; 54 percent thought it had worsened. The high 
level of dissatisfaction, as well as on-going administra-
tive abuses, have been attributed to crime and corrup-
tion within local governmental bodies, which leads 
to illegal activities and the abuse of oﬃcial respons-
ibilities.
Indeed, corruption in Armenia appears to be 
ﬂourishing. According to a recent survey by Regional 
Development/Transparency International (RD/TI), 
61 percent of citizens, 41 percent of entrepreneurs, and 
54 percent of civil servants believe that corruption is 
“endemic.”  Some suggest deﬁning corruption broadly, 
to include the abuse of oﬃce and bribery.  Analysts 
agree that all the key spheres in Armenian society and 
economy are experiencing extreme pressure from cor-
rupt oﬃcials in the higher echelons of power.
Recently, research and consultancy on crime pre-
vention and community safety measures by the police, 
local authorities and community-based organizations 
have been launched.  A primary approach to crime pre-
vention and community safety is that the involvement 
of residents and users is essential for problem-solving 
and for control. Regardless of the real situation, it is 
very dangerous for local democracy that many people 
believe that local government in Armenia is more cor-
rupt than other political institutions. This opinion has 
been quite recently expressed by the media, in regard 
to local authorities’ signiﬁcant and negative inﬂuence 
on the voting process during the presidential elections. 
Particularly during preparatory stages in local elections, 
the involvement of corrupt individuals and actors in lo-
cal governance has been high. Figure 10 shows citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption as an issue of local or central 
administration (Figure 13).
  
2.3 Administrative Control of 
  Local Governmental Bodies
2.3.1 Transparency and Access to Information
Three main dimensions of transparency are necessary 
for a democratic system (Mather 1998):
1. Public access to information must be granted not 
only in theory, but also in practical terms. This 
requires not only that individual documents be 
accessible to the public, but also that the decision-
making process be easy to follow, and that deci-
sions be phrased in clear and understandable 
terms.
2. The thought processes, actions, and inﬂuences be-
hind published documents and decisions should 
be publicly accessible. People should know why 
and how decisions have been made, so that those 
who have made decisions can be held account-
able, if only as a last resort.
3. Transparency and access to information should 
empower people in general, and interested parties 
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in particular, to contribute to decision-making. 
People need information to know how to act 
eﬀectively.
The formal framework comprises the laws and legal 
forms of regulation for the activities of community 
members, the council, and community leaders.  Broadly 
speaking, the lack of transparency, accountability, and 
equity is a fundamental and pervasive administrative 
abuse in Armenia. Applying formal rules based on trans-
parency, accountability, and equity will most probably 
lead to the creation of informal rules that, along with 
the formal rules (and by being conditioned by them), 
will establish grounds for sustainable (if not habitual) 
administrative remedies. Ethics and morality are typi-
cal examples of the informal groundwork necessary for 
the creation of a stable social system.
During recent years, it has become clear that open-
ness and transparency in local government are particu-
larly burning issues.  Surveys conducted in four districts 
of Yerevan, in the town of Artashat, and in the villages 
of Noraduz and Axuryan, suggest that respondents are 
mainly not well informed about their local government 
activities. Lack of information is endemic, particularly 
in Yerevan; the degree of transparency diﬀers from 
district to district. The highest rates of transparency 
in local self-governmental activities were registered in 
Kanaker-Zeytu; the lowest, in Malatia–Sebastia.
About 46 percent of respondents living in villages 
answered that they are, in general, aware of the activi-
ties of their community head and council. However, 
the remaining 54 percent complained that they need 
more objective information about local aﬀairs. They 
would like local media to report on issues pertaining 
directly to the community. Local government oﬃcials, 
meanwhile, make use of relatives and friends in order 
to gather information about community needs (79%). 
Sixty-two percent gather information from television; 
32 percent, from newspapers and radio; and 8 percent 
from community members, organized meetings, local 
publications, and non-governmental organizations 
(Figure 14).
Figure 14.
Main Sources of Information for Local Self-government Oﬃcials Regarding Community Needs  
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 Regarding the transparency of LGU activities from 
the perspective of the press, there are few journalists 
specially assigned to reporting on local government ac-
tivities and operations. Such reporting is almost solely 
done by journalists who specialize in economic, social 
and legal areas. To illustrate, the Yerevan Press Club 
reported in 2003 that there are eight newspapers and 
numerous small weekly bulletins or newsletters pub-
lished in Yerevan. The Press Club surveyed these publi-
cations to determine how they allocate available space to 
various issues. Unfortunately, information about local 
government activities either was not included among 
the surveyed activities or was so insigniﬁcantly reported 
that it does not register on the survey. Newspapers are, 
meanwhile, one of the main sources of information 
shaping public opinion. The Bulletin of the Yerevan 
Press Club reported that in domestic publications 
covering Armenian news, only 7.9 percent of the total 
coverage dealt with marz-level government activities, 
7.4 percent with communities, and 0.5 percent with 
villages (2003).  Reporters in Yerevan in particular state 
that they encounter signiﬁcant diﬃculties in obtaining 
information from local authorities and do not perceive 
the information they do receive to be reliable or com-
plete. Usually, information is provided in a form that 
is most favorable for the local authorities. 
A recent study determined that LGUs are not meet-
ing the requirement to keep their citizens informed. 
This conclusion was drawn from interviews with of-
ﬁcials and community members to determine existing 
structures and procedures for providing information to 
citizens, NGOs and the media, and the extent to which 
local oﬃcials make such information available.
2.3.2 Openness and Transparency: Local Budgets, 
  Fees, and Financing
As the local budget is created by all members of the 
community and is supposed to be directed to the reso-
lution of community problems, it is extremely impor-
tant to ensure its openness and transparency. Evidence 
suggests that in communities where citizens are well 
informed about the sources and expenditures of their 
local governmental bodies’ activities, citizens ﬁght 
against administrative abuses more eﬀectively. This 
particularly pertains to ﬁnance and budget activities.
In order to make the budget more understandable 
for a whole community, composed of diverse individu-
als, it is essential  to make ﬁnancial documents clear 
and understandable. To these ends, the Community 
Financial Oﬃcers Association of Armenia has elaborat-
ed, developed, and implemented information systems 
in ﬁve regional centers of Armenia: Artik, Aparan, 
Abovian, Ararat, and Ejmiacin. This involves: 
• training community ﬁnancial specialists on how 
to make initial information understandable for 
community members;
• training community members regarding their 
rights and responsibilities; and
• legal training for local governmental oﬃcials and 
community members.
These activities are implemented through focus 
groups, non-governmental organizations and other 
civic groups, and direct and open work with LGUs 
and councils. As an eﬀective method of transparency, 
the information centers promote and make use of 
newspapers, journals, television, and so on.
Perhaps the most important means of information 
dissemination is through informational technologies 
with which it is possible to elaborate a program for 
budget calculations, particularly for tax purposes.  Such 
technology creates access to local governmental infor-
mation, both for those working within the government 
and for community members.  In fact, recent analyses 
suggest that in almost every village surveyed, there are 
many abuses that could be prevented through better 
means of ﬁnancial management (and, in particular, by 
promoting accountability in ﬁnancial management). 
It is known, for instance, that state and local taxes 
are primary sources of local budget revenue. As well, 
resources from various ﬁnancial services (a civil regis-
tration oﬃce, or the local branch of the state notary 
oﬃce) also contribute to the local budget—at which 
point, community members tend to become confused. 
Civil registration oﬃces or notary oﬃces do not exist 
as such in every community; rather, they are mainly 
concentrated in regional centers, and fulﬁll functions 
for the members of neighboring communities. Con-
sequently, this creates inconveniences for people who 
pay diﬀerent types of fees into the budgets of other 
communities.
Another type of administrative abuse arises from 
a lack of knowledge about fee amounts, means of 
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payment, and so forth.  Often, clients pay much more 
than necessary. Non-governmental organizations ﬁght 
against these type of abuses. For example, members 
of one village community in Armenia paid more for 
birth certiﬁcates than stipulated by legislation. With 
assistance from a foreign organization involved in the 
defense of community members’ rights, the formal, 
legal amount was disclosed. Since then, price lists for 
every service in the notary and registration oﬃces have 
been publicly displayed. 
Analysis has shown that the State (central) Tax 
Agency does not cooperate with community tax inspec-
torates during the process of tax collection. This sug-
gests that the party most interested in tax is local gov-
ernment.  Based on information from the Department 
of Tax Improvement at the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, the level of tax collection in 2002 decreased 
by 7.3 percent from the previous year, as a result of the 
methods and administrative practices in rural commu-
nities, as well as the lack of a uniform organizational 
system. Local governments can signiﬁcantly raise col-
lection rates, because they have a greater interest in the 
collection, know more about their residents (in theory), 
and could administer some taxes more eﬃciently than 
the central government.
Finally, local governments do have the formal ca-
pacity to implement their legislative responsibilities. 
However, the collection of taxes, fees, rents, and other 
revenues is poor.  This is explained not by the inability 
of local self-governments to implement their revenue 
duties, but by the poor social-economic state of the 
population. This is particularly true in rural areas, 
where unemployment is high and incomes are low. 
Administrative abuses ultimately lead to increased tax 
collection costs: a tax inspectorate reported that to col-
lect 2 percent of taxes, they spend 15 percent of their 
operating costs. 
3. REMEDIES AND ABUSES
3.1 Administrative Remedies for 
  Specific Administrative Abuses
The goal of on-going, local government reforms is to 
develop more transparent, accountable, and responsive 
governance in Armenia. To meet this goal, projects 
and programs should involve both governmental and 
non-governmental actors to strengthen local insti-
tutions and organizations, and to increase citizen 
conﬁdence in them. In order to strengthen govern-
ment institutions, local self-governmental bodies must 
support legal reform, for example by assisting the ju-
diciary in becoming a more independent and eﬀective 
branch of government. As well, local governments 
must strengthen their capacity to manage resources 
and respond to citizens’ concerns. In this endeavor, 
the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) has initiated a program with the 
National Assembly of Armenia to improve internal 
management and to increase citizens’ access to the legis-
lative process and to their representatives. In order to 
strengthen non-governmental actors, USAID works 
with NGOs and communities to increase citizens’ 
participation in public policy development and the 
oversight of the government. These eﬀorts represent 
an interest in counteracting and combating adminis-
trative abuses.
Administrative abuses can include actions which 
are illegal (like bribe-taking or giving), which violate 
normal procedures (such as the preferential processing 
of paperwork) or which involve the inappropriate 
exercise of discretion (based on, for example, nepotism, 
cronyism, partisan politics or discrimination). Rekosh 
(2003) deﬁnes an administrative abuse speciﬁcally as 
an act of enforcement, the promulgation of a norm, the 
taking of a decision, or the denial of a beneﬁt by a state 
oﬃcial, which is illegal, a result of the inappropriate 
exercise of discretion, or procedurally improper, irregu-
lar, or erroneous.2
Among the number of ways to ﬁght against ad-
ministrative abuses, the most important remedies are:
• increased availability of legal services;
• increased availability of information;
• decreased barriers;
• increased transparency;
• eﬀective and fair legal sector institutions;
• increased independence; and
• improved management and administrative capacity.
Developments such as the improving educational 
standards of the population, the changing role of the 
media, new technological services and opportunities, 
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and increasing expectations and awareness of the need 
for transparency and accountability in public life, have 
been commonly mentioned as recent areas of change 
for the better in Armenia. As in other transitional coun-
tries, these factors serve to ensure that old approaches 
are no longer acceptable. The government of Armenia 
tries to achieve this by supporting programs related to 
the following: 
• increased citizen participation in policy develop-
ment and oversight of government; 
• the availability of multiple sources of information; 
• a more responsive and eﬀective local government; 
• a more responsive and eﬀective parliament; and
• a transparent, dependable and eﬀective legal system.
The ultimate beneﬁciaries of administrative re-
forms are the citizens of Armenia, who gain not only 
an understanding of how to act upon their rights and 
responsibilities in a democracy, but also access to 
stronger democratic institutions.
3.2 Creating a Framework 
  Against Abuse
The legislative and institutional framework for the 
execution of public procurement in municipalities 
relates directly to two issues: 
1. The judicial basis, which basically consists of 
several interrelated normative acts, with no direct 
impact on services (from the point of view of bet-
ter quality for the public). A normative basis is 
created for keeping corruption low.
2. The public procurement agency, under the govern-
ment of Armenia, is supposed to regulate all public 
procurement in the country. It can only act within 
the framework provided by the normative basis. 
Clients (citizens) are kept at a distance from control 
over the process of service provision, largely as a result 
of the long sequence of actions necessary for a service 
to be provided: gathering the budget, redistributing 
the budget back to municipalities, redistributing the 
municipal budget, organizing competition, and provid-
ing the service.  Generally, citizens’ participation begins 
and ends with the payment of taxes. Even procurement 
committee meetings are kept secret—only a few details 
may be announced later, and only in the event of a 
written request for information. That said, there have 
been cases related to public procurement, when citizens 
approached their local government with complaints 
about bad road repair, improper service delivery, tax 
administration, and so on.
The ﬁght against administrative abuses aims at 
achieving a correspondence between legal norms and 
the ethical standards demanded in public life. Those 
ethical rules not accompanied by legal sanctions are 
guided by the individual (ethical) intuition of members 
of society.  There is always the possibility, however, of a 
conﬂict between legal and ethical norms.  For instance, 
local governors enjoy immunity from criminal liabil-
ity, but civic ethics demand that they be punished like 
other citizens for committing criminal acts.  For this 
reason, the priority of those committed to democratic 
transformation and the elimination of corrupt practices 
is to reduce the number of discrepancies between legal 
norms and the ethical standards demanded in public 
life. The common goal of law and ethics in public life 
is, after all, to establish eﬀective measures to guarantee 
state rule in the interest of the public.
In 1999, a monitoring project for investigating the 
legal framework for complaints concerning local gov-
ernmental oﬃcials’ activities, as well as activities con-
nected with local governance, was launched. According 
to the results of this project, only one-fourth of all 
complaints concern the sphere of local governance.
        
              
3.3 Equal Access to Justice 
Access to justice refers to the ability of citizens to use 
various public and private services on demand. Equal 
access means that such ability (and the treatment ac-
corded) is not restricted to certain classes or groups of 
citizens. Access will always be restricted in some sense 
(for instance, by court jurisdiction or by material or 
ﬁnancial constraints). For this study, the basis of such 
restriction is considered—and particularly that it does 
not additionally harm already disadvantaged groups. 
Mather states: 
 “Which groups are relevant is system dependent, 
but the usual concern is that access not be inequi-
tably available according to gender, ethnic, politi-
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cal, or religious category, social or economic class, 
or physical incapacity. Where apparently equitable 
rules may in fact bar access to such groups, special 
measures may be introduced (e.g., subsidized legal 
services, interpreters for those who cannot com-
municate in the court language) in compensation” 
(1998).
Establishing an independent judiciary was among 
the most important institutional achievements in post-
socialist Armenia. Common constitutional features in 
this direction regard the method of appointment. In 
proceedings, typical arguments such as popular sover-
eignty, representation, method of appointment, lack of 
transparency and openness were used in opposition to 
constitutional control.
The defense of citizens’ rights and legal interests 
is considered one of the main principles of local self-
governance in Armenia. Local governmental bodies 
may apply to a court and discuss any problematic 
issue—those raised between community members and 
local governmental bodies, or between a community 
head and the council. According to law, local self-
governmental bodies have the right to complain against 
the decision of state bodies and oﬃcials for breaching 
rules in local governance.
The legal system includes (but is not necessarily 
limited to) such institutions as trial and appellate courts, 
the judiciary, other court oﬃcials, administrative 
courts, the prosecution, public defense, police and 
other enforcement agencies, and prisons, as well as non-
governmental entities such as bar associations, advocacy 
organizations, legal aid service providers, law schools, 
and other private organizations. The binding character-
istic is their involvement in legal dispute resolution. 
Research has shown that, in general, respondents 
are not well informed about the legal system of Ar-
menia. Only 3 percent of respondents think that they 
know enough about the court system and their legal 
rights; nearly 70 percent feel as though they do not 
have enough information about their legal rights in 
local governance, and 21 percent answer that they have 
“some” knowledge. Education level and background 
play an important role in this survey: educated people 
tend to be more interested in legal and court systems. 
Respondents largely (88 percent) distrust the courts, 
however, because they do not make “fair decisions.” 
Similarly, 86 percent do not think courts are fair or 
act in the interest of all community members equally 
(Figure 15). That said, most citizens had never actually 
approached a court.  Of those that had, one-third were 
satisﬁed with the decision. Finally, 96 percent believe 
that the legal system and the court are not independent 
from the state; according to the Foreign Investors’ As-
sembly, courts in Armenia are the second most corrupt 
state structure in Armenia (2001).
 Figure 15.
Questionnaire: Do Courts Act Fairly and Equally in the Interest of All Citizens?
63% Strongly disagree
23% Somewhat disagree
11% Somewhat agree
2% Strongly agree 
1% Do not know
A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  R E M E D I E S  F O R  A B U S E S  I N  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T:  A R M E N I A
45
Generally, respondents stressed the following rea-
sons for not applying to a court:
• lack of trust (44%); 
• delays in issuing a ﬁnal decision (16%);
• high incidence of bribery and corruption (23%);
• high application fees and additional illegal pay-
ments (6%); and
• lack of knowledge about the right to appeal (11%).
Access to justice will be limited if there are barriers, 
including formal and informal institutional and legal 
biases. Legal requirements may impose exceptional 
hardships on some groups—for instance, unusually 
large fees, or the requirement that a woman get permis-
sion from a male relative before appearing in court. As 
well, services may be located so that some (particularly 
rural inhabitants) must travel long distances, or institu-
tional members may have certain prejudices aﬀecting 
the performance of their duties.
Eﬀectiveness is the degree to which the legal system 
(and justice sector institutions in particular) resolve 
disputes in a timely, predictable, and reliable manner; 
fairness is the degree to which justice sector institutions 
uphold principles of  law in a manner that serves the 
public interest while treating all individuals according 
to the same standards. Fairness would also prohibit 
any arbitrary favors to any individual or group, unless 
prescribed by law. Importantly, legal organizations must 
be staﬀed by professional individuals, with specialized 
training and skills. A personnel system should be based 
on recognizing and rewarding professionalism.
A quick read of the Law on Self-government would 
seem to suggest that local governments in Armenia have 
been delegated broad powers by the state. For example, 
the Law states that “Local self-government is the right 
and capacity of local self-government bodies acting at 
their own responsibility, to dispose of community’s 
property and to resolve problems of community im-
portance with a view to improving the well-being of 
the population.” However, a careful review of this Law 
reveals references to other laws that often take away 
from or severely limit those very powers and responsi-
bilities that the basic law appears to grant. Moreover, 
the non-institutionalized nature of LGUs vis-à-vis the 
state make uncertain the amount of informal discretion-
ary prerogatives available to local oﬃcials. When these 
limited or ambiguous legal powers are considered in the 
context of a very low ﬁscal capacity and a high level of 
dependency upon state subventions, LGUs in Armenia 
are capable of little political, social, or ﬁscal impact.
In economic and ﬁnancial spheres, the Law on 
Local Self-government upholds the notions of appro-
priate revenue assignment, property rights, and equity. 
The Law also permits the devolution of responsibility 
for the management of utilities and other communal 
services to the private sector through tender proc-
esses.
Public conﬁdence in local government suggests im-
provement. A citizen participation survey, conducted 
in late 2000, shows a decline in citizen conﬁdence in 
most governing institutions, except in the case of local 
government. The NGO sector’s rating in the NGO 
sustainability index did not change from the previous 
year, which reﬂects that the sector is developing—but 
that it remains ﬁnancially and organizationally weak. 
Although there have been some examples of NGOs suc-
cessfully advocating policy, legislative, and procedural 
changes, such incidences are not the norm.  Progress in 
the legal sector lagged signiﬁcantly behind expectations, 
with only marginal improvements in citizens’ access 
to the court system and in the professional standards 
and qualiﬁcations of advocates and judges. To note, 
the passage of a mandatory judicial code of ethics was 
expected, but revised during the year because of a lack 
of local understanding of and support for such a self-
regulating process. 
Decentralization usually begins with a legal frame-
work, which sets out the responsibilities, powers, and 
resources for each level of government. The Charter of 
Local Self-government of the Council of Europe can be 
used as a point of reference for Armenia.  The Charter 
oﬀers a striking view of local government rights and du-
ties, showing how seriously the principle of subsidiarity 
should be taken.  It declares that local self-government is 
a cornerstone of autonomy, which should be supported 
by a broad set of rights and competencies.
The results of the USAID/Armenia Governance 
Index (a score of 1 out of 64) reﬂect the lack of progress 
made in the passage of critical legislation in the past 
year. This index measures the status and quality of leg-
islation by looking at the adoption, supporting regula-
tions, and implementation of legislation in six critical 
areas: civil service, public disclosure of assets for public 
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oﬃcials, the institution of the ombudsman, administra-
tive procedures, freedom of information, and govern-
ment procurement. In 2000, only one relevant law was 
passed (in the area of government procurement), but, 
at the time of writing, the regulations necessary for full 
implementation were not yet in place.
3.4 Transparency, Openness, and 
  Fairness: Good Governance and the 
  Exercise of Authority
One of the fundamental principles of local self-gov-
ernment is openness and transparency in the exercise 
of authority. In Armenia, local councils are elected 
bodies; thus, they are ultimately accountable to the 
voters.  However, for local self-governance to take root 
in a meaningful way, residents must be well informed 
about what transpires and how local decision-mak-
ing should actually proceed. For instance, as noted, 
citizens should be kept informed about the sources of 
their local budget revenues, as this may stimulate their 
willingness to pay taxes, local duties, and charges. Ulti-
mately, information about how and for what purposes 
community resources are spent, or about the services 
an LGU must provide from its limited funds, should 
serve to involve citizens in the solution of community 
problems and in the optimal distribution of available 
funds. Survey results indicate that there is insuﬃcient 
transparency in LGU operations in Armenia. As well, 
the populace is not knowledgeable about local com-
munity activities, what the mandatory activities of the 
LGU are, and which duties are executed by commu-
nity leaders. Citizens do not understand how the pay-
ment of taxes and duties is related to the improvement 
of service delivery. In short, transparency and access to 
information are important remedies for administra-
tive abuses.
3.4.1 Media and Other Sources of Information
The media can serve as a means to promote good 
governance and to prevent abuses.  In Armenia, there 
is a need to strengthen and diversify independent me-
dia and other sources of information dissemination, 
to encourage and enhance citizens’ involvement in 
decision-making processes. Diversity of local media 
refers to the number of locally available information 
sources that have regular coverage of local issues and 
are independent of each other. The total hours of local 
programs on local governmental issues in electronic 
media per month varies widely; there is no reliable 
information on this point. The total number of pages 
covering local issues amounts to approximately one-
eleventh of print media. Surveys indicate that citizens 
are twice as inﬂuenced by the media now than they 
were in 1995.
3.4.2 Openness and Fairness
One of the principles of good local governance is open-
ness. Does the local government promote openness 
and transparency by readily providing information 
about its activities? Does the local government allow 
and further citizen involvement in decision-making? 
These are critical questions in Armenia, particularly 
in areas in which remnants of state socialism continue 
to inﬂuence local governance. Democratic practices 
oﬀer local citizens the opportunity to understand lo-
cal governance operations and to participate in deci-
sion-making on local public issues. Certainly, citizens 
might not engage in local governance; however, this 
does not inherently detract from the quality of local 
government. 
A second important principle is fairness. As demo-
cratic institutions, local governments are required to 
treat citizens equally and according to the rules. To 
put it simply, from the viewpoint of democratic deci-
sion-making, performance is the capability of the local 
government to operate in an open and fair manner. 
Measurements of fairness are based on survey questions 
about the sense of political eﬃciency; open discussions 
on public issues; the level of information on local gov-
ernment; the role of good connections; and corrup-
tion in local government oﬃces. Measures pertain to 
transparency and openness in policy-making, as well as 
oﬃcials’ political responsiveness. Political responsive-
ness is the relationship between what local government 
does, and what local citizens think it should do. This 
relationship is measured by the level of satisfaction with 
the allocation of resources and the quality of services 
and programs provided by the local government. 
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3.4.3 Continuity and Change in the Composition 
  of a Local Representative Body 
Continuity and change in the composition of a local 
representative body can also inﬂuence local govern-
ment performance, although in an unclear way. Rates 
of change do not necessarily correspond to the level 
of interest among citizens in local oﬃcials or bodies. 
As well, change neither clearly hurts nor harms local 
governance. For instance, high rotation of oﬃcials 
was very common ﬁve years ago in Armenia. This 
increased the innovative capacity in local government 
but decreased levels of competence, which relates to 
political experience. 
Change in the composition of a local representative 
body is measured by the number of new members in 
an elected body in an election year. In Yerevan, only 25 
percent of the heads of local government changed after 
local elections in October 2002. Another indicator is 
knowledge about local oﬃcials. About 80 percent of re-
spondents know their community leader’s name (mayor 
or rural community head); only 38 percent know the 
name of their deputy elected to Parliament. Such 
results vary according to the size of the community 
(Figure 16).
3.4.4 Accountability as a Remedy
Accountability as a control mechanism presses deci-
sion-makers to formulate feasible, eﬃcient, and eﬀec-
tive policies; to reduce the diversion of public re-
sources toward particular interests; and to improve 
service quality by imposing minimum standards. Lo-
cal government oﬃcials must be ready to justify their 
deci-sions and answer to administrative, legislative, or 
judicial authorities. The importance of a well-devised, 
comprehensive, legal and institutional framework rests 
with its function to establish rules, incentives, and con-
straints on public oﬃcials. Institutions create oppor-
tunities for public oﬃcials to make choices and exer-
cise autonomy. As well, they constitute a framework 
of regulations and other enforcement mechanisms 
that together provide a means of holding public 
oﬃcials accountable for their choices, as they aﬀect 
ﬁscal and economic performance. There is thus a criti-
cal interdependence between accountability and the 
autonomy of oﬃcials: both rely on the strength of 
supporting institutions. 
In order to analyze accountability as remedy for 
administrative abuses, its connection to indicators like 
responsibility, professionalism, and democracy deserves 
attention. In this regard, diﬀerentiating among types 
of accountability is useful.
1. Administrative accountability: The basic operation-
al principle is to act in full compliance with tech-
nical rules and practices of the profession. Inter-
nal (administrative) accountably refers to superior 
administrative and political authority, while ex-
ternal accountability refers to external organs of 
Figure 16.
Questionnaire: Do You Know Your Local Oﬃcials? (By Community Size, Answer “Yes”)
Note: Compared with analyses by the Institute of Economics and Law, 2001.
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supervision and control. Citizens are the subjects 
of administrative accountability. Accountability 
criteria comply with established rules and proce-
dures. Mechanisms are: administrative claims, ju-
dicial procedures, and external and internal super-
vision and control.
2.  Professional accountability: The basic operational 
principle is to act in full compliance with techni-
cal rules and practices. Professional accountability 
also may be internal or external, depending the 
superior professional organ (internal or external). 
The results of professional performance and the 
professional rules followed are subjects of profes-
sional accountability. For this type, criteria com-
ply with established rules and practices of the pro-
fession. Professional accountability mechanisms 
are: internal technical or administrative control 
and external technical or administrative control.
3. Democratic accountability: This refers to acting in 
accordance with the needs and interests of social 
groups or societies; it revolves around “external” 
accountability to society and social groups. The 
subject matter of democratic accountability are 
the results of administrative performance. The cri-
teria for democratic accountability’s are the social 
impacts of administrative performance. Mecha-
nisms are: information technology; media and 
instruments of expression of public opinion; and 
mechanisms of civic participation.
3.5 Correlations among Data 
  Categories and Conclusions
3.5.1 Administrative Performance, Service 
  Delivery, and Citizen Participation
Decentralization contributes to the democratization 
process, providing opportunities for citizen participa-
tion in government through local elections, and par-
ticularly through local referenda and the direct elec-
tion of mayors. Authentic decision-making power can 
prompt the involvement of local and regional actors in 
local and regional development policies. Once issues 
of real importance are decided locally, this provides 
motivation and opportunities for the development of 
leadership sub-nationally, and for the dissemination 
of political skills that might enable citizens to partici-
pate more eﬀectively in political life at various levels.
There is an evidence that a symbiotic relationship 
does exist between decentralization and participation, in 
which local-level mobilization makes the decentralization 
process more successful, and decentralization enhances 
opportunities for real participation by placing more 
power, information, and resources closer to the people. 
Participation in this sense can be both a goal and a 
means of successful decentralization. While the absence 
of actual participation can create local demands for 
change, opportunities are not realities. Evidence suggests 
that perverse results can ensue when decentralization 
or the increased role of local democracy have not been 
prepared for properly (Ter-Minassian 1997).
One factor that might inﬂuence an appropriate 
degree of decentralization in a given situation is insti-
tutional development, which inﬂuences both the 
capacity and the credibility of the state.  Countries with 
greater institutional development might be expected to 
have a greater capacity for implementing decentralized 
policies. Certainly, institutional development is diﬃ-
cult to measure: by its very nature, it is rather more 
qualitative then quantitative. The World Bank World 
Development Reports (1997 and 1998) involved the 
formulation of indices of government credibility,3 
which, when considered in tandem, provide a proxy 
for institutional development.  
Decentralization necessitates the determination of 
an optimal level of administrative territorial division. 
The division of Armenia has involved investigating 
local economic and ﬁnancial conditions, as well as 
the opportunities provided to local self-government 
bodies to carry out eﬃcient governance and render 
public services to the community population. Multiple 
commissions to promote decentralization and local-
level governance have been established, yet there is an 
evident lack of communication and coordination 
among these commissions. Thus, decentralization is 
not delt with through a single and uniﬁed approach 
or framework; there is no one decentralization strategy 
(South Caucasus Regional Program).
Analyses prove that administrative and ﬁscal 
issues, service delivery, and citizen participation 
interrelate to create what can be seen as a vicious circle 
that impedes the development of an eﬀective system 
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of local governance.  The last stage of this circle is 
client—or citizen—satisfaction. Surveys suggest that 
in communities of diﬀerent populations and budgets, 
if LGUs have insuﬃcient power and revenue to provide 
adequate services, citizens recognize the severe limitations 
on local government autonomy and the incapacity of 
LGUs to deliver services, and therefore have little 
interest in participating in local government activities 
and decision-making. Citizens correctly perceive that, 
under present circumstances, local governments can 
do little to improve local situations. Ultimately, with 
little meaningful or broad-based citizen involvement, 
local governments are unlikely to have the political 
power to persuade the central authorities in Armenia. 
Certainly, performance measurement depends greatly 
on factors other than a local government’s activities. 
A municipality with a wealthy population, a large tax 
base and political support is more likely to have good 
services than a poor municipality with poor inhabitants 
and no political support. Citizens’ willingness to 
participate in public activities, and their inﬂuence 
on local politics, work together to inﬂuence the 
performance of local government.  Willingness can serve 
as a means of measuring the eﬀectiveness of citizens’ 
inﬂuence on public issues, and of the opportunities 
available for exerting inﬂuence. It also indicates the 
level of information about public matters with which 
citizens are provided (Figure 17).
                                                                 
4. OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Public Policy Considerations
It is extremely important to take seriously the decen-
tralization of power, as it carries potential disadvan-
tages and risks that should not be ignored. The greater 
scope for autonomous local decision-making directly 
aﬀects decisions at the national level. As well, local in-
terests may fundamentally diverge from a society-wide 
concept of “public interest.”  
Eﬀective public sector reform requires a skilled 
cadre of people who are well educated and adequately 
paid. The majority of Armenian local governmental 
bodies are composed of non-professionals, who tend 
not to “think globally and act locally.” Moreover, the 
real wages of government employees have fallen dra-
matically since 1990, and training opportunities are 
limited. One suggested means of combating corrup-
tion and bribe-taking is increasing the salaries of local 
oﬃcials. 
The local legal framework of Armenia has changed 
dramatically in recent years. In most cases, this has 
brought about signiﬁcant improvements in the legal 
environment. At the same time, it should be recog-
nized that these changes also have created a sense of 
legal uncertainty with respect to the interpretation and 
Figure 17.
Correspondence among Level of Satisfaction and Budget Possibilities
Administrative 
and ﬁscal issues
Service delivery Public participation
Client satisfaction
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application of new laws and regulations. Many of the 
inconsistencies among laws, and also implementation 
diﬃculties, result from the lack of public participation 
in decision-making and rule-making. There is a need to 
recognize that passing laws does not make them reality. 
The relevant executive authorities as well as the public 
need to develop a clear understanding of the eﬀect laws 
will have on their daily life.
Along with the speciﬁc areas addressed below, this 
study suggests:
• the creation of external and internal control mecha-
nisms to provide for transparency and account-
ability;
• the clear distribution of responsibilities among the 
diﬀerent levels of public administration; and
• the introduction of new public ﬁnance resources 
that are consistent with these control mechanisms.
Increase accountability. Despite eﬀorts to increase 
accountability in local government by means of the 
Treasury and budget laws, enterprises and municipal 
service providers appear to be outside overall manage-
ment system, and are often not held accountable. Local 
governments are held accountable for services provided 
by private enterprises. The interference of the central 
government in the provision of services clearly reduces 
the ability of LGUs to perform their mandatory duties 
and to provide adequate services. 
Raise the standards of public services. The cur-
rent government is attempting to develop policies for 
improving governance in communities, raising the 
standards of public services, and making them more 
responsive to users. The overall goal is to clearly deﬁne 
the roles, responsibilities, and accountability of both 
the central and local government in the provision of 
services. As part of the commitment to responsive pub-
lic services, local governmental oﬃcials must identify 
problems and listen to constituents’ concerns. It is very 
important to involve diﬀerent socioeconomic groups 
and to meet their needs through, for instance, forming 
partnerships and establishing one-stop-shops.
Implement a developed set of information techno-
logies. The Community Financial Oﬃcers Association 
has formulated formal information channels of interac-
tion between the government and citizens. Such new 
channels in Armenia oﬀer obvious potential support 
for reforms and for the development of local com-
munities. Their role should not be seen as passive: 
government information services have an important 
responsibility to foster interest in and awareness of 
public issues, and to improve public understanding of 
policy issues. Information services should be pro-active 
in presenting information which is accurate, clear, and 
understandable.
Through the Encouraging Community Develop-
ment Project, thirty-one communities have received 51 
contemporary computer centers. The goal is to equip all 
communities nationwide with computers and informa-
tion technology. This involves creating informational 
databases and on-line administrative services, along 
with demographic surveys. The project has included 
the training of specialists from local administrative bod-
ies. This project was particularly important prior to the 
Presidential and National Assembly elections in 2003, 
as it contributed to the development of voting lists.
Work with focus groups. Focus groups can contrib-
ute to improving the level of satisfaction with public 
administration and service delivery. An important role 
is played by non-governmental organizations, groups 
of experts, and foreign/international organizations. 
For the Community Financial Oﬃcers Association, 
work in focus groups (of pensioners, young citizens, 
and so forth) has proved to be extremely informative. 
The government of Armenia should use this method to 
access a particularly vulnerable social group: refugees. 
Persons displaced by the conﬂict in Nagorno-Karabagh 
continue to lack shelter and full rights as citizens, as 
well as access to public services and local authorities. 
In short, they have speciﬁc needs which must be ad-
dressed. While amendments to the electoral code in 
2000 granted refugees the right to vote, many remain 
disenfranchised. The government should be proactive 
in accessing refugees; rural administrations will require 
support from NGOs, foreign/international organiza-
tions, urban areas, and the central government in these 
matters.
4.2 Recommendations 
Admittedly, laws do provide a rudimentary frame-
work for limited administrative and ﬁscal decentrali-
zation and the regulation of ﬁnancial issues relating 
to local government administration. Modiﬁcations 
are needed, however, to enhance the ability of local 
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government bodies to perform as viable democratic 
institutions. These modiﬁcations include:
• Developing a uniﬁed approach to reforming the 
public administration system, which reﬂects the 
mandates of various levels of government.
• Promoting openness and transparency in order to 
combat corruption. This involves raising the legal 
awareness of citizens through civil institutions and 
the media. Transparency and openness can be ac-
complished by broadening and deepening public 
participation, both in policy and “street level” issues.
• Protecting citizens and civil servants from unwar-
ranted accusations, and mediating (within reason) 
personal information made available to the public.
• Ensuring managerial autonomy of administrative 
units and agencies, as well as of individual oﬃcials, 
in order to allow them to perform their duties 
eﬀectively and eﬃciently. That said, duties must 
be carried out not only in accordance with estab-
lished guidelines or programmatic provisions, but 
also in full compliance with the legal order.
Also, this study suggests equipping local govern-
mental oﬃcials with skills they lack, by using diﬀerent 
training methods and replacing some older public 
employees, in order to make use of new, precise skills 
essential for better governance.
4.3 Conclusions 
With the municipal reform issued in 1996, Armenia 
has taken important steps toward reconstructing the 
political and administrative system, decentralizing state 
functions, and constructing municipal autonomy. 
However, in spite of a number of already introduced 
legal and institutional reforms, communities are not 
yet able to execute their tasks adequately. Foreign/
international and local projects aim to support municipal 
institutions in fulﬁlling these tasks, through consulting, 
trainings, technical assistance, and so forth. Reforms 
are undertaken with the view to balance the need for 
public revenue and the need to promote community 
development, as well as to promote transparency and 
to develop new administrative methods.
Assuming that local self-governments achieve an 
appropriate degree of autonomy with regard to ad-
ministrative issues, it is certainly important to have in 
place mechanisms to hold decision-makers accountable, 
both to their constituents and to other levels of govern-
ment. Accountability requires access to information. 
Mechanisms to ensure access to information include 
public statements of short and medium-term objectives, 
a transparent and inclusive budget process, accurate and 
comprehensive administrative reporting on outcomes, 
and an independent media to assist in the public dis-
semination of the information.  
Research analysis has shown that in small commu-
nities, local authorities are more likely to try to develop 
techniques for learning citizens’ preferences. In smaller 
local government units, there are more opportunities 
for building close links between authorities and citizens. 
However, ﬁscal problems often increase the level of 
administrative abuses, as administrative abuses tend to 
stem from a lack of ﬁnancial resources. This suggests a 
need to improve the administrative-territorial division 
of Armenia, by merging very small communities into 
larger ones, with more eﬀective public administration 
and service delivery.
Based on the current situation in Armenia, and 
comparing it with public administration in more de-
veloped countries, it is possible to conclude that  local 
self-governmental bodies in the former are relatively 
ineﬀective as governmental entities, and are hampered 
by lack a of clear legal authority and limited ﬁscal capac-
ity. Local governments must be restructured to enable 
local democracy.  For public administration to function 
eﬀectively, the following are necessary:
• predictability of policies and government stability;
• integrity of public oﬃcials and low levels of cor-
ruption;
• secure and well-deﬁned property rights;
• decentralization of powers to promote local de-
mocracy;
• eﬀective processes for ﬁscal control, including 
budgeting and ﬁnancial reporting; and
• protection of political and civil liberties, including 
democratic elections, freedom of expression, op-
portunities to form civic organizations, and physi-
cal mobility.
This study promotes the notion that local democ-
racy is fundamental for the well being of individuals 
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and communities.  The European Charter of Local Self- 
Government, drawn up by the Council of Europe, was 
the ﬁrst multilateral legal instrument to deﬁne the fun-
damental principles of local autonomy. It safeguards the 
rights of those government authorities that are closest 
to the citizen, and grants citizens the opportunity to 
participate eﬀectively in local government institutions 
that aﬀect their everyday lives.  Indeed, local authori-
ties with authentic responsibilities can serve citizens 
in a way that is eﬀective and meaningful. Meanwhile, 
the right of citizens to participate in public aﬀairs is a 
central democratic principle, and this right can be most 
directly exercised at the local level.
NOTES
1 Taken from a United Nation Development Program (UNDP), World Bank (WB), and Local Government and Public Service Initiative (LGI) policy 
paper. “Enhancing Capacities of Local Authorities” South Caucasus Regional Program.
2 See Edwin Rekosh. 2003. “Remedies to Administrative Abuses.” Local Government Brief. Summer 2003. Local Government and Public Service Reform 
Initiative, Open Society Institute–Budapest. http://lgi.osi.hu/publications_datasheet.php?id=241. The deﬁnition was developed collaboratively by 
Edwin Rekosh, PILI, and fellows of the LGI Fellowship Program, 2002–2003, Administrative Remedies at the Local Government Level.
3 This index is based on country surveys and considers: the unpredictability of laws and policies, the stability of government, the security of property, the 
reliability of the judiciary, the extent to which extra payments must be made for services, and the time spent negotiating. See World Bank. 1997. The 
World Development Report 1997: The Role of the State. Oxford University Press.
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APPENDIX 1
Competencies of Local Governments in Armenia 
Functions
(Maintenance, development, staff hiring, financing)
All municipalities Central or state territorial 
administration
EDUCATION
Pre-school X
Primary X
Secondary X
Technical X
Higher X
Specialized X
SOCIAL WELFARE
Nurseries X
Kindergartens X
Welfare homes X
Personal services for elderly and handicapped X
Special services (for homeless, families in crisis, etc.) X
Social housing X
HEALTH SERVICES
Primary health care X X
Health protection X
Hospitals X
Public health X X
CULTURE, LEISURE, SPORTS
Theaters X X
Museums X X
Libraries X X
Parks X
Sports, leisure X
Maintaining buildings for cultural events X
ECONOMIC SERVICES
Water supply X
Sewage X
Electricity X
Gas X
District heating X
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ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC SANITATION
Refuse collection X
Refuse disposal X
Street cleaning X
Cemeteries X X
Environmental protection X X
TRAFFIC, TRANSPORT
Roads X X
Public lighting X X
Public transport X X
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Town planning X
Regional/spatial planning X
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Administrative Remedies for Abuses 
in Local Government: Bulgaria
S t a n k a  D e l c h e v a
LEGAL TEXTS AND ACRONYMS
AA Administration Act
APA Administrative Procedure Act
APIA Access to Public Information Act
ASPLEA Administrative Service to Physical Persons 
and Legal Entities Act
AVSA Administrative Violations and Sanctions 
Act
CCCS Code of Conduct for the Civil Servant
CRB Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria
CSA Civil Servant Act
CTA Construction of the Territory Act
DFID Department for International Develop-
ment
EA Environment Act
HACA Higher Administrative Court Act
IPAEI Institute for Public Administration and 
European Integration
LC Labor Code 
LEA Local Elections Act (also Law on Local 
Elections)
LSLAA Local Self-governance and Local Admin-
istration Act
NAOA National Audit Oﬃce Act (also Court of 
Audit Act)
NCIOM National Center for Public Opinion Polls
NGO Non-governmental Organizations
PPA Public Procurement Act
RA Referendum Act
RMALR Regulation 1 on the Minimum Amount 
of Lawyers’ Remuneration
RPA Regional Planning Act
RTCAESA Regulation for the Terms and Conditions 
for Attesting Employees in the State Ad-
ministration
PSAAA Proposals, Signals, Appeals, and Applica-
tions Act
SAC Supreme Administrative Court Act
SIFCA State Internal Financial Control Act
TARIFF From the State Fees Acts, for fees collected 
by courts, prosecutor’s oﬃces, investigat-
ing bodies, and the Ministry of Justice
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General Objectives 
This study examines administrative mechanisms and 
practices designed to overcome abuses of power and 
instances of malpractice in Bulgarian administration, 
particularly at the local level. Abuses of power are 
considered in a broader context. The study goes beyond 
the common link established between “abuse of power” 
and “corruption,” and outlines the relationship be-
tween instances of individual abuses of power in local 
government and the conditions for adequate planning 
of administrative remedies, which are designed to over-
come and prevent these instances. The abuse of power 
is deﬁned as the adoption of norms, the taking of de-
cisions, or the denial to grant rights on the part of civil 
servants, which is illegal, unethical, or results from the 
inappropriate exercise of discretionary authority.1 
The process of reforming the Bulgarian adminis-
trative system after 1997, directed at re-formulating 
the status of civil service, has envisaged a number of 
remedies related to lawfulness, ethics, and rightful 
exercise of authority. In spite of the results achieved, 
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these principles have not been established yet as a 
stable practice in administrative work.
The overall goal of this study is to identify the 
main tools and mechanisms applied in Bulgaria 
that are designed to raise the accountability of local 
authorities and to restrict abuses in local governance. 
The study examines both the internal control mecha-
nisms of the performance and accountability of local 
administration and those implemented by the central 
executive power and the court system. Special atten-
tion has been paid to the mechanisms, practices, and 
forms of civic control related to local authorities. 
1.2 Historical Background of State and 
  Local Administrations  
Bulgaria faces the challenge of successfully completing 
the process of radical transformation in the structure 
of state governance, the economy, and social relations 
that began more than a decade ago. From the onset of 
transition until 1997, there was no clear national vision 
about administrative roles and functions. Post-1997 
reforms established a model of power distribution 
between the central government and local govern-
ments, and asserted a new role for public administra-
tion: to serve as the main provider of services to socie-
ty. The realization of this vision called for the adoption 
of a number of normative acts, which formed a new 
and contemporary framework for the organization and 
functioning of the Bulgarian administrative system. 
The adoption of new legislation re-established the 
status of civil service in Bulgaria and laid the foun-
dations for modifying administrative work. As well, 
reforms aﬀected the court system to a great extent, 
especially in relation to administrative jurisdiction.
One of the main goals of the reforms was to 
ensure conditions for the radical improvement of the 
quality of administrative work on all levels, adopting 
the “best European practice” when providing public 
services. In the context of these goals, mechanisms 
designed to prevent corruption, abuses of oﬃcial 
positions, and conﬂicts of interest were envisaged. 
Another key element was the regulation of transpar-
ency in administration, access to public information, 
and the protection of personal data. In developing a 
normative base, the practice of public discussions on 
planned remedies was established. The positive impact 
of this led to the introduction of regulations related to 
citizen control and partnership between state bodies 
and civic organizations. The establishment of eﬀec-
tive partnership relations, especially at the local level 
(between local authorities and civic organizations), 
is already a common practice, which is spreading in 
a number of municipalities.
According to an assessment of this process made by 
the European Commission2 and the World Bank,3 the 
main challenge facing Bulgaria is the creation of condi-
tions and capacity for the eﬀective application of new 
legislation concerning the status, organization, and 
functioning of civil service. This assessment is more 
pertinent for local administrations, since the central 
administration does not provide them with suﬃcient 
methodological support necessary to carry out reforms.
The legally regulated model of the administrative 
system in Bulgaria identiﬁes a single system of civil 
service, which encompasses all levels of state power 
in the country: central, regional, and local. The law 
lays down both the principles for the functioning 
of the administrative system (lawfulness, openness, 
accessibility, responsibility, and coordination), and
the rules and forms of organization of administrative 
structures in relation to the powers of corresponding 
governing bodies.
Local self-governance in Bulgaria is realized on a 
single level: the municipality is the main administra-
tive and territorial unit at which local self-governance 
is exercised.4 Municipalities in Bulgaria most often 
include more than one urban area. The exercise of 
local governance at the municipality level is part and 
parcel of the decentralization of state power. Local 
authorities have independent powers, wield control 
over independent budgets, and possess rights to prop-
erty. Local authorities consist of a municipal mayor 
and municipal council, directly elected by the popula-
tion for four-year terms. Populated areas with more 
than 500 citizens directly elect their mayor, while 
in localities with less than 500 citizens, the mayors 
are elected by the municipal council. The municipal 
mayor is deﬁned as the territorial body of executive 
power, and the municipal council is a body of local 
self-governance. The municipal council adopts rules, 
ordinances, decisions, and instructions on issues of 
local importance. 
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The distribution of governing powers assigns 
a leading role to local authorities in the process of 
planning local development. This allows for the con-
centration of power resources in determining the pri-
orities of the community in short-term and long-term 
perspectives. Local authorities are, to a great extent, 
responsible for the provision of social services, for 
creating propitious conditions for the development of 
entrepreneurship on a local level, and for ensuring the 
necessary infrastructure to support business develop-
ment. In fulﬁlling their functions, the local authori-
ties are responsible to the local community for their 
actions and for the resulting outcomes.
According to Art. 11 of the Local Self-governance 
and Local Administration Act (LSLAA),5 local self-
governance in a municipality is expressed through the 
right of citizens or bodies to participate in elections, 
and within the framework of deﬁned competencies 
(responsibilities, roles, resources, or functions) to decide 
on and act on a range of issues. These issues relate to:
• municipal property, municipal enterprises, mu-
nicipal ﬁnances, taxes, and fees;
• municipal administration;
• the territorial development of the municipality, in 
both urban and rural areas;
• education, healthcare, and cultural activities (in-
cluding maintenance and preservation of cultural, 
historical, and architectural monuments of mu-
nicipal signiﬁcance);
• public works (water supply, sewage, electricity, 
central heating, telephones);
• social care;
• environmental protection and the rational utiliza-
tion of natural resources of municipal signiﬁcance; 
and
• the development of sport, public recreation, and 
tourism of municipal signiﬁcance.
Bodies of local government also dispose of powers 
and competencies beyond those mentioned, in cases 
when they are delegated by the central government to 
do so (most often through legislation).
According to LSLAA, the municipal mayor is 
responsible for delivering administrative services 
to physical and legal bodies. The general principles 
for realizing such services are laid down in the new 
regulative framework. More generally, local authori-
ties perform activities established by law by awarding 
public procurement contracts. A signiﬁcant part of 
the necessary registrations, licenses, and permits for 
initiating or pursuing economic activity in the private 
sector are issued or controlled by local power bodies. 
Services in the social sector for individual citizens or 
communal (social) groups are also performed and 
monitored by the bodies of local government or by 
territorial units of the central administration. These 
services include social assistance, health care, educa-
tion, maintenance of public order and security, provi-
sion of public services, as well as water supply, sewage, 
electrical supply, and so on.   
It should be noted that, due to the single norma-
tive base, most observations and conclusions made 
about the eﬀectiveness of the organization principles 
of administrative servicing provided and the quality 
of administrative services refer both to the central and 
the local administration. A number of speciﬁc issues 
are highlighted below, and relate only to the local 
administration.
The essential role of Bulgarian local authorities in 
ensuring suitable conditions for local economic devel-
opment necessitates conduct status studies, to identify 
opportunities for developing remedies for removing 
the obstacles against abuse of power on a local level. 
The eﬀective execution of local administrative powers 
requires for the application of mechanisms that guar-
antee the adequate and unbiased functioning of local 
institutions and restrict the opportunities for abuse 
on the part of public servants fulﬁlling their duties. 
The creation of such mechanisms is one of the goals 
of the current reforms but their actual application re-
mains a challenge for representatives of institutions in 
charge of realizing communal priorities. Such are the 
expectations and demands of citizens regarding the 
functioning of local authorities.
The lack of eﬀectively working mechanisms that 
ensure control and transparency in the execution of 
duties by local administrations creates conditions for 
the abuse of power and opportunities for some pub-
lic servants to use their discretionary powers for per-
sonal or group proﬁt. There are also opportunities for 
the illegal expansion of these powers, resulting from 
“freedom” to interpret regulations—which often is 
not intentional and does not lead to illegal proﬁt, but 
does harm public interest and trust. Such phenomena 
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likely result from the inﬂuence of old practices, insuﬃ-
cient knowledge of the normative base, and lack of 
methodological support in its application.
The problem of the abuse of power and ineﬀective 
application of mechanisms for counteracting such 
practices considerably diminishes public trust in state 
and local institutions. This ultimately “de-motivates” 
members of the community to express their demands 
to their representatives, and to exercise their right to 
control and participate in local decision-making.
In recent years, various non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) and policy institutes have raised 
the issue of corruption and the diﬀerent forms it 
takes. The issue of corruption is among the most sen-
sitive in Bulgarian society; discussion on the matter 
shapes and is shaped by public institutions and the 
country’s political system. The existing corruption 
practices harm the prestige of institutions and erode 
democratic mechanisms in society. Local authorities, 
who are closest to the problems of citizens and are 
responsible for the realization of local community 
goals, have gained the trust of less than one-third of 
citizens. Corruption also has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence 
on the business climate by reducing the trust of local 
economic entities and foreign investors, thus limiting 
opportunities for economic development. 
According to the results of several studies, citizens 
in Bulgaria most frequently encounter corruption on 
the local government level. Considering corruption, 
however, as the only or main form of abuse of admin-
istrative power can lead to ineﬀective application of 
the proposed remedies for overcoming the problem.
The public evaluation of the quality of admin-
istrative services is predominantly negative: over 45 
percent of citizens think that dministrative services 
have not reached the needed quality. Considering 
the complexity of current procedures, insuﬃcient 
information, and the lack of an integrated approach 
for administrative servicing, the means to restrict 
abuse committed by local administration employees 
(preferential processing of documents or inappropri-
ate exercise of discretion, for instance) are seen as 
possibilities for qualitative improvement in how cor-
ruption and other abuses are addressed. This study 
shows that current administrative remedies against 
abuse do not work eﬀectively, and this is reﬂected in 
the level of public trust in and the prestige of local 
institutions. In this context, the present study is very 
topical and contributes to the evaluation of the poten-
tial for improvement and consequently for planning 
adequate remedies for restricting abuse of power on 
a local level.
1.3 Methodology and Analytical 
  Framework
The methodology of this study combines several 
research techniques designed to identify and as-
sess abuse of power and of oﬃcial positions in local 
government. The indicators developed to assess the 
eﬀectiveness of these remedies fall into three main, 
interdependent groups: 1) citizen or client satisfaction 
with the public and administrative services provided 
by the local government; 2) degree of public trust in 
local government institutions and civic and electoral 
participation; and 3) types and ways of application of 
the various administrative remedies restricting abuse 
of power (Figure 1).
There are many diﬀerent deﬁnitions and consid-
erations of trust in the ﬁeld of public management. 
It can be accepted that trust has a positive eﬀect on 
the parties involved in a relationship: it simpliﬁes 
interactions and reduces the need for control (Hinna 
and Monteduro 2003). Studies (Gulati 1995) have 
identiﬁed two factors on which trust can based: 
knowledge and deterrents. 
In the ﬁrst, experience is necessary for developing 
trust.  Experience in this sense is based on the ob-
servation of past behaviors of the subject. Experience 
can be based not only on direct contact, but also in-
direct contact, by gathering information concerning 
relationships with third parties. Trust based on the 
power of deterrents is connected to the existence of 
contractual or external warranties, such as making 
it inconvenient for a partner to behave improperly. 
As such, the existing conviction of some community 
members, based on direct or mediated experience, 
as to the degree of trust they can have in the public 
administration is as important as the presence of ex-
ternal guarantees (or remedies, tools) against abuses 
on the part of the administration.
Other authors (Bouckaert, Van de Walle, Maddens, 
and Kampen 2002) examine in detail the relationship 
between trust in and satisfaction with administrative 
performance. Factors that impact the level of trust 
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relate to the performance of public service delivery, 
along with social and demographic factors and social 
capital. With regard to public services, citizens expect 
public servants to serve the public interest with fair-
ness and to manage public resources properly on a 
daily basis (OECD 2000).
In this research, the level of trust in institutions 
and the level of satisfaction with the public services 
that they oﬀer are used as markers to indicate the 
spheres where the public considers that administrative 
performance does not fulﬁll its expectations. The lev-
els of trust and satisfaction also serve as indicators in 
evaluating the eﬀectiveness of remedies against abuse 
implemented by the assessed institutions.
In short, the main objects of this study are: 
administrative structures of local government that 
provide administrative servicing to citizens; custom-
ers of administrative services (citizens and economic 
entities) and their opinions and evaluation of service 
quality; and the general public’s trust in local govern-
ment and its work.
Data collection and evaluation required several 
diﬀerent methods. First, this study involved desk 
research to review relevant documents and data 
sources.6 Documents included: legal texts and the 
legal framework; oﬃcial accounting documents 
related to the organization and regulation of the 
work of local government and the provision of ad-
ministrative services; annual reports of various ad-
ministrative bodies; reports from non-governmental 
organizations and policy institutes; and repealed 
administrative acts.7 These sources were reviewed 
and analyzed. Particular attention was paid to exist-
ing literature on accountability and transparency of 
the local government; reforms in local government; 
civil involvement; raising the eﬀectiveness of local 
administration; and initiatives aimed at reducing the 
level of corruption and abuse of power. Second, this 
study required in-depth ﬁeld research. This involved 
personal semi-standard interviews with employees 
performing administrative services regarding the issu-
ing of licenses, permits, and registrations (in the mu-
nicipalities of Soﬁa, Plovdiv, Stambolijski, Kazanluk, 
Koprivshtitsa, Byala, and Devnya); e-mail interviews 
with representatives of 18 municipalities in relation 
to the practices for public consultation in the proc-
ess of local planning;8 and observations. Observation 
was used as a non-invasive means of identifying and 
assessing administrative organizations and their ope-
rational and functional structures, the functioning of 
the systems for control, and the available technical, 
human, and other resources.
The scope of the study does not include adminis-
trative remedies against abuses in the ﬁeld of munici-
pal ﬁnances, due to the speciﬁcity of these issues and 
the number of topical analyses made in this sphere. 
The issue of Bulgaria’s electoral system (the Law on 
Local Elections) is considered only with a view to 
outlining the legal framework of local government 
in Bulgaria.
The starting point of analysis is the new legal 
and organizational framework of the Bulgarian 
administrative system and the changes introduced 
in civil and administrative law and processes. These 
changes serve to create conditions for restricting 
abuses and unlawful exercise of powers; that said, it 
Client Satisfaction Public Trust
Eﬀectiveness of 
Administrative Remedies
Figure 1.
Cyclic Interdependence of Indicators
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is important to recognize that reforms are on-going, 
and have not been completed. Thus, the realization 
of the planned goals, especially at the local level, is 
directly related to the need to strengthen the capacity 
of local administration for eﬀective and uncontrover-
sial application of the new legal framework.
In analyzing and formulating the proposed 
recommendations, we have accounted for the inﬂu-
ence of various mechanisms for restricting abuses in 
relation to the main types of administrative abuses 
that are being observed. We have identiﬁed the main 
reasons, participants, and mechanisms for commit-
ting abuses in the local administration and as a result 
we have established the most eﬀective approaches for 
applying administrative remedies for overcoming 
abuses. This study also considers the various sources 
of employees’ discretionary powers and the various 
forms of control on their application. The reasons that 
condition abuses of power include: ineﬀective control 
mechanisms or misapplication; lack of information 
in relation to citizens’ rights and the procedures for 
providing public services and taking of decisions; 
complex procedures for appealing (administrative 
and court); normative anomalies; and (generally) the 
illegal, unethical, or inappropriate exercise of discre-
tionary powers.
The designation of various remedies against abuse 
as “weak” or “strong” in Table 1 is made with the aim 
of clarifying the ordering of control remedies origi-
nating from various sources. The assumption is that 
control over regulations exercised by institutions or 
courts at this stage of public administration reform 
and civil society development has more weight (or, 
is more eﬀective) than the majority of forms of civic 
control. Without being exhaustive, several examples 
from the local authorities’ work in the country, re-
ported on and commented on in the media over the 
last two years, support this thesis. The limited time for 
the current survey and the lack of exhaustive statistics 
prevented a more detailed study. An in-depth study 
of the weight of various control remedies is of vital 
importance for identifying opportunities for control-
ling not only lawfulness, but also the purposefulness 
of local government actions and decisions.
Table 1.
Links between Types of Abuses and Remedies for Control9 
Administrative actions deﬁned as abuses Sources: Illegal, unethical, inappropriate exercise of discretionary powers
Adoption or spread of 
norms
Taking of decisions Failure to grant rights
Damages Actions of more general 
eﬀect
(predominantly damage 
public interests)
Individualized actions 
or actions of more 
general eﬀect10
(damage individual and 
public interests)
Individualized actions
(predominantly 
damage individual 
interests)
Remedies internal 
to administrative 
system 
Strong Internal rules and procedures for (hierarchical) control; control by higher 
administrative instance
Weak Legal norms for civil control
Remedies external 
to administrative 
system
Strong Court control; institutions (ombudsman); access to information
• Electoral participation and electoral results; 
• Ethical and professional codes;
• Legal norms defending public interests.
Weak • Study on satisfaction with provided services;
• Civic participation in the consultative process;
• Studies of research institutes.
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There are a number of devices applied to enhance 
the accountability and transparency of local govern-
ment work. These devices, however, should not be 
considered universal methods for overcoming abuses. 
The study of corruption in public administration in 
Bulgaria and the development of counter-remedies in 
recent years are undoubtedly induced by the critical 
importance of administrative reform in the country. 
Focusing on this, however, leaves aside areas that 
have a direct bearing on corruption as well as on 
other types of abuses, such as conﬂict of interest and 
the exercise of discretionary powers on the part of the 
administration.
To evaluate and analyze the eﬀectiveness of ad-
ministrative remedies against abuses, remedies are 
diﬀerentiated and separated into three groups. The 
ﬁrst group includes remedies related to hierarchical 
accountability and general mechanisms for admin-
istrative and ﬁnancial control in Bulgarian admin-
istration. The second group includes procedures for 
judicial control over the work of local government 
bodies and their accessibility to citizens. The third 
group includes remedies with which the local authori-
ties ensure feedback from and practical involvement 
of citizens in local governance and civil initiatives. 
Based on research, this study oﬀers practical recom-
mendations directed at enhancing the eﬀectiveness of 
the applied administrative remedies against abuses of 
power on a local level.
The analysis of the state and the recommenda-
tions for enhancing the eﬀectiveness of administra-
tive remedies have been based on the understanding 
that more transparent governance, the provision of 
public services of a higher quality, the raising of the 
qualiﬁcation and motivation of employees improved 
and the eﬀectiveness of internal and civil control will 
ensure reliable defense against abuses. The proposed 
recommendations are directed at decision-makers at 
both the local and national levels.
***
This study develops the presented topic in two 
sections, with a conclusion. The ﬁrst section presents 
a short description and historical background of state 
and local administrations in Bulgaria. The second 
considers citizens’ evaluations of local governance 
through the notions of “public trust” and “client 
satisfaction” with the services provided by the local 
government. This section presents descriptions of the 
types of administrative remedies and the abuses they 
are designed to prevent. Next examines the existing 
mechanisms for performance control of local ad-
ministration on behalf of the state and citizens, and 
practices for their application in the local administra-
tion. The study examines the internal mechanisms 
for hierarchical control and accountability, the pro-
cedures for administrative control by external in-
stances, juridical control, and mechanisms to ensure 
transparency in the work of the local administration 
and civic involvement in the decision-taking process. 
This study concludes with a consideration of the data 
presented by the ﬁrst sections, along with policy op-
tions and recommendations.
2. GOVERNANCE AND 
 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
Trust (or mistrust) is formed on the basis of the pre-
vious experience, that citizens have in using public 
services provided by local authorities, and accessible 
information about the mechanisms of governance and 
the main values that the authorities defend through 
their activities. Trust is also based on the relationships 
between citizens and local authorities. Without trust, 
it is impossible to create cooperative relations among 
stakeholders in the process of local development. These 
relationships are a prerequisite and a necessary condi-
tion for the eﬀective execution of local government 
tasks as well as for the eﬀective application of remedies 
against abuses. The level of trust and the legitimacy of 
local government depend on the eﬀective execution of 
these tasks (Hinna and Monteduro 2003).
Satisfaction with public service delivery is also 
linked to citizens’ evaluation of the tools applied 
by an administration to defend the public interest, 
and of the use local government makes of public 
resources.
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2.1 Data on "Public Trust"
2.1.1 Public Trust in Institutions
Public trust and active civic involvement in the devel-
opment of local policies are critical conditions for the 
eﬃcacy and eﬃciency of institutions. As noted above 
in Bulgaria, community members have a direct rela-
tionship more frequently with the local rather than 
central authorities.  
In consideration of the classiﬁcation scheme es-
tablished in Table 1, and applying values of trust in 
various institutions to units, the data suggests that 
citizens are wary of institutions that apply the main 
tools for the control of abuses at the local level 
(Table 2).
On average, studies made in recent years in 
Bulgaria suggest that expressed trust in local govern-
ment is mediocre: citizens ranked local government 
seventh out of 13 state and public institutions. This 
indicates that institutions that play a vital role in 
the application of remedies against abuses in local 
government enjoy signiﬁcantly lower public trust. 
Such institutions are the court, non-governmental 
organizations, and private enterprises—all of which 
are prominent players in local economic development, 
and important “clients” of local government services 
(Table 3).
The expressed trust in the municipal mayor, as a 
body of local executive power, does not exceed the 
mark of 4 on a scale from 1 to 10.11 One-third of 
citizens responded that they did not trust the mayor 
of their municipality, while only 6 percent expressed 
full trust in him/her. Compared to the evaluation 
of trust in other state bodies, however, mayors rank 
third, after the President and the church. Data from 
a recent study in Soﬁa (Open Society Institute 2002) 
conﬁrms a low level of public trust in institutions 
that exercise controlling functions in relation to the 
work of municipal mayors and municipal councils. At 
the same time, public trust in mayors is marked by 
growth in comparison to studies made a year earlier 
(Table 4).
Age signiﬁcantly aﬀects trust in local govern-
ment—trust grows with age. The youngest interview-
ees (under 39 years) voiced little trust in government 
(17.2 points), compared to 33.9 points for those over 
60 years of age.12 Exceptionally low is trust in munici-
pal councils—the local legislative body that can repeal 
Table 2.
Relationship between Types of Control Remedy and Expressed Trust in Implementing Institutions*
Type
Measures Implementing 
institution(s)
Transformed 
level of trust
Remedies internal to 
the administrative 
system
Strong Internal rules and procedures for 
(hierarchical) control
Mayor of the 
municipality
1
Control by higher administrative instance Municipal council, 
Governor of region
0.5
Weak Legal norms for civil control
Legal norms for civil control, including 
professional groups, etc
Professional unions 0.6
Trade unions 0.5
Remedies external 
to the administrative 
system
Strong Court control Courts 0.7
Access to information Mass media 0.9
Weak Study on satisfaction with provided 
services
Civic participation in the consultative 
process
Non-governmental and 
civic organizations
0.5
* The table includes only remedies with available data on the level of trust in the implementing institutions.
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Table 3.
Public Trust in Certain Institutions and Organizations
Organization or institution Percent answering “Trust very much” and “Trust a fair amount”
NGOs 8.8
Trade unions 9.4
Courts 12
Private enterprises 16.7
Parliament 19.1
Universities 25.6
Local Authorities 27.2
Government 30.7
Police 33
Church 51.3
Army 53.2
Source: International IDEA 2002. p.19.
Table 4.
Public Trust in Certain Institutions and Organizations
Organization or institution Average level of public trust
NGOs 2.0
President 4.3
Parliament 2.3–2.4
Prime Minister 3.5
Government 2.7–2.9
Mayor of Municipality 3.5–3.72
Mass media 3.5–3.7
Court 2.6
Police 3.5–4.2
Bank system 2.7
Church 4.2
Trade unions 4.0
Source: Open Society Foundation–Soﬁa, Bulgaria  2002.
orders (administrative acts) issued by the municipal 
mayor. Meanwhile, over 40 percent of those inter-
viewed could not say whether they do or do not have 
trust in the municipal council. The reason for this 
situation is the fact that citizens lack familiarity with 
the powers and functions of the “local parliament.”
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2.1.2 Level of Electoral Participation in 
  Presidential, Parliamentary, and 
  Local Elections
Electoral participation is an important indicator for 
the state of a community and its readiness to take part 
in the resolution of common problems. Since electoral 
bodies, especially those within local government, have 
missions and tasks directly related to the realization of 
communal goals for development and better living. 
After the onset of democratic changes in 1989, a 
stable decrease in electoral participation has occurred. 
Analysts attribute this to the increasing mistrust in 
the political system, due to its inability to express 
and realize public expectations. Recent sociological 
data suggest extremely low levels of public trust,
under 10 percent. The decreasing trend in electoral 
participation is highlighted by the level of voter turn-
out in mayoral elections in 2002: in Sliven, less than 
14 percent of voters; in Blagoevgrad, 26 percent; and 
in Rousse, 26 percent. Polls regarding the October 
2003 elections predicted turnout around 30 percent. 
These numbers suggest a lack of legitimacy of 
local governance and present an alarming signal for 
public integrity; they indicate a growing distance 
between citizens and the issues related to power, and 
they highlight the atomization of society and social 
activity.
Declining electoral participation could also be 
viewed as a result of the re-establishment of “normal” 
perceptions of the electoral process after the euphoria 
characteristic of the early 1990s.  When compared to 
the low level of trust both in national elected institu-
tions (Parliament and President) and in local govern-
ment, however, low electoral participation reveals an 
increasing level of mistrust in the capacity of these 
bodies to fulﬁll citizens’ expectations. This tendency 
was corroborated by surveys of public intention to 
vote in local elections in October 2003.
Low public trust and the failure to exercise the 
right to vote relate directly to the unwillingness of 
citizens to exercise their right to control and partici-
pate in local governance. This problem must be taken 
into account in planning and applying such control 
remedies as mechanisms for the prevention of abuses 
and correctives for local government work.   As well, it 
should be noted that diﬀerent sources of power deter-
mine the diﬀerent strategies that ensure remedies for 
preventing abuses in local government. Considering 
that local authorities, as direct representatives of citi-
zens in a given municipality, have the competence to 
decide on the main issues related to local economic 
and social development, civic non-participation in 
elections can be seen as an instrument (among au-
thorities) for controlling the work of “electable” bod-
ies of local government. Meanwhile, local government 
employees are often appointed by the mayor, who 
directs executive activities in a municipality. By law, 
they are accountable for their work only to the mayor; 
they cannot be sanctioned directly by citizens. This 
Table 5.
Electoral Participation in Various Elections
Election Electoral participation by year
Presidential 2001* 1996 1992
Total 50.05% 63.06% 75.39%
Parliament 2001 1997 1994 1991 199013
Total 67.03% 62.93% 78.05% 83.87% 90.75%
Local 1999 1995 1991
Total Municipal 
council
Municipal 
mayor*
Municipal 
council
Municipal 
mayor*
Municipal 
council
Municipal 
mayor*
51.61% 51.58% 64.19% 64.19% n/a n/a14
Source: Central Electoral Commission Bulletin
* The data refer to electoral participation on the First Electoral Tour.
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highlights the growing need for internal procedures 
and performance indicators, which will be considered 
further in this study.
2.2 “Client Satisfaction” with 
  Administrative and Public Services 
  Provided by Local Authorities
Key goals in the modernization of public administra-
tion are to improve performance and to perfect the 
systems for administrative service delivery. The adopted 
remedies for improving administrative service are led 
by the understanding that an administration should 
be open to citizens and businesses.
Performance accountability is a mechanism through 
which individuals and groups can hold institutions 
responsible for their work in delivering administra-
tive services. Performance accountability allows for 
critical examination of those actions of employees 
and institutions that are related to achieving results, 
providing services, and implementing objectives and/
or inﬂuences (Brinkerhoﬀ 2001).
In Bulgaria, local government bodies—the mu-
nicipal mayor and municipal council—bear the main 
responsibility for the just, transparent, and eﬀective 
delivery of public services, as well as for the spending 
of public resources locally. 
Data on citizens’ trust in institutions (presented 
in the previous section) show that the municipal may-
or ranks high in terms of trust, while trust in institu-
tions that apply the main controlling remedies over 
local government performance is signiﬁcantly lower. 
A mayor, however, is to a great extent also responsible 
for transparent and eﬀective administrative service 
delivered locally. Surveys suggest that the majority 
of citizens are not satisﬁed with the quality of service 
delivery, and in many cases consider it justiﬁable to 
employ corrupt practices in order to receive service of 
desired quality.  In this sense, data on citizens’ satis-
faction with the  delivery of administrative and public 
services, as will be discussed, are considered indicators 
of the adequacy of the applied controlling remedies 
against non-transparent servicing and abuses.
In the framework of this project, the term “ad-
ministrative service” is used in a much broader sense 
than the interpretation given by the Administrative 
Service to Physical Persons and Legal Entities Act 
(ASPLEA, see below).15 It refers to every contact 
that citizens or economic agents establish with their 
public administration in order to initiate or further 
their business. “Public services” also includes services 
provided by organizations empowered to provide ad-
ministrative services, as well as services provided to 
the public by legal entities on a market principle.
Finally, maintaining control and transparency 
in the work of a local administration concerns each 
member and each group in the community—both 
individuals and economically active agents—aiming 
to establish favorable conditions for their business.
2.2.1 Service Delivery: 
  Organization of Administrative Service
The main rules underlying the organization of ad-
ministrative service are introduced by ASPLEA. The 
Act lays down the principles of lawfulness, speediness, 
accessibility and quality in administrative service. It 
also applies to organizations delivering public serv-
ices (water supply, sewage, central heating, electricity 
supply, gas supply and so on).
In accordance with ASPLEA, the general meth-
odological management and coordination of deliv-
ered services among all bodies and administrations 
with executive power (at the municipal level as well) 
are prerogatives of the minister of public administra-
tion. District governors coordinate and control the 
performance of territorial units of ministries and all 
other administrative structures, regardless of their 
hierarchical positioning. According to Art. 44 of 
LSLAA, municipal mayors direct and coordinate the 
activities of specialized executive bodies on the terri-
tory of municipalities.
The operational work concerning the methodo-
logical provision of the administrative service system 
is done by the Public Administration Directorate at 
the Council of Ministers Administration, which conti-
nuously processes and analyzes status reports on 
administrative service. The administrative service pro-
cedure, according to ASPLEA, starts with a request, 
which can either be written or oral, made in person 
by the interested party or through his/her authorized 
representative, by mail or otherwise. How a request is 
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made depends on whether an applicant’s identity is 
established, as well as the essence of the requested 
administrative service.
Requests can be addressed either to the admin-
istration executing a service or to its headquartes in 
the territorial unit, where the interested party is lo-
cated. The execution of the administrative service 
starts with the acceptance of a request. If the request 
for the execution of an administrative service is in-
correctly addressed, the seized body or oﬃcial must 
send it oﬃcially to the competent body or oﬃcial, if 
they are from the same administration. Otherwise, 
the applicant is advised as to the correct addressee for 
his/her request.
ASPLEA stipulates that for the execution of ad-
ministrative services, administrations may only require 
documents envisaged in the regulations. It bans the 
imposition of requirements regarding evidence of facts 
and circumstances which could be established by the 
respective administration.
All documents and declarations that are signiﬁ-
cant for the execution of the administrative service 
should be attached to the application. If they are not 
attached, the oﬃcer executing the service will set 
up an appropriate time-limit for their submission. 
Applications that are not completed by the deadline 
will be left unexamined.
The administrative act, which otherwise has no 
time-limit, should be executed immediately if possi-
ble, and not later than within three working days. The 
time may be extended to seven days if the execution 
of the service necessitates veriﬁcation, data collection, 
or research. When the purpose of the application is 
the issuing of an act, a seven-day term is envisaged. 
When the establishment of facts or circumstances 
requires veriﬁcation, data collection, or research, the 
timeframe may be extended up to one month.
The terms for executing an administrative service 
begins at the moment all necessary documents and 
declarations are submitted correctly. When a request 
for an administrative service also includes a request 
for the same administration to issue a respective ad-
ministrative act, the term begins after this document 
has been issued.
2.2.2 Service Delivery: 
  Access to Administrative Services 
A great number of the administrative services pro-
vided by municipal administrations are directed at 
economic agents. These services are part of the system 
for regulating and administering various types of eco-
nomic activities. This most often concerns services for 
issuing acts related to construction or reconstruction 
of a necessary procedure base, licenses, and permits 
related to speciﬁc economic activities (manufacturing, 
trade in alcohol and tobacco products, registrations of 
trade premises and so on).
The existing organization for administrative pro-
cedures does not fully account for the character of 
the regulatory framework and the inter-relatedness 
among normative conditions for carrying out certain 
economic activity. Thus, in practice, employees de-
mand identiﬁcation documents, already-received ad-
ministrative acts, copied documents available in the 
respective municipal administration, and additional 
documents, not envisaged in regulations. Such exten-
sive documentation may be demanded at the discre-
tion of the municipal administration. However, there 
is no common model designed to identify economic 
agents, and the documents issued are not uniﬁed and 
include redundant information. The phraseology used 
in diﬀerent administrations varies and does not have 
a universal interpretation.
According to the ASPLEA, to initiate the proce-
dure, an interested person must only send an applica-
tion, and then the administration must determine an 
appropriate time-limit for the submission of all 
required documents (Art. 15, par. 7). Not all admin-
istrations accept incomplete sets of documents, and 
the procedure does not begin until all required docu-
ments are submitted. Thus, in practice, time-limits 
for completing the procedure are extended (but not 
accounted for during performance evaluation).16
2.2.3 Quality of Performance: 
  Evaluation of Quality of Service Delivery
For the provision of some public and administrative 
services, legislation envisages shared competencies be-
tween the bodies of central and local government. In 
all other cases, central government bodies are entirely 
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responsible for the provision of administrative serv-
ices. According to this criterion, public services are 
divided into three provisional groups:17 
• Public services delivered by the territorial units of 
central administrative structures (the army, police, 
the pension fund) or by state enterprises (electri-
cal supply);
• Public services delivered by central and local ad-
ministrative structures—territorial units of the 
central administration and units of municipal 
(local) administration (primary and secondary 
education, healthcare, social care, transport infra-
structure, central heating); and
• Public services delivered by municipal administra-
tions or by public organizations and legal bodies, 
such as trade associations owned by municipali-
ties or legal bodies awarded with a public procure-
ment contract (water supply, public transport).
Consequently, the quality of the provided services 
depends on the degree of coordination among com-
petent bodies of central and local governments. The 
evaluation of the quality of administrative services is 
established through a system of indicators designed to 
monitor and evaluate the performance of administra-
tive procedures. These indicators include: the number 
of services delivered within a given period of time; the 
time for service execution; the number of complaints 
and responses to these complaints; and service prices. 
As well, the quality evaluation includes the establish-
ment of communication with clients and access to 
information related to the respective administrative 
services.
Citizens’ Opinions
Surveys of clients’ satisfaction with administrative 
services show that they evaluate various aspects of 
service delivery in diﬀerent ways. A public opinion 
poll on service delivery in Bulgaria, conducted in 
the summer of 2002,18 indicates that the greatest 
level of dissatisfaction is with bureaucratic procedures 
described as ineﬀective; when clients are redirected 
to diﬀerent oﬃcers and units or even to diﬀerent ad-
ministrative structures; when they must present docu-
ments which are already available in the municipality 
or documents which are not expressly mentioned in 
the regulation; and ﬁnally with the “excessive” prolon-
gation of procedures.  Other aspects of administrative 
servicing that clients evaluate negatively include the 
speed of service delivery; the inconvenient work-
ing hours of the institutions delivering the services; 
employees’ level of competence in executing services; 
and the service results. Only one-third of cases were 
described positively.19 
Public opinion polls indicate that the main 
reason for failure to express dissatisfaction with the 
quality of provided services is the widespread belief 
that appeal procedures would not produce the desired 
result. Nearly half those interviewed were convinced 
that their opinion/proposal or complaint would not 
produce a result. In one-third of the cases, the ad-
ministration provided an answer to the proposal or 
complaint, but had not undertaken any actions. In 
only one-ﬁfth of the cases had there been a positive 
development: after responding, the administration 
took all necessary actions (Figures 2 and 3).20
According to 40 percent of entrepreneurs, lodging 
a complaint regarding low quality service in a given 
institution will not produce a signiﬁcant change. The 
main reason for not lodging a complaint in cases of 
low quality service is the belief that the complaint 
will not bring about the desired result. In addition 
to being time consuming, appeal procedures are de-
scribed by entrepreneurs as excessively complicated; 
most refuse to use this channel to defend their rights. 
In only 4 percent of the cases, was the reason for not 
lodging a complaint a lack of information about the 
appeal procedure and its addressee. Nearly half of the 
surveyed business representatives believed that the 
delivery of higher quality municipal services would 
decrease corruption and abuses directly, while 40 
percent believed it was possible.21 Nearly 10 percent 
of all clients saw the delivery of higher quality services 
as linked to the use of (personal) contacts.
Only 10 percent voiced satisfaction with the 
quality of the municipal administration. Over half of 
the interviewees could specify which administrative 
structures provide high quality service, while one-
ﬁfth were not satisﬁed with the quality of administra-
tive service as a whole, regardless of whether it was 
delivered by the central administration, its territorial 
divisions, or regional or municipal administrations.22 
When asked to which units of the executive 
power interviewees most often turn, half answered 
the municipal administration, while 15 percent pointed 
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Figure 2.
What Was the Outcome of Your Proposal or Complaint?
Source: Public poll on the provision of administrative services in Bulgaria, July 2002, Vitosha Research Agency, conducted for the One-
Stop-Shops Project, DFID
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Figure 3. 
Do You Believe that Appeal Procedures Are Ineﬀective?
Source: Vitosha Research Agency 2002.
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0
15.4
Yes
31.7
No
33.8
No opinion
19.1
Not applicable
[Percent of 
respondents]
to territorial divisions of the central administration. 
Almost half of all respondents had visited the munici-
pal administration on business less than once in three 
months, 15 percent visited at least once a month, and 
nearly 10 percent visited between one and four times 
a month.
In bigger cities (50,000 to 400,000 inhabitants), 
nearly half of the respondents voiced dissatisfaction 
with the organization and quality of the administra-
tive service. Speciﬁcally, 70 percent found survice de-
livery to be slow, and more than 50 percent suggested 
that they do not receive competent information when 
using the services of the municipal administration. In 
Soﬁa (the capital), over two-thirds answered that lo-
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cal authorities do not manage the major issues related 
to the delivery of basic public services. The results in 
smaller localities are slightly more favorable.
As indicated by Devnya (pop. 9,000) and Byala 
(pop. 2,000), citizens in less populated areas are 
much less dissatisﬁed with the delivery of administra-
tive services. Oﬃcers do not have the workload typi-
cal in bigger towns; in most cases, citizens and oﬃcers 
in the municipal administration know each other.
Opinions of Municipal Employees 
In the process of conducting this study, we established 
certain practices that can be deﬁned as rudimentary 
elements of the quality of administrative service. Mu-
nicipal administrations keep statistics of the number 
of services delivered within a period of time, as required 
by the Public Administration Directorate at the Council 
of Ministers. These indicators, however, are not used by 
the decision-makers in the municipal administration 
for the purposes of monitoring, controlling and plan-
ning the quality of delivered administrative services.
Figures 4–6 present data by the Public Adminis-
tration Directorate at the Council of Ministers on the 
number of services provided by municipal adminis-
trations for the eight-month period between January 
and August 2001.
A study conducted among municipal administra-
tion employees in Pazardzhik shows that few of the 
employees were satisﬁed with the organization of 
work in the municipal administration as a whole, but 
many of them were satisﬁed with the organization of 
work in their unit.23 Half of those interviewed found 
it hard to deﬁne the service provided by the municipal 
administration as fast or slow, while one-third deﬁned 
it as slow.
The observed delivery procedures of some admin-
istrative services reveal excessively and unnecessar-
ily complicated procedures and redundant informa-
tional ﬂows.24 Clients are forced to make multiple 
visits to the municipal administration to perform all 
Figure 4.
Provided Services  per 10,000 Citizens
Source: Report of the Minister of Public Administration, January–August 2001.
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the actions necessary in order to receive a document. 
The organization of service delivery is more oriented 
to the order of municipal administration employees’ 
work than to the actual interests of citizens. This 
method of organizing work in municipal administra-
tions should not be observed in isolation. The multiple 
administration visits necessary to receive a single 
administrative service directly correspond with clients’ 
opinion that service is slow. This is also conﬁrmed by 
the fact that it is generally municipal administrations 
that control the observance of the legally-regulated, 
maximum time-limits for administrative service delivery.
Figure 5.
Overdue Procedures per 1,000 Administrative Services 
Source: Report of the Minister of Public Administration, January–August 2001.
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Figure 6.
Grievances (ASPLEA) and Maladministration per 1,000 Provided Administrative Services
Source: Report of the Minister of Public Administration, January–August 2001.
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The applied methods for quality control of service 
delivery by the municipal administration are under 
hierarchical control and based only on the assessment 
of a higher ranking oﬃcer. There are no written or 
organizational performance standards designed to 
evaluate the quality of administrative service deliv-
ery.  Regulatory requirements do not envisage the 
obligatory introduction of quality control systems of 
any type. The introduction of such quality control is 
a voluntary act on the part of local authorities, and 
certain measures should be adopted to clarify the 
beneﬁts of its application for local self-governance, as 
well as the beneﬁts of personnel training. Few mu-
nicipalities have a certiﬁcate for quality under ISO 
(Troyan, Veliko Turnovo).
2.2.4 Quality of Performance:  
  Usefulness and Suﬃciency of Information 
  Provided on Service Delivery
Municipal administrations make the eﬀort to intro-
duce into practice ASPLEA’s requirements, as well as 
the requirements for the standardization of documents 
necessary to execute administrative services. It must 
be said that at the present, these requirements are ob-
served only formally. The information maintained on 
public information boards is not suﬃcient to ensure 
that citizens and economic agents will prepare eﬀec-
tively for administrative procedures. The practice of 
issuing brochures and handbooks for citizens is wide-
spread, but in most cases, only the types of services, 
time-limits, and prices for their delivery are listed.
In general, information concerning procedures 
is provided only “on the spot,” in the administrative 
structure, or as a last resort over the phone. In the 
latter case, communication is often hampered and of 
very low quality since the employees who provide the 
information by phone are the same who deliver serv-
ices to clients on the spot. As such, they do not have 
enough time to go into details.
The formal observance of legal requirements does 
not meet citizens’ expectations to receive useful infor-
mation. According to the survey conducted among 
economic agents, there is no access whatsoever to 
information about the rules and criteria for taking 
decisions under various administrative procedures. 
This is the opinion of half of the entrepreneurs.25 
These evaluations also correspond to the established 
view that the procedures for obtaining all necessary 
licenses and permits for conducting business present 
an obstacle to small enterprises.26 
Half of the interviewed citizens answered that 
when using municipal information services, the in-
formation they receive is not suﬃcient or helpful.27 
Only 4 percent found it suﬃcient. Between one-third 
and one-half of those interviewed identiﬁed diﬃcult 
access to information as a major problem in their con-
tacts with local administration (Vratsa and Haskovo, 
both of which are large towns).
***
Citizens’ dissatisfaction with the quality of service is 
directly linked to the complex and prolonged admin-
istrative procedures which municipal administrations 
must perform. Unclear and slow procedures may give 
rise to many abuses by employees. The simpliﬁcation 
of these procedures and the provision of competent 
information about requirements and conditions for 
their observance falls to a great extent within the 
competencies of managerial levels in the municipal 
administration and within the competencies of the 
employees themselves.
The low quality of administrative services pro-
vided by the local government represents a signiﬁcant 
barrier for the business activities carried out by eco-
nomic agents. Delays in licensing, gaining permis-
sions, or other relevant administrative acts pose prob-
lems that businessmen and women try to resolve—
and typically with little regard for the public interest. 
More than one-ﬁfth of citizens replied that they would 
oﬀer money or presents, or would pull strings if the 
quality of the provided administrative service was not 
satisfactory (Survey on Administrative Services con-
ducted by Vitosha Research). A survey of the corrup-
tion tendencies conducted by Coalition 2000 shows 
that, from October 2002 to July 2003,  ﬁgures meas-
uring the corruption practical eﬃciency index did not 
change, and remained around the highest level (seven 
points) for the period studied.28 This index is now 
used to estimate how respondents determine to what 
extent corruption is an eﬀective way of solving prob-
lems. As corrupt behaviors are seen to be an eﬀective 
means of solving problems, they are widely employed. 
Moreover, this view (and the pervasiveness) of cor-
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ruption allow municipal employees to take advantage 
of the authority they have (for example, to speed up 
a service) in return for a respective “remuneration” 
by the business. Half of the interviewed employees 
replied that citizens are justiﬁed in oﬀering money 
or presents to have their problem solved (Corruption 
Project Veliko Tarnovo). 
As the present situation is marked by decreasing 
electoral participation, the way to re-establish public 
trust in local institutions is to apply eﬀective internal 
mechanisms, designed to guarantee the quality of 
administrative service. These mechanisms ensure the 
conditions for reducing abuses of power and oﬃcial 
position.
2.3 Administrative Control by the State 
  over Local Government Work 
Mechanisms for control and accountability of the 
work of diﬀerent stakeholders in local government 
are primary tools that ensure the prevention of (and 
subsequent actions against) abuses of administrative 
power or oﬃcial position. The mechanisms for inter-
nal control and accountability introduced in Bulgarian 
legislation include administrative control by a higher 
instance and judicial control in relation to the local 
government bodies and municipal administrations. 
Control and accountability of local government 
work is realized by diﬀerent state bodies and institu-
tions. This should ensure objectivity in resolving local 
issues and prevent the unlawful realization of private 
interests by local administration employees at the 
expense of the public interest. These bodies exercise 
internal and external control in relation to the local 
government work and decisions.
2.3.1 Internal Mechanisms for Hierarchical 
  Control and Accountability
Hierarchical accountability is based on direct moni-
toring of employees’ work and performance control. 
Continuous monitoring and periodical performance 
evaluations are the most common forms of hierarchi-
cal accountability mechanisms. Indicators for indivi-
dual performance evaluation are the degree to which 
an employee’s performance meets the requirements set 
by the management and the rules laid down by the 
monitoring body. 
The main elements of hierarchical accountability 
refer to administrative structure rules, regulations, 
organizational manuals, and diﬀerent operational 
mechanisms. They determine to a maximum degree 
the sphere of competence of each employee, and envis-
age direct control of his/her actions by the immediate 
head. As well, they contain administrative directions 
such as work guidelines, administrative check-ups, 
and career development. The degree to which these 
mechanisms determine the uncontroversial distribu-
tion of responsibilities and levels of reporting is an 
important factor in the evaluation of hierarchical ac-
countability in the examined administrative structure 
(Romzek 2001).
A municipal council adopts an organizational code, 
which regulates the issues related to the organization 
and functioning of the municipal administration.29 
According to Art. 10 of the Administration Act, a 
code regulates the work, functions, and number of 
personnel of each administrative structure.30 As well, 
it regulates the order and organization of the admin-
istrative service provided by a municipal administra-
tion, while internal rules, sanctioned by the respective 
administrative secretary, regulate the concrete details 
of the work related to administrative service delivery.
An administrative secretary is appointed for an 
unlimited period of time by the municipal mayor.31 
This, however, contradicts the general rule laid down 
by the Administration Act, according to which ad-
ministrative secretaries (in executive power) are
appointed for ﬁve-year terms. A secretary is respon-
sible for organizing municipal administration work, 
overseeing the conditions in which municipal em-
ployees work, administering organizational and tech-
nical facilities in the oﬃces, and handling complaints 
and proposals made by citizens.
Municipal administration employees perform 
their duties in accordance with the Civil Servant Act, 
the Labor Code, subsidiary regulations, and internal 
rules for the work of the municipal administration. 
The State Administrative Commission at the 
Council of Ministers exercises full control over the 
adherence to civil servants’ status in central and local 
bodies, monitors civil servants’ performance, moni-
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tors the lawful conduct of recruitment contests and 
gives methodological guidelines for these contests, 
keeps the Civil Servants Register and, upon estab-
lished violations, issues mandatory directions to the 
respective body.
Civil servants and employees who have employ-
ment contracts with the municipality carry out their 
tasks and report to their direct unit head, in accord-
ance with their job description. Heads of administra-
tive units manage, organize, supervise, coordinate, 
report, and are responsible for the work of the respec-
tive structural unit in accordance with its functions 
as stipulated in the organizational code.  Finally, the 
municipal mayor exercises the powers of an employee 
as well as the powers of an administrative sanctioning 
body.32 
Some municipalities maintain an internal con-
trol unit.33 Its functions include: control of budget 
spending; provision of methodological support to 
the municipal administration in applying norma-
tive documents related to the control of work; giving 
statements on drafts of orders, regulations and other 
documents related to municipal administration work; 
and system control of the expedience and lawfulness 
of budget spending.
2.3.2 Internal Rules, Instructions, 
  and Guidelines for Work
The legally-established documents that examine in 
detail the organization and order of functioning of 
administrative structures include internal rules, inst-
ructions and other guidelines for work. These docu-
ments regulate issues that fall outside the organiza-
tional code of the municipality and are sanctioned 
by the administrative secretary. The rules (or, in some 
places, “instructions”) for the organization of oﬃ-
cial work and for the ﬂow of documents regulate the 
order of submitting, internal processing and entering 
of documents at the municipal administration. There 
are also rules that refer to administrative service to 
citizens. They contain descriptions of the responsibili-
ties of heads of units and employees in working with 
municipal administration documents.
Civil servants and the employees working un-
der employment contracts in the municipality fulﬁll 
their tasks and report to their direct head for their 
performance in accordance with their job description. 
Job descriptions include recruitment requirements, 
description of main and additional tasks, knowledge 
requirements related to these tasks, regulations and 
internal administration rules, and organizational and 
managerial links and relationships (hierarchical and 
functional). In outlining the responsibilities that di-
rectly relate to tasks, it is often mentioned that the 
performance of tasks that in line with assigned func-
tions should be of high quality and done within a set 
time-limit.  As a rule, though, the criteria for per-
formance quality are not described in detail. 
Apart from the duties and responsibilities as-
signed to municipal administration employees that 
are described in organizational codes, rules for docu-
ment ﬂow, and job descriptions, there are no written 
guidelines designed to establish the performance stan-
dards applied in a particular administration. Nearly 
three-fourths of interviewed employees think that 
their professional freedom in fulﬁlling their tasks is 
within suitable limits. A small percentage (8 percent) 
think they have too much professional freedom in 
fulﬁlling their tasks.34
The existing standards and control mechanisms 
account mainly for the technical parameters of task 
performance—time limits, lawfulness of decisions—
and leave aside the formulation of clear rules for tak-
ing the most appropriate decision for each separate 
case in the framework of regulatory requirements.
Internal rules related to administrative service of-
ten repeat word for word ASPLEA’s texts, and to a 
very small degree consider in detail internal organiza-
tion, the distribution of responsibilities, and control-
ling procedures.
The model for administrative service delivery 
has the following components: legal grounds; rel-
evant and necessary documents; internal motion of 
the procedure, service delivery or denial; and order of 
appeal. Very often when the administrative service is 
delivered to an economic agent, it is part of a chain 
of conditions related to the execution of a particular 
economic activity and is linked to previous and/or 
subsequent administrative actions.
Municipal administrations do not have a clear 
description of the motion of individual administra-
tive procedures and the technology of their execu-
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tion (which is very important when the procedures 
are related to the checking of circumstances on site 
by the controlling organs). Nor do they have any 
description of the sequence of individual procedures 
and how they interrelate. Clients cannot follow the 
progress of the procedure in their cases. As an excep-
tion, Soﬁa Municipality has developed a system for 
oﬃcial check-up, which is accessible on the municipal 
web-page.36  Currently, this system does not function 
well and does not provide information on the inter-
nal motion of the requested document in the units of 
Soﬁa Municipality.
Example: Organization of procedures for administrative 
service delivery to economic agents by the municipal ad-
ministration in a small municipal center.35 
The studied municipality does not have a separate body 
for administrative service (or other similar form, such as 
front oﬃce or information center). Information about all 
documents necessary to initiate the procedure for issuing 
a requested document is given directly by the experts who 
execute the service. The experts who enter the applications 
and those who make the decision are essentially one and 
the same.
Procedures for executing an administrative service start 
with the submission of all documents required by law. 
Then, experts are required to consider in substance the 
submitted documents and make a decision on the basis 
of their content: whether to issue the requested document 
or a justiﬁed denial. Citizens have the right to appeal this 
denial through an order stipulated by the law (for details 
see Service Delivery).
In practice, experts who enter an application for adminis-
trative service and the documents necessary for its execu-
tion consider these documents substantively at the time 
of their ﬁling. If they consider that there are no grounds 
to issue the requested document, they do not enter the 
application at all based on their determination that the 
content of the documents does not meet requirements and 
must be updated.  As a result, citizens cannot appeal this 
“denial” to issue a document, as administrative procedure 
has been initiated. 
This practice is motivated by an interest in economiz-
ing resources and time, both for the administration and 
clients. The examined case is an example of an unlawful 
extension of discretionary powers, contrary to the pro-
cedure established by law, which limits citizens’ rights 
without providing any personal gain for the respective 
employees. There is also an opportunity for abuse due to 
incompetence and “free” interpretation of the law on the 
part of the employee.
Many municipalities set diﬀerent permit require-
ments that go beyond established norms and regu-
lations. The terminology used in diﬀerent administra-
tions can also cause problems, as there are few gen-
erally accepted deﬁnitions, and interpretations vary 
from department to department and even individual 
to individual. As well, there is no internal system 
that informs employees about envisaged changes in 
regulations directly related to their service delivery 
duties or to their potential impact on the organiza-
tion of work. This often results in ignorance of chan-
ges in regulations, and leads to incompetent decision-
making—thereby aﬀecting service users. Certainly, 
communication (and thus consistency) among admin-
istrative units could be facilitated if there were written 
delivery procedures for each administrative service. 
The lack of administrative guidelines designed to 
deﬁne powers in detail, as well as mechanisms for the 
application of these powers, allows for abuses on the 
part of municipal administration employees.  This is 
due both to the individual desire for (unlawful) per-
sonal gain, and to ignorance or inappropriate exercise 
of discretion.
2.3.3  Staﬀ Training in Municipal Administrations
Employees in municipal administrations receive oﬃ-
cial education and vocational training to develop their 
capacity and skills. Such training serves to enhance 
their competence and the overall performance of the 
administration. With a view to establishing vocational 
qualiﬁcations for civil servants, the appointing body 
should ensure all necessary conditions.  When certain 
qualiﬁcations are required by particular work or serv-
ice, the expenses should be covered by the municipal 
administration.37 
Bulgaria has established a special state institution 
charged with training civil servants in central and 
local administrations, called the Institute for Public 
Administration and European Integration (IPAEI), 
at the Ministry of Public Administration.38 The main 
task of the Institute is to provide vocational qualiﬁca-
tion and re-qualiﬁcation to civil servants. To this end, 
the Institute makes annual training plans and con-
ducts various courses and seminars for employees.
Employee training is done in accordance with 
the National Training Strategy for Administration 
Employees of the Council of Ministers, adopted in 
February 2002. The Strategy determines the priorities 
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of vocational training and aims to raise the expertise 
of those working in the administration. As well, it 
promotes strengthening administrative capacity in 
light of Bulgaria’s future membership in the European 
Union. The Strategy envisages the realization of an 
overall integrated policy for management and devel-
opment of human resources, which should ensure the 
continuation of administrative work toward serving 
public interests. Training measures are directed pre-
dominantly toward civil servants, but the Strategy 
also envisages measures in relation to all employees 
in the Public Administration, working “oﬃcially,” or 
under contract.  
In fulﬁlling the requirements to consolidate 
a competent and professional administration, the 
amendment of the Civil Servants Law, adopted in 
early October 2003, envisages new terms for civil 
service employment (i.e. requirements related to pro-
fessional experience, and obligatory contest). These 
include better opportunities for professional develop-
ment (based on merit), the introduction of a perform-
ance-based payment system, the right to training, 
revisions to the code of conduct, and procedures for 
overcoming conﬂicts of interest. 
In 2003, training accounted for just over 0.8 
percent of the budget for civil servants salaries. The 
Institute for Public Administration and European 
Integration provided training to over 15,000 people 
in 2002, which represents an increase of 40 percent 
compared to 2001. The Institute organizes obligatory 
training for newly employed civil servants, as well 
as specialized training on the issues pertaining to 
European integration.
The Institute for Public Administration and 
European Integration develops and implements an-
nual training programs for employees in municipal 
administrations. Results from local surveys show that 
half of all municipal employees thought their work 
was obstructed by the incompetence of a colleague.39 
One survey conducted in 2001, in the framework of 
a project funded by the World Bank, suggests that 
the majority of employees believed they will need 
additional instruction and/or training for their cur-
rent position.40 Yet, more than 50 percent considered 
themselves familiar with the opportunities for train-
ing in their organization. Over 70 percent thought 
that the opportunities for training in their organiza-
tion depend on training programs and their service 
merits. These results outline a rather broad scope of 
tasks that the IPAEI now faces, and which highlight 
the need for methodological preparation of training 
plans for Bulgarian civil servants, especially in local 
administrations.
2.3.4 Performance Appraisal of Municipal 
  Administration Employees
A regulatory system for employee performance ap-
praisal at all levels of public administration was in-
troduced early 2003, along with a regulation for the 
terms and conditions for attesting employees in the 
state administration.41 The periodical performance ap-
praisal laid down by the regulation is a key element in 
a three-year (2001–2004) project, entitled Perform-
ance Appraisal, Pay, and Grading in the Public Sector, 
and funded by the British government through the 
Department for International Development.
The terms for performance appraisal of employees 
established by the regulation refer to persons who 
work on an oﬃcial or employment contract basis in 
the state administration, except for executive power 
bodies, including municipal mayors. The attestation 
of employees’ performance has multiple aims:
• to establish the level of vocational qualiﬁcation 
and its correspondence to the requirements set in 
job descriptions and organizational codes;
• to improve the work of respective administra-
tions (units, and individuals) through eﬀective 
performance management, in order to achieve 
goals, execute duties, and enhance personal com-
petence;
• to ensure fair remuneration of employees accord-
ing to their capacity and contribution to the ac-
tivities of the administration; and
• to identify the vocational development needs of 
each employee and enhance his/her vocational 
competence.
The evaluation of employees in public adminis-
tration is made on the basis of periodical appraisals 
of their performance, where the following factors are 
taken into consideration: vocational qualiﬁcation, term 
of service, and the requirements for the execution of 
direct duties set in the job description of the given post.
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Attestation, through annual performance ap-
praisal of each employee in public administration, is 
done by an evaluator under the supervision and con-
trol of a supervisor, along with representative trade 
unions in the administration. The evaluator should 
be the individual to whom the respective employee is 
directly subordinate; the evaluator is subordinate to 
the supervisor.
Performance appraisal is used when deciding to 
promote civil servants. Requirements and appraisal 
mechanisms envisaged in the regulation allow for 
additions to be made to control areas that are omit-
ted or insuﬃciently developed by the internal rules of 
municipal administrations.
The process of appraisal covers a period of one 
calendar year. It includes development and coordina-
tion of a work plan at the start of the period, an inter-
im meeting in the middle of the period and a closing 
meeting and overall performance evaluation at the 
end of the period. The initial work plan accounts for 
the main goal, direct duties, managed resources, and 
competencies set in the job description of the post 
taken by the evaluated employee. It establishes the ob-
jectives and requirements that the evaluated employee 
should realize throughout the year. These should be 
related to the achievement of concrete goals, to the 
improvement of certain qualities of the evaluated 
employee, including his/her vocational qualiﬁcation, 
and to changes in his/her behavior.
Individual indicators for performance evaluation 
include: demonstrated competencies and the degree 
of realization of work plan goals and of the require-
ments of the direct duties set in the job description. 
The regulation gives a detailed description of indi-
cators for performance evaluation as well as indica-
tors for competence evaluation of diﬀerent groups of 
employees. The latter includes: competence in work 
with customers (knowledge of a service’s customers, 
and ability to deliver services eﬀectively), commu-
nication skills, openness, tolerance, courteousness, 
and the ability to evaluate and prioritize customers’ 
interests and preferences. According to Art. 19, par. 
2, the assessment of competencies takes into account 
the number of complaints in relation to customer 
service.
As of yet, there is still no established practice for 
applying the regulation in municipal administrations. 
At this stage, it is not possible to assess the eﬀective-
ness of its application. The methodological support of 
the process will ensure eﬀective practice in appraising 
employees’ performance, as well as a basis for apply-
ing the principles for employees’ career development.
2.3.5 Liability in Case of Abuse of 
  Oﬃcial Position
According to Bulgarian laws, the liability that employ-
ees in local administrations bear in the case of abuse of 
oﬃcial position depends on the character of the viola-
tion. A liability can be property, criminal, administra-
tive, and disciplinary (the latter applies only to civil 
servants and employees in the local administration).
Administrative Liability 
Administrative liability is realized when employees 
do not perform their legal duties, when physical and 
legal bodies violate duties they are obliged to perform, 
and when the committed violations do not constitute 
crimes under the Penal Code.  Such liability takes the 
form of ﬁnes for oﬃcials and physical entities (citi-
zens), and property sanctions (which also have a mon-
etary expression) for legal entities (organizations).
Among the violations subject to sanctions, as 
envisaged by ASPLEA, are: failing to enact an order 
of a higher administrative body or a court order pre-
scribing delivery of a certain administrative service; 
requiring documents that are not required by law; 
failing to take a decision within a set term, without 
acceptable excuse, in relation to a request for an ad-
ministrative service or in relation to an appeal against 
the administrative service; failing to send a request for 
an administrative service or appeal against a refusal to 
deliver an administrative service in a timely manner; 
and failing to fulﬁll other duties arising from the law.
Fines range from 20 to 100 BGN, and from 40 to 
200 BGN for repeated oﬀences. The average monthly 
salary for the country is 280 BGN.42 The ﬁnes as en-
visaged by the law range from 7 to 35 percent of an 
average monthly salary for a ﬁrst oﬀence, and from 12 
to 70 percent for a second oﬀence.
Disciplinary Liability 
Disciplinary liability arises from a violation of service 
duties. Consequently, it is imposed only on those who 
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have an oﬃcial employment relationship with the 
head of an administration or an employer—such as 
civil servants and contract employees in central and 
local administrations. Civil servants are sanctioned 
according to the penalties envisaged in the CSA: note, 
warning (reproach), postponement of promotion for 
a year, reduction in rank for a term of six months to 
one year, and ﬁnally, dismissal. For violations of work 
discipline, oﬃcials under employment contracts are 
subject to the disciplinary sanctions envisaged by 
the Code of Labor: note, warning of dismissal, then 
dismissal. 
Statistic shows that in nearly half of all cases, 
disciplinary sanctions are imposed for to the poor 
performance of duties. In approximately 10 percent 
of the cases, they are imposed for to pecuniary abuse 
or disregard of subordination. According to fewer 
than half of the employees, the existing sanctions for 
disciplinary violations are ineﬀective.
2.3.6 Conduct and Ethical Codes: Best Practices 
  for Task Performance and the Prevention of 
  Conﬂicts of Interest  
A Code of Conduct for civil servants has been ap-
proved43 that outlines the basic principles and rules 
for ethical conduct of civil servants and their relation-
ships with citizens in fulﬁllment of their professional 
duties and also in public and private life. National 
Center for Public Opinion Polls (NCIOM) research 
shows that almost half of civil servants think that the 
Code contributes to improvements in their work; one-
quarter could not give an opinion. However, nearly 15 
percent of the interviewed civil servants claimed that 
they were not familiar with this Code.  
The practices of approving and implementing a 
Code of Ethics in local administration work are not 
very widespread; such documents have been devel-
oped in isolated cases.
***
The regulatory framework that determines the organi-
zation and functions of municipal administrations en-
visages all main elements and mechanisms for internal 
hierarchical control and accountability. Municipal 
administrations apply and adhere to the requirements 
set in regulations, but in the majority of cases, this ap-
plication covers only the minimal legal requirements. 
Decision-makers do not use their delegated rights to 
further develop these mechanisms. The lack of inter-
nal performance standards, which account for the 
speciﬁc conditions, creates conditions for abuse on 
the part of municipal administration employees—due 
to a desire for unlawful personal gain, to ignorance or 
to inappropriate exercise of discretion.
The mechanisms for training civil servants and 
managing career development envisaged in the re-
gulatory framework, and recently applied by admin-
istrations, represent a solid basis for the development 
of those areas of control that are omitted or insuf-
ﬁciently developed by the internal rules of municipal 
administrations. Their application requires continu-
ous methodological support on the part of the compe-
tent bodies and units in the Bulgarian administrative 
system.
2.3.7 Administrative and Financial Control in 
  Local Government Work
Legal accountability includes mechanisms designed 
to ensure that the decisions taken by administra-
tive bodies, within the scope of their powers, are 
technically “correct.” Speciﬁcally, they must meet or 
coincide with requirements set in legislation. In its 
essence, control is subsequent (post facto) and consists 
of examining the legal grounds of decisions made and 
actions taken.
The mechanism applied in Bulgaria to ensure le-
gal accountability of local authorities consists of pro-
cedures united in a single and consistent process. At 
various stages of this process, control (in relation to 
the activities performed by local government bodies 
and local administration) is exercised both internally 
and externally. Understanding that the eﬀectiveness 
of this mechanism can be evaluated best if it is con-
sidered in its totality, this study ﬁrst presents the ele-
ments of administrative control, and then considers 
the procedures for judicial control, which are insepa-
rable from the whole mechanism.
The Local Self-governance and Local Adminis-
tration Act (LSLAA) empowers the municipal mayor 
and the municipal council to take on the functions 
of controlling bodies in relation to one another. The 
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Act establishes the way in which these powers will be 
exercised. A municipal council can repeal acts issued 
by a mayor in violation of municipal council deci-
sions. In turn, a municipal mayor can veto a council 
decision or postpone action on a decision when he or 
she thinks that it contradicts the interests of the mu-
nicipality or violates the law. In case of a veto, a mayor 
can dispute the lawfulness of a decision in the court.
As an institution external to the system of local 
government, and as a representative of the central ad-
ministration, a district governor exercises control over 
the lawfulness of acts and actions taken by the bodies 
of local self-government and local administration.44 
According to LSLAA, a district governor can repeal 
an unlawful act issued by a municipal mayor in a one-
month term. The district governor can stop the ex-
ecution of unlawful acts issued by municipal councils 
and can refer the acts to the district court. However, 
the order of receiving acts issued by municipal coun-
cils and municipal mayors is not regulated.
Municipal administration work, which is subject 
to administrative control on the part of external and 
internal instances, is to a great degree related to ad-
ministrative service delivery. Upon a refusal on the 
part of responsible authorities and oﬃcials to deliver a 
requested administrative service, citizens and organi-
zations can issue an appeal, according to the order set 
by law. It is also a case of refusal when an adminis-
trative service is not delivered in the requested form. 
Failure to take a decision within a set term is deemed 
a “silent” refusal to deliver a requested service.
There are two options envisaged by the law for 
appealing against refusals: either through administra-
tive channels or through the court channels. Appeal 
through court channels is considered in the following 
section. Appeal through administrative channels takes 
place before the administrative body of the executive 
power, unlike an appeal through court channels, which 
takes place before a body of the legislative power.
2.3.8 Order of Appeal of Administrative Acts: 
  Refusal to Deliver a Service or Poor Service
According to ASPLEA, a refusal to perform a particu-
lar administrative service should have legal grounds, 
a time-limit, and a body before which it may be ap-
pealed. When a refusal to perform an administrative 
service is committed by an oﬃcer of the municipal 
administration entrusted with the powers to take such 
decisions, the competent body to consider the appeal 
is the head of the administration, such as a munici-
pal or regional mayor. Refusals issued by mayors of 
regions or mayoralties are appealed before the mayor 
of the municipality. When a refusal is made through 
an administrative act issued by a mayor, it may be 
appealed through the administrative channels of the 
district governor’s oﬃce. This pertains speciﬁcally to 
external forms of administrative control. 
Through administrative channels, the content 
of a document that certiﬁes facts of legal substance 
or that aﬃrms or denies the existence of rights and 
obligations can also be appealed. The appeal should 
be ﬁled within the deadline set by the law, in writ-
ten form. The minimal requisites set by the law are: 
addressee; name and the address of the appellant; and 
his/her complaints or claims.
Time-limits for taking a decision on an appeal in 
the above mentioned cases are set in ASPLEA, and 
hold where other laws do not establish any speciﬁc 
rules. The time-limit for ﬁling an appeal is seven days 
in the case of explicit refusal, or two weeks in the case 
of silent refusal. Within seven days of receiving the 
appeal, the body that refused to deliver the adminis-
trative service can reconsider the issue and deliver the 
requested service, or if it does not ﬁnd legal grounds, 
it should immediately forward the appeal to the com-
petent body. The competent body should formulate 
a decision on the appeal within fourteen days. The 
competent body then has three days to inform the 
appellant. The overall time-limit for taking a decision 
in these cases is 24 days.
Appeals against poor administration beyond 
ASPLEA stipulations are envisaged in the Proposals, 
Signals, Appeals, and Applications Act.45 Since ASPLEA 
envisages the terms for appeals against refusals to 
provide administrative services, all other forms of 
appeals against unsatisfactory administrative service 
on the part of the obliged bodies may be considered 
under PSAAA.46 Despite outdated terminology, this 
law envisages the terms for considering appeals by 
citizens and organizations others than cases of refusal 
to provide a service.
Appeals are considered under PSAAA in cases 
of illegal or improper actions on the part of the ad-
ministration, slowness, inappropriate and insulting 
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attitudes on the part of administrative employees, 
and other bureaucratic misdeeds that may aﬀect 
citizens’ rights or legal interests. These might include 
failure to adhere to the working hours for providing 
services to citizens and organizations, illegal re-direc-
tion from one oﬃcer to another, attempts to demand 
undue proﬁt form those requesting the administrative 
service, and so on.
Appeals are pleaded to the bodies that directly 
manage and control the institutions and persons 
whose unlawful or unjustiﬁed actions are the object 
of the appeal. The body takes a (written) decision on 
the appeal within a one-month period, or within a 
two-month period for a collective or central body. 
When there is evidence of a crime, the respective 
prosecutor is immediately notiﬁed.
When an appeal is accepted, the competent body 
removes or orders the removal of the committed of-
fense or irregularity or takes other suitable measures.
Finally, the order for appeal should be indicated 
in the administrative act issued by the respective 
body. In practice, municipal administrations do not 
provide information in advance about options for 
control and for appealing administrative procedures. 
Consequently, one-ﬁfth of those interviewed believed 
that there is no such order.47  According to another 30 
percent of interviewed citizens, in the case of a refusal 
to deliver a service by an administration, the order 
for appealing is ineﬀective. These opinions call into 
question statements made by municipal administra-
tions that the low number of appeals reﬂects the good 
performance of local administrations. Moreover, 
while the order for appealing administrative acts is 
addressed explicitly and in written form, the options 
for grievances and complaints against poor admin-
istration under PSAAA is not indicated in issued 
documents, nor is any preliminary information about 
them available (Figure 7).
2.3.9 Financial Control of Local Government 
  Work by External Mechanisms
The National Audit Oﬃce is the national auditing 
body in Bulgaria. It carries out independent external 
audits (ﬁnancial management assessments) of public 
resources, including municipal budgets and the re-
sources absorbed by municipalities from European 
Union funds and programs (National Audit Oﬃce 
Act). On the basis of these audits, the National 
Audit Oﬃce presents a report on its evaluations to 
the National Assembly and informs the public, thus 
making the spending of public resources transparent. 
Upon the establishment of violations, it recommends 
measures designed to stop the illegal actions and sends 
the materials from its audit or its audit report to the 
respective competent body, in order to initiate legal 
proceedings.
Figure 7.
Distribution of Number of Grievances Regarding Poor Administration 
per 1,000 Administrative Services Provided by Municipalities
Source: Report of the Minister of Public Administration, January–August 2001.
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A main task of the Agency for State Internal 
Financial Control is to prevent, expose and restore 
damages. The Agency monitors the ﬁnancial activities of 
the bodies that manage budget credits under the re-
publican budget, EU program funds, revenues in the 
republican budget, and so on, with a view to estab-
lishing their legality and adherence to the principles of 
eﬀectiveness, eﬃcacy and the market economy.
In relation to local authorities, the State Internal 
Financial Control Bodies carry out external audits 
through the chief accountant of the municipal body. 
These audits are conducted prior to taking a decision 
to assume liability or to make expenditures.  External 
audits can also be carried out by a delegated internal 
auditor from the Agency for State Internal Financial 
Control, who prepares a survey on the audited body 
as well as a report with recommendations (State Inter-
nal Financial Control Act).
There are also special bodies for combating cor-
ruption, which conduct investigations in cases of 
corruption on the central, regional, and local levels. 
These are the Agency for Financial Investigation 
Service at the Ministry of Finance, and the Economic 
Police, a specialized unit of the National Police 
Service. The Financial Investigation Service Agency 
receives, maintains, examines, analyzes, and discloses 
to the law-keeping bodies information related to sus-
picions of money-laundering. 
2.4 Judicial Control
2.4.1 Bodies and Procedures
Judicial control is exercised over acts issued by muni-
cipal councils or by municipal mayors that have passed 
through the administrative appeal channels, but for 
which the decision taken has not satisﬁed the parties. 
Through court channels, one may appeal administra-
tive liability acts with which the administrative bodies 
impose sanctions on citizens or legal bodies, upon the 
establishment of administrative violation. Refusals to 
deliver an administrative service not only may be ad-
dressed through administrative channels, but also can 
be appealed before the court. An appeal before the 
court can take place in two cases: a) after the option 
for administrative appeal is exhausted and the deci-
sion made by administrative body has not satisﬁed 
the person requesting the service; or b) after the legal 
term for appealing through administrative channels 
has expired.
Competent Bodies
The competent court bodies that consider disputes as 
to the lawfulness of refusals to execute administrative 
services are the Supreme Administrative Court and 
district courts, depending on the body that has issued 
the act. The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC), in 
accordance with the Supreme Administrative Court 
Act, convenes in three-member sessions, as court of 
ﬁrst instance, in relation to refusals or decisions by 
district governors; and in ﬁve-member sessions, as a 
court of last resort, in all cases of last resort appeals. 
District courts act in accordance with the Administra-
tive Procedure Act.
Procedures
The current legal framework requires aﬀected citizens 
or organizations to ﬁle an appeal to the competent 
court of ﬁrst instance or to ﬁle an appeal through the 
administrative body, which then sends it to the com-
petent court. The court considers the appeal in a court 
session; then, the court of ﬁrst instance comes up with 
an order, which may be appealed (a cassation appeal) 
before the SAC. The SAC order enters into force once 
the court delivers its judgment, and is not subject to 
further appeals.
As mentioned earlier, there are two levels of 
courts of appeal when appealing administrative acts. 
District courts are courts of ﬁrst instance in admin-
istrative procedures, and the SAC acts as a court of 
ﬁrst instance in relation to appeals against acts and 
decisions of district governors. The court of last resort 
(cassation) is the SAC, which only acts as a court of 
cassation in relation to administrative cases.
The average duration of the court procedure 
cannot be speciﬁed, as existing laws do not limit the 
period within which the court must consider admin-
istrative cases. The only time regulation relates to is-
suance of the court order and motives: the court must 
issue its order and motives 30 days, at the latest, after 
the ﬁnal court session.
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2.4.2 Access to Court Appeal Procedures: 
  Fees and Financing
According to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),48 
the state collects fees for appeal proceedings.49 The 
amount of the fees for complaints against administra-
tive acts varies from around 3 percent of the average 
monthly salary for physical personsd and legal non-
proﬁt entities to 18 percent of the average monthly sal-
ary for legal entities that do not fall in the above cate-
gories. For the complaint to be considered, a deposit 
of half the cassation fee is required. There are no state 
fees for appeals made through administrative channels 
against refusals to execute administrative service.
Apart from the fees collected under APA, the price 
that citizens and legal bodies must pay in practice in-
cludes lawyer’s fees as well.50 The amount of lawyer’s 
fees for representation in administrative cases is deter-
mined by the material consideration of the claim. For 
claims with no material consideration, lawyer’s fees 
are 50 BGN (18% of the average monthly salary). For 
claims with material consideration, the fees begin at 
the same level and depend on the amount of money 
claimed. Besides these fees, there may be other fees, 
such as fees for advice, research, and preparation of 
documents, which range from 5 to 20 BGN. No-cost 
legal assistance is provided to people in need.
The amount of state fees collected for appeals 
through administrative channels make appeal pro-
cedures accessible, in terms of the price that citizens 
and legal bodies must pay to gain access to one of the 
main mechanisms designed to control and sanction 
public administration work. The amount of lawyer’s 
fees, in cases of claims with material consideration, 
can be viewed as a potential barrier diminishing the 
access to appeals before the court. As this issue falls 
outside the competencies of local and central govern-
ment, this barrier may be overcome by developing 
measures concerning the activities of civic or profes-
sional organizations.
Appeals through court channels can also be made 
in regard to decisions awarding public procurement 
contracts, which represent administrative acts of the 
respective administrative body. Complaints under the 
Public Procurement Act are ﬁled through the body 
awarding the contract and are considered by the court 
in one-month period after they are entered. Appeals 
through court channels may also be made in relation 
to acts for administrative violations committed by a 
physical or legal body and issued by the empowered 
oﬃcial bodies (municipal mayors, head of body, dis-
trict governor or other body empowered by the law to 
establish administrative violations).  The court passes 
a judgment on the lawfulness of the appealed acts. 
Bulgarian courts do not follow the practice of passing 
judgments on the expedience of issued administra-
tive acts when this right falls within the powers of 
a decision-making body. There are cases, however, 
when a court of last resort conﬁrms the lawfulness of 
the decisions and administrative acts issued by local 
government bodies. However, the application of these 
decisions is met with strong resistance by citizens, 
due to their inexpedience and the damages they may 
inﬂict on the citizens’ interests.
Eﬀectiveness and Eﬃciency of Administrative Justice
While recognizing improvements to the legislative 
framework in the ﬁght against corruption, the Euro-
pean Commission’s 2002 Regular Report on Bulgar-
ia’s Progress Toward Accession considers reform of the 
legal system and the judiciary as crucial to the ﬁght 
against corruption and provision of transparency in 
the work of Bulgarian administration. Administrative 
justice helps to increase the transparency and account-
ability in the activities and conduct of the administra-
tion and thus turns into an important defense mecha-
nism against corruption.
In fulﬁlling the envisaged remedies for creating 
a modern and eﬀective system for administrative jus-
tice in Bulgaria, the government carried out, with the 
aid of donor organizations, a comprehensive survey of 
administrative justice (Bilak and Galligan 2003). It 
includes a detailed analysis of Bulgarian legislation in 
this ﬁeld (including a comparative analysis of positive 
practices in EU candidate countries). The government 
plans to implement a project entitled Creation of a 
New System for Administrative Justice in Bulgaria.51 
Its main aim is to ensure the protection of citizens’ 
rights in dealing with the administration and to raise 
the quality of administration by enforcing a clear and 
accountable framework for the implementation of 
functions.
Data show that there is no uniﬁed practice for 
applying procedures for administrative legislation in 
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the system, and no uniﬁcation and classiﬁcation of 
administrative acts and actions. There is an inconsist-
ent legal basis for the issuance, internal appeal of and 
judicial control of administrative acts.
The ineﬀective action of institutions in the court 
system is caused by inconsistent legal bases used in 
administrative justice, the need for specialized train-
ing of judges, and often the lack of trained judges 
and of resources for dealing with the workload in ad-
ministrative justice. All this is reﬂected in the length 
of the time periods in which courts announce their 
decisions on a given trial, which directly aﬀects the 
quality of justice. 
One reason given for delays pertains to the 
mechanisms for summonses and the obstacles caused 
by the administrative bodies issuing summonses. As a 
result, the consideration of most trials takes on aver-
age more than three months.
The main suggestions for improving the court 
system to ensure the protection of citizens’ rights in 
their dealings with the administration are directed at 
the development of a comprehensive Administrative 
Code as well as the creation of a system for specialized 
administrative courts, based on the framework of the 
Higher Administrative Court.
2.5 Citizen Control
 
2.5.1 Transparency in the Performance 
  of Local Administrations’ Activities
2.5.1.1 Access to Public Information
The Access to Public Information Act (APIA), adopt-
ed in 2000, grants citizens and organizations the right 
to information created and stored by local authorities. 
The right to access information is granted to every 
Bulgarian citizen, to foreign citizens, to persons with-
out citizenship, and to Bulgarian or foreign legal enti-
ties. As well, it obliges all state and local authorities, all 
public legal entities, and persons ﬁnanced by the state 
budget to provide information. The media are also 
obliged to grant certain types of information.52
Authorities are mandated to publish information 
relevant to the issued acts (decisions, rules, ordi-
nances, orders): the grounds for their adoption, and 
description of the functions and responsibilities of the 
respective administration. They are obliged, when re-
quested by citizens, to grant equal access to stored in-
formation—except in cases of classiﬁed information 
or information that presents personal data to third 
parties who have not given their explicit consent for 
the provision of the latter. To grant access to public 
information, the Act envisages that every administra-
tion adopt internal rules and organizational guide-
lines, by which to designate a unit and an oﬃcialto 
receive applications for access to information, as well 
as a procedure for registration and consideration of 
applications.
Annual report data on the status of public infor-
mation in Bulgaria (2002) show that in over 70 per-
cent of the municipal administrations under survey, 
there was an appointed oﬃcial to receive applications 
for access to information.53 In two-thirds of those 
administrations, a register of the applications received 
was being kept.
The Access to Public Information Act determines 
the cases in which access to information may be 
refused. It is within the powers of senior oﬃcers to 
adopt internal rules and to delegate responsibility for 
decision-making on the granting or refusing of access 
to public information. Such internal procedures have 
been partially studied. In three-fourths of the sur-
veyed municipal administrations, the person taking 
the decision was a senior oﬃcer, while in 10 percent 
of the cases, the civil servant receiving the application 
took the decision. In over 60 percent of the cases, con-
sultations were held with the jurist at the municipal 
administration, and in one-third,  with the senior of-
ﬁcial at the respective administrative structure.
2.5.1.2 Publicity of Reports on the Work of Local 
  Authorities and of Municipal Council Meetings
According to regulations,54 municipal council sessions 
are open to the public. Upon a council’s decision, 
some sessions may be held behind closed doors. A 
council adopts statutes, orders, decisions, and instruc-
tions on issues of local signiﬁcance. All decisions taken 
at sessions should be announced to citizens. Municipal 
council acts are displayed on the premises of the mu-
nicipality on a site determined by the mayor, and are 
brought to the attention of citizens through the mass 
media or in other ways suitable for that purpose.
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Methods for disseminating information on cur-
rent activities and decisions adopted at council ses-
sions include publishing decisions and other adopted 
documents in the local press and disseminating infor-
mation through the local electronic media (radio and 
TV channels). In some cases, municipal administra-
tions assign the publishing of documents of the mu-
nicipal administration and municipal council in the 
local press via public procurement.55 Some councils 
publish schedules for their sessions and minutes from 
previous sessions on their own web pages or on the 
municipal web pages.56  Unfortunately, this is not yet 
common practice. In most cases, minutes of council 
meetings can be obtained upon request.
A growing tendency is for mayors to present an-
nual reports to the public. This practice, for which 
there are no explicit regulations, enhances transpar-
ency in local administration work. Reports are pre-
sented at public meetings and are disseminated by the 
local media.57
The described measures for publicity and access to 
municipal council decisions and acts are normatively 
guaranteed by law in the ﬁelds of local self-govern-
ance and local administration.
2.5.1.3 Mechanisms for Feedback from Citizens
Mechanisms for feedback from citizens are instru-
ments with which local authorities’ accountability 
can be enhanced, and citizen control can be exercised. 
Mechanisms for studying citizens’ opinions on the 
activities of the municipal administration and council 
present opportunities for the eﬀective monitoring of 
the results of administrative activities.  Certainly, feed-
back from citizens may contain valuable information 
for a local administration. For example, requests for in-
formation may reveal the need for secondary drafting 
of information activities. Proposals may outline useful 
measures for improving the delivery of services. Com-
plaints may point out necessary prevention measures 
against potential abuses. Tools that support voluntary 
feedback include: “mailboxes” for receiving proposals 
and complaints, and for allowing for the collection 
of information and its release along processing chan-
nels; web-pages through which citizens may submit 
questions; hot-lines and questionnaires evaluating the 
work of an administration; focus groups, discussions, 
and other tools for qualitative study of public opin-
ion; open hours with experts and heads of municipal 
administration (mayors, deputy mayors, and heads of 
structural units); and public opinion polls.
After the information has been received and 
processed, the eﬀective implementation of feedback 
mechanisms requires an analysis of proposals and 
complaints that are to be made public (Figures 8, 9).
2.5.1.4 Service Delivery: Projects and Programs
Current initiatives for perfecting administrative serv-
ice, carried out with government support, include: 
the Improving Public Service thorough Provision 
of One-Stop-Shop project (funded by the DFID); a 
program for the establishment of front-oﬃces; and 
pilot projects for the establishment of one-stop-shops 
in municipal administrations (funded by the central 
government). Within the recommendations drafted 
as a result of the Improving Public Service project, 
the government adopted a concept for improving 
administrative service within the “one stop-shop” 
principle. The general model of service for the one-
stop-shop principle is currently in the initial phases 
of implementation in six administrative structures at 
the central level. There are also a number of programs 
for improving administrative service, without direct 
governmental support. Such programs are most often 
initiated by donor organizations or non-governmental 
organizations.58 Currently, out of 18 municipalities, 
12 have no information center or any other type of 
structure for the provision of information to citizens 
on municipal administrative activities; six do have 
such structures.59
The establishment of municipal centers for in-
formation and services is also undertaken to meet 
ASPLEA requirements. It is expected that these cent-
ers will directly increase civic control on the terms of 
delivery, reduce the time for service delivery and the 
expenses both for citizens and the administration, and 
increase transparency in local self-governance. The aim 
is to present concrete administrative information de-
livered by a respective administration. The centers are 
involved in the preparation of handbooks for admin-
istrative services, including information catalogues, 
leaﬂets, and so on, that describe the procedures of a 
respective administration.
In actuality these projects are carried out in sepa-
rate administrative structures, without aﬀecting the 
operative organization of administrative activities and 
possibilities for improving administrative procedures 
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Figure 9.
Municipalities’ Use of Collected Information
Source: Survey conducted by the author within the current project.
Figure 8.
Means by which a Municipal Administration Provides Feedback to Citizens
Source: Survey conducted by the author within the current project.
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
13
Mailbox for
complaints,
questions 
[Number of 
municipalities]
2
Special
telephone
line
3
Questionnaire
for assessing
administration
activiities
2
Focus groups
16
Reception
hours
7
Public
opinion
surveys
6
Internet page
with option
to submit
questions
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
0
18
Analyzes received
complaints and
grievances 
[Number of 
municipalities]
10
Analyzes the quality
of services provided
2
Prepares public opinion
reports on the activities
of the local authorities 
18
A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  R E M E D I E S  F O R  A B U S E S  I N  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T:  B U L G A R I A
89
for service delivery. The lack of a broader view in the 
execution of such projects by NGOs provides no room 
for a true integration of administrative services or the 
creation of eﬀective mechanisms for coordinating the 
activities of various administrations. There are still no 
projects that envisage an actual integration of certain 
services at the central or municipal level. Thus, the 
eﬀect of building service centers remains solely to de-
liver information to interested citizens and juridical 
persons, without any implication for actual adminis-
trative procedures.
2.5.1.5 Ombudsman
An ombudsman is an institution that defends citizens 
and legal entities before local government bodies when 
these bodies do not take necessary actions or when 
their actions violate the existing law, the principles of 
the democratic state and the concept of “good govern-
ance.” By performing these duties, an ombudsman 
contributes to the defense of fundamental rights and 
freedoms (as outlined by international conventions). 
The ombudsman institution has not been a typical 
feature of administrative law in the “continental” legal 
system, upon which the Bulgarian legal system has 
been built.  
The Ombudsman Act, adopted in May 2003,60 
envisages the establishment of the ombudsman insti-
tution as “a body that advocates for citizens when 
state, or municipal bodies in their action or lack of 
action infringe upon citizens’ their rights and free-
doms.” Under the law, the Ombudsman shall be 
elected by the National Assembly for a mandate of 
ﬁve years. Members of Parliament and Parliamentary 
groups may propose candidates for the position of 
Ombudsman. This appears to contradict the basic 
formulation that “in his/her activities, the Ombuds-
man is independent and subject only to the Constitu-
tion, the laws, and the ratiﬁed treaties to which the 
Republic of Bulgaria is a party, and s/he shall be gov-
erned by his personal consciousness and morals.”61
The Ombudsman may be approached with grie-
vances regarding the infringement of rights and free-
doms by legal entities. Certain powers are contra-
dictory, and procedures for the reception and con-
sideration of grievances have not been suﬃciently 
developed. Powers for considering a grievance have 
not been made clear, nor has the timeline for this 
function with respect to the timeline for the appeal 
of administrative acts under administrative and judi-
cial orders. As well, the range of “state and municipal 
bodies and their administrations” against which the 
Ombudsman may realize his/her powers to conduct 
veriﬁcation under received grievances has not been 
speciﬁed. This formulation comprises state bodies, 
against whose acts and actions Ombudsman institu-
tion could not exercise control. This includes, for ex-
ample, activities related to the carrying out of judicial 
power, or the activities of private legal entities deliver-
ing public services. These discrepancies and loopholes 
lead to contradictions and uncertainties in the appli-
cation of the Ombudsman Act, which detracts from 
the eﬃcacy of the institution.
Citizen advocacy in Bulgaria is regulated by a 
series of rules regarding the activities of local advo-
cates, adopted as decisions of municipal councils. The 
statute of the Ombudsman of Soﬁa Municipality is 
regulated by a decision establishing the institution, 
and by rules for the organization of the ombuds-
man.62 In accordance with the requirements of the 
rules, the Ombudsman publishes an activity analysis 
every three months, along with an annual report. 
Both are accessible to citizens via the web site of Soﬁa 
Municipality.63 In 2002, the Ombudsman dealt with 
381 cases. Two-thirds of these were “fact-checking” 
for grievances and appeals, and one-third required 
mediation related to procedures for delivering admin-
istrative services.
Currently, there are public mediators working in 
a number of municipalities with the support of NGO 
pilot projects.64 Ombudsman oﬃces function in 20 
municipalities of varying sizes. The new Ombudsman 
Act does not regulate these municipalities.
2.5.2 Civil Participation in Direct Democracy
2.5.2.1 Civil Participation in Local Governance 
  through Direct Democracy
Bulgarian legislation stipulates the following forms of 
civil participation in local governance through direct 
democracy: local referenda, general assemblies, and 
petitions (collection of signatures).65 Citizens take 
direct decisions through local referenda by voting on 
speciﬁc issues. Local referenda are conducted on issues 
of local importance only, which are within the com-
petencies of local self-government bodies, and which 
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have been explicitly provided for by the law. Local ref-
erenda held in two Bulgarian municipalities under the 
Balkan Assist initiative showed extremely low voter 
participation. Voters in Elena and Sevlievo comprised 
about 7 percent of the total electorate. General assem-
blies represent a form of direct participation in the 
resolution of issues of local importance. They consist 
of all voters in the localities in which they are held, 
and are used to solve concrete issues pertaining to the 
vital interests of the citizens from a particular locality. 
Finally, through petitions, citizens make proposals to 
their municipal council regarding solutions to perti-
nent issues (Figure 10).
2.5.2.2 Consulting Citizens Regarding Changes 
  to Service Delivery Procedures 
Public participation has increasingly been recognized 
as a key factor for the successful planning and imple-
mentation of regional development. Thus, local com-
munity members must be included in solving prob-
lems of social and economic signiﬁcance, as well as 
environmental problems. This calls for the inclusion 
of various interests and needs, as well as for a desire on 
the part of the government to develop partnerships. 
There is a range of norms in Bulgarian legislation 
regulating public participation in the development 
and adoption of plans in the ﬁelds of environment, 
construction investment, and territorial regulation. 
Many norms are aimed directly at the local govern-
ment (municipal mayors and municipal councils), as 
far as the adoption of such plans and the requirements 
for public discussion are within their competence.66
The main tool for conducting consultative proc-
esses locally, when this is not required by law, are 
public discussions—such as holding open public 
meetings to discuss draft projects related to territo-
rial regulation, environmental protection, and so on. 
There is also a tendency to organize such meetings 
and discussions on issues concerning local policies or 
concrete proposals of local government. These, how-
ever, are not regulated in the normative acts (muni-
cipal council orders and decisions) of a local govern-
ment.
A municipal council can include in its permanent 
and temporary committees other experts, apart from 
municipal councilors,67 which could be seen as an 
opportunity for enhancing citizen participation and 
consultation. Permanent committees are tasked with 
surveying the needs of the local population, making 
proposals for resolving expressed problems, provid-
ing support to the municipal council in preparing its 
decisions on raised issues, and exercising control on 
the execution of municipal council decisions. They 
can engage external bodies as experts and consult-
Figure 10.
Survey: Extent to which Municipal Problem-solving Depends on Citizens’ Activity
Source: S. Delcheva 2003. pp.44–45.
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ants. Legally, permanent committees adopt proposals 
and recommendations in relation to the issue under 
consideration, which are sent to the municipal coun-
cil and respective interested parties. There are no 
regulatory requirements or practices for consulting 
stakeholders from the local community regarding 
drafting and introducing changes in procedures for 
administrative service delivery.68 
Regional development planning as part of the 
country’s preparation for EU accession could have 
considerable inﬂuence on the development of prac-
tices to enhance citizen participation. In this context, 
encouraging regional development is closely related 
to the utilization of EU structural funds, and a main 
principle in the work of EU structural funds, empha-
sized by the European Commission, is the principle 
of partnership. In this study, e-mail interviews with 
administration employees revealed that consultations 
with local community representatives on planning 
local government policies had taken place (Figures 
11, 12).
In regard to regional planning, this study uncovered 
and identiﬁed a range of initiatives, including training 
seminars for municipal administration employees and 
municipal council representatives on the principles of 
developing and conducting consultations when plan-
ning local community development. These seminars 
aim to contribute to the improvement of the institu-
tional capacity of local government, both in relation 
to the concrete requirements for the application of 
regional planning,69 and in planning the overall social 
and economic development of the local community.
Figure 12. 
Representatives of which Groups Have Taken Part in the Consultative Process?
Source: Survey conducted by the author within the current project.
Figure 11.
Cases in which Consultations with Representatives of the Local Community Are Used
Source: Survey conducted by the author within the current project.
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2.5.2.3 Participation of Local NGOs 
  in Consultations among Stakeholders
Civil society organizations in Bulgaria face challenges 
characteristic of organizations at the early stages of 
their development. A considerable number of NGOs 
work in the sphere of local self-governance (Vitosha 
Research Agency 1997). NGO initiatives include sup-
port for developing municipal information centers;70 
training seminars for representatives of municipal 
administrations and municipal councils working in 
the sphere of regional planning and European integra-
tion;71 surveys of opportunities to adopt independent 
institutions similar to that of the ombudsman;72 and 
so on. Activities of NGOs are funded primarily by 
donor projects, and are not always trusted by local 
authorities.73 Many NGOs have taken part in the 
systematization of data and documents necessary for 
receiving certain services, and in the distribution of 
free brochures containing such information. These 
initiatives help raise public awareness, but the level of 
topicality and usefulness depends on the competence 
of experts, considering the frequent changes in the 
legislation.
 
Table 6.
Degree of Trust in Non-governmental Organizations 
by Locality
Answered “trust very much” 
and “trust some”
Big town 10.6
Medium town 9.5
Small town 8.3
Rural area 7.4
Source: International IDEA 2002. p.19.
Attitudes about the work of NGOs are predomi-
nantly negative, based on stereotypes formed at the 
beginning of transition, when the public learned 
about illegal activities conducted behind the cover of 
NGOs. Another reason for negative attitudes is the 
lack of information among citizens about the aims 
and outcomes of the activities of various civic organi-
zations. The average level of trust in NGOs is below 10 
percent;74 less than 1 percent of citizens indicate that 
they are members of NGOs and 85 percent had never 
participated in any form of civic organization.75
3. POLICY OPTIONS AND 
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1 Options
In this research, the level of trust in institutions and 
the level of satisfaction with public services that they 
oﬀer are used as markers to indicate the spheres in 
which the public considers that administrative per-
formance does not fulﬁll its expectations. Levels of 
trust and satisfaction are also useful indicators for 
evaluating the eﬀectiveness of remedies against abuse 
implemented by the assessed institutions. 
This review of remedies against abuse of power 
and oﬃcial position shows that low levels of trust and 
satisfaction with the performance of local administra-
tions are suﬃciently clear markers for the problematic 
administrative areas. The evaluation of ways to raise 
the eﬀectiveness of the remedies designed to combat 
abuses in local government has been based on the 
understanding that transparent governance, high 
quality public services which meet citizens’ demands, 
a d functioning internal and civic control collectively 
protect against abuses. In this regard, administrative 
remedies are considered policy and organizational 
mechanisms, developed to ensure the necessary bal-
ance between individual and public interests in local 
government decisions and activities, and to provide 
citizens with access to their rights.
Although the level of trust in the court system is 
closest to that of the mayor, the remedies that need 
to be implemented to improve the functioning of the 
court system and to guarantee the rights of citizens 
in their relations with the state, are perhaps the most 
demanding in terms of resources and political will. 
Necessary changes will have a positive inﬂuence both 
on the practices of courts and on administrative 
control (appealing administrative acts through the 
administrative channels).
Low levels of trust in institutions that apply 
controlling remedies related to internal hierarchical 
standards, communications and civic participation, 
as well as results from the survey on the application 
of these remedies, show the need for serious and sus-
tainable work on the part of both local and central 
government representatives.
Improving the quality of administrative service 
and of internal hierarchical control will guarantee 
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citizens that spending of public resources and service 
provision will be done in a transparent, just, and ad-
equate manner. Methodological changes and capacity 
development require support and commitment from 
the state, local authorities, and international and local 
community members, with an awareness of roles and 
responsibilities. Developing standards and mecha-
nisms for information, communication, and consul-
tations with a local community will help to increase 
the eﬀectiveness of local administration performance, 
the transparency of the decision-making process, as 
well as citizens’ trust.
The quality of the delivered services is a factor that 
will raise public trust in local government institutions 
and in turn raise electoral motivation. Decreasing 
electoral participation is an indication that authori-
ties do not fulﬁll the expectations of their electorate. 
Institutions that play a vital role in the application of 
remedies against abuses in the local government, such 
as the court, enjoy much less public trust than does 
local government. The refusal to exercise the right 
to vote, combined with low public trust, highlights 
citizens’ hesitance to participate in local governance 
work, which blocks the implementations of a single 
main mechanism against abuses.
In the present situation, marked by decreasing 
electoral participation, the primary way to re-estab-
lish public trust in local institutions is through the 
eﬀective application of internal mechanisms designed 
to guarantee the quality of administrative service. 
These mechanisms ensure conditions for reducing 
abuses of power and of oﬃcial position (Figure 13).
This study suggests that actions taken to improve 
the eﬀectiveness of remedies against administrative 
abuses should include the process of policy formula-
tion and development, and should be directed at deci-
sion-makers on both local and national levels. This 
conclusion follows from the general principles for 
administrative service, laid down in the regulatory 
framework of the single (uniﬁed) system for admin-
istrative service.
Reforms to the Bulgarian administrative system 
form a solid basis for the further modernization of 
the civil service and the eﬀective functioning of 
public administration. A clear vision is proposed for 
modernizing public administration, inline with the 
norms of the law-abiding state, a market economy 
and fundamental human rights. A main priority is 
to strengthen the capacity of administration planning 
in response to the justiﬁed expectations of Bulgarian 
Figure 13.
Outcomes that Will Be Achieved via the Proposals for Improving the Eﬀectiveness of Administrative Remedies
Civic participation; 
citizens hold local authorities 
accountable for their work
Transparency of the 
administration; knowledge of the 
principles of administrative 
functioning and of the responsi-
bilities of local authorities
Quality of  
services provided
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citizens for unbiased, open, and eﬀective administra-
tive service.
The achievement of eﬀective outcomes in policy 
implementation is related to planning and provision 
of resources, as well as to serious methodological sup-
port both for the implementation of developed reme-
dies and for the evaluation of their eﬃcacy. There is 
political will to implement the envisaged remedies, 
and there is understanding of the need to invest con-
siderable ﬁnancial and human resources to achieve 
the reliability which is characteristic of the European 
administrative environment. After formulating the 
policy and the means for its implementation over a 
long-term period, it will be possible to plan for neces-
sary resources.
Local authorities play a key role in implement-
ing policies for modernizing public administration. 
The decentralization process and the formulation 
of managerial decisions on a local level are essential 
parts of the institutional framework, designed to op-
timize the functions and organization of administra-
tive structures.
The recommendations made below are based on 
the policy adopted by the government on general 
functional optimization of the administrative system, 
and on the contemporary trends and practices which 
aim to improve service in the European Union. The 
Service Standards Improvements Project (funded by 
the World Bank)76 has been used as a guideline. The 
recommendations for improving administrative regu-
lation and the process of administrative service refer 
to:
• integrating administrative service;
• improving the system for administrative appeal;
• introducing standard procedures for receiving and 
considering appeals and complaints;
• raising the qualiﬁcation and motivation of mu-
nicipal administration employees;
• publicizing municipal administration work and 
improving communication with clients;
• improving the methodological base and the or-
ganization of administrative service delivery;
• developing a quality system for administrative 
service; and
• developing mechanisms for planning and con-
ducting the consultative process.
3.2 Recommendations
1. Integration of administrative service
The integration of administrative service is a main 
tool for eﬀective implementation of the principles, 
laid down by Bulgarian legislation for service delivery 
to citizens and legal bodies. The Council of Ministers 
approved a National Program for integrated admin-
istrative service, which outlines the main activities 
involved in integrating the administrative service 
and the necessary ﬁnancial resources for a mid-term 
period until 2004.
Integrating administrative services will require 
using modern information technology and creating 
a common communication and information environ-
ment to connect local and central administration 
structures with interested organizations and compa-
nies, in order to establish a global administrative net-
work for management and services. It is also necessary 
to introduce a “window point” or “one-stop-shops” 
for access to administrative services, through which 
all interested parties could contact the administrative 
system that would be responsible for the coordination 
of all actions involved in delivering the required serv-
ice (transfer of documentation, agreement, checks). 
The purpose of integrating access (window points) 
and administrative services is to create a new func-
tional model for providing administrative services, 
based on the logical potential of the administrative 
system for internal (oﬃcial) coordination of admin-
istrative procedures and activities. The realization of 
this idea is connected with the establishment of a sin-
gle main administrative organ to coordinate separate 
administrative structures (regardless of their locality) 
and to provide administrative services to citizens and 
legal bodies. A review of the existing system of state 
bodies and their functions, as laid down by law, shows 
that the status and functions of municipal mayors ful-
ﬁll these requirements to the greatest extent.  
The new functional model of administrative serv-
ice should ensure the most eﬀective access possible 
(from the customers’ point of view) to administrative 
services. This model of administrative service includes:
• determining entry/exit “points” for access to ad-
ministrative services;
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• organizing the administrative procedures for the 
provision of services; and
• regulating the means for internal coordination 
and agreement. 
2. Improving the system for administrative 
 and court appeals
The procedures for issuing administrative acts are reg-
ulated by ASPLEA and APA. Additional regulations 
for the order of appeals are included in the Higher 
Administrative Court Act,77 Administrative Violations 
and Sanctions Acts,78 and, to a lesser degree, in the 
Proposals, Signals, Appeals, and Applications Acts.79 
Improving general legislation in relation to admin-
istrative service should be linked to a clear diﬀer-
entiation made between ASPLEA and APA or their 
convergence in a single regulatory act. In practice, 
both laws regulate the issuing and appeal procedures 
of individual administrative acts related to the ac-
knowledgement of certain rights. The Administrative 
Procedure Act, however, is much more familiar to the 
civil servants who deliver the administrative services. 
At the same time, a number of laws, including some 
adopted after ASPLEA, provide for appeal procedures 
for acts issued under APA, regardless of the fact that 
the issuing and appeal procedures for such acts are 
regulated by ASPLEA.
The main issue to be considered is the develop-
ment of a new general law on administrative pro-
cedures that codiﬁes the administrative procedure 
legislation. It should include regulations that cur-
rently are either not regulated to a suﬃcient degree, 
or are contained mainly in the above mentioned laws. 
This codiﬁcation should restrict exceptions from the 
general procedures as much as possible. Certainly, 
the high quality of administrative service delivery is 
based on clear legal standards. This refers also to the 
appeal of administrative acts via suitable procedures. 
The proposal formulated here does not claim to be 
full or exhaustive; instead, it aims to direct attention 
to the need for a comprehensive and modern regula-
tion of administrative procedure and the application 
of relevant procedures.
3. Introduction of standard procedures for 
 receiving and addressing appeals and complaints
It is vital that citizens be well informed about the 
opportunities and procedures for ﬁling appeals and 
complaints with regard to provided administrative 
services. Employees’ competence in relation to these 
opportunities and to the procedures to realize them 
form the basis of their eﬀective implementation. The 
availability of accessible appeal procedures and the 
active encouragement to use them will give citizens 
the conﬁdence to defend their own rights and inter-
ests—particularly when rights and interests have been 
violated or ignored by local oﬃcials. Creating such a 
procedure is within the capacity of municipal admin-
istrations, in regard to their authority and required 
and available resources. 
The main principles to be considered in develop-
ing standards for appeal procedures include: 
• easy access and broadly distributed information 
materials;
• speed, with ﬁxed deadlines for considering com-
plaints and for informing citizens of develop-
ments;
• conﬁdentiality, to protect both employees and 
those who ﬁle appeals and complaints;
• information, particularly for management, on 
how problems could be solved;
• comprehensibility and user-friendliness;
• fairness, with a comprehensive investigation pro-
cedure;
• eﬃciency, to deal with arising problems and to 
provide suitable solutions; and
• regular control and monitoring, to ensure that the 
system works eﬀectively.
4. Raising the qualiﬁcation and motivation of
 municipal administration employees
The improvement of administrative service depends di-
rectly on the professional and managerial preparation 
of administration oﬃcials and on the introduction of 
appropriate stimuli encouraging the implementation 
of measures for improving working methods. Oﬃcials 
should adapt their work and attitudes to the new role 
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of the administration as service providers for citizens. 
The aim is to meet the growing demand of citizens 
and the public for high quality public services. 
For better performance, it is necessary to ensure 
that civil servants receive special training in the new 
requirements, such as transparency of administrative 
decisions, the right to appeal, protection of data, provi-
sion of information, and so on. Achieving perceivable 
changes in administrative culture requires the orienta-
tion of training not only toward skills and competence, 
but also toward conduct, values, and norms. It is also 
necessary to create a system of stimuli to encourage 
innovative decision-making and practices, particularly 
in connection with the providing service to citizens 
and ﬁrms.
5. Raising awareness about municipal 
 administration work and improving 
 communication with clients
Publicity about the work within municipal oﬃces and 
improved relations with clients go hand-in-hand, and 
foster more eﬀective modes and means of governance. 
Possibilities for promoting awareness include:
• Designing manuals about requirements for deliv-
ery of the various kinds of administrative services 
to citizens or economic agents. The manuals for 
citizens or economic agents should describe the 
requirements of and procedures for all activities 
connected with the delivery of separate adminis-
trative services, along with necessary forms. The 
manuals should include terms for the delivery 
of administrative services and options for appeal 
procedures.80
• Providing information regarding responsibili-
ties regarding engaging in economic activities, 
and, speciﬁcally for economic agents, regarding 
obligations and responsibilities in the perform-
ance of their respective economic activities (for 
instance, environmental protection and public 
healthcare and safety). Information should also 
be provided in regard to what needs to be done 
in order to acheive maximum eﬃciency. Special 
care should be taken to inform local small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) about require-
ments and opportunities to do business locally. To 
provide complete information, it is suitable to use 
brochures, audio, and videocassettes (ready-made 
packages), targeted to speciﬁc economic activities 
and personal services. 
These eﬀorts should be directed at the profession-
al provision of reliable and detailed information by 
the administration economic agents and the public. 
Recommendations for improving information reli-
ability and accessibility include:
• improving technology for the provision of infor-
mation;
• developing web pages and other options for on-
line access to information or applications; and
• establishing call centers to provide information 
over the phone by specially-trained employees or 
through recorded answers to the most frequently 
asked questions.
6. Improving the methodological support 
 and the organization for administrative 
 service delivery
Improving the quality of administrative service is 
directly related to improving its organization and the 
provision of methodological support for its realiza-
tion. Improving organizational service requires for the 
precise internal organization of administrative struc-
tures (units, departments). This involves establishing 
units in the general administration to grant access to 
administrative services. Information centers can serve 
to raise access to information and to improve quality. 
The working hours of service units should be conven-
ient for municipal administration clients.
The eﬀective implementation of envisaged mecha-
nisms for control and high quality service provision 
requires a preliminary methodological survey to identify 
the scope of and the concrete procedures for adminis-
trative services, as well asfor addressing inquiries to the 
most appropriate administrative body. As a result, the 
administrative procedures should be speciﬁed under 
the following criteria:
• The description of the procedures will ensure de-
tailed and clear deﬁnition of each employee’s tasks 
and responsibilities and of the internal and exter-
nal functional links of units, and will improve the 
tools for internal hierarchical accountability.
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• The development of a logistical and functional 
model for administrative service delivery will 
facilitate planning for the ﬁnancial and human 
resources necessary for the execution of munici-
pal administration work. The model will help to 
optimize the expenses of service delivery and to 
determine proportionate service fees.
This study also proposes the development of 
manuals for oﬀering various kinds of administrative 
services, directed at the staﬀ of respective administra-
tive structures responsible for service delivery.  
• Service delivery manuals should oﬀer speciﬁc and 
clearly described procedures, directed at munici-
pal administration employees.
• Manuals for administration should describe all 
successive activities connected with the delivery of 
individual administrative services.
• Manuals should deﬁne unambiguously the deci-
sions that need to be taken in connection with re-
quests for services, depending on the actual cases.
• Manuals should be updated on the basis of pe-
riodical assessments of the application of the 
respective administrative procedures.
 
7. Introduction of a quality system for 
 administrative service
The overall improvement of the quality of administra-
tive service is a complex issue, directly related to the 
organization of administrative work and the manage-
ment of administrative structures. The creation of a 
quality system for administrative service incorporates 
the following basic elements:81  
• a policy for the maintenance and development of 
administrative service quality, and organizational, 
ﬁnancial, and human resources management 
(in-cluding planning and evaluation, results, and 
necessary changes);
• a complete classiﬁcation and description of the 
characteristics of the separate administrative struc-
tures and the related administrative procedures;
• a methodology for the performance of the admin-
istrative procedures necessary for the delivery of 
services;
• measurable indicators for evaluating the operative 
eﬃciency of administrative services and related 
administrative procedures (for instance: number 
and types of services delivered; number of docu-
ments processed; time for performance of proce-
dures; number of challenges and signals of omis-
sions; prices; level of satisfaction of clients with 
the administrative service or delivered services, 
etc.); and
• quality control mechanisms for administrative 
service, based on periodic assessment of the work-
ing procedures and organizational capacity and 
on feedback from clients and their attitude to the 
service delivered.
8. Development of mechanisms for planning and 
 conducting the consultative process
Preliminary consultations with stakeholders in rela-
tion to planned measures designed to introduce new 
administrative regulations, or to revoke/optimize ex-
isting administrative regulations, will ensure trust and 
support for implemented policies. The organization of 
an eﬀective consultative process includes:
• developing mechanisms to identify and involve all 
interested parties;
• regulating practices for public consultations and 
informing all interested parties; and
• training of key civil servants.
The involvement of interested parties—citizens, 
economic agents, and their organizations—through 
consultative processes is an eﬀective approach for 
ensuring and maintaining economic agents’ and 
citizens’ trust in and support of government policy 
and for creating a predictable and foreseeable business 
environment.
The process of regional development planning 
as part of the country’s preparation for EU accession 
could have a considerable inﬂuence on the develop-
ment of such practice. In this context, encouraging re-
gional development is closely related to the utilization 
of  EU structural funds. A main principle in the work 
of EU structural funds, emphasized by the European 
Commission, is the principle of partnership.
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4. CONCLUSION
As a result of changes in the Bulgarian social and 
political system, there have also been changes in the 
functions and responsibilities which local authorities 
assume before citizens and local communities. With 
the processes of decentralization and growing citi-
zens’ demands, local government assumes more and 
more responsibilities in planning and realizing local 
development. It has a vital role in creating favorable 
conditions for citizens and businesses, and in taking 
decisions so as to strike a balance, to a maximal de-
gree, between individual and public interests. Public 
trust and active civic involvement in local policy de-
velopment are prerequisites for the good performance 
of institutions.
Measures that will ensure the eﬀective work of 
employees should be sought in order to strengthen the 
measures for performance control in the development 
of and adherence to procedures ensuring transpar-
ency and eﬀectiveness of administrative service.
To be able use civic control as an eﬀective tool 
against abuses, it is necessary to work toward the 
re-establishment of public trust in the institutions of 
local government and civic society. This is a two-way 
process and requires purposeful actions on the part 
of both local administrations and citizens. Citizens, 
as local community members, should assume their 
part of the responsibility in ensuring transparent and 
eﬀective local government by exercising their right to 
exert control over its work and decisions.
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35 The issue of hotel category certiﬁcates, the issue of licenses for trade in tobacco and tobacco products and the issue of permits for trade in alcohol and 
spirits, by the Municipal Administration, Devnya Municipality.
36 http://www.soﬁa.bg/spravka.asp. 
37 Civil Servant Act, promulgated in the State Gazette, issue 67, 1999, enforced August 28, 1999. Amended 2002.
38 The statute of the Institute for Public Administration and European Integration was adopted in the Council of Ministers Directive 82. May 15, 2000. 
Published in OG 41, May 19, 2000. 
39 See Initiatives and Civil Activity Foundation 2000.
40 See Gokcekus. 2001. The survey was conducted among 1,089 civil servants, 18 percent of whom work in municipal administrations and 5 percent in 
district administrations. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/bulgaria/index.htm.
41 Adopted in the Letter of the Council of Ministers 105 from May 21, 2002, prom. State Gazette, issue 54, May 31, 2002. In eﬀect June 01, 2002 for 
the Administration at the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Finances and the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works for pilot ap-
plication; in eﬀect from January 01, 2003 for other administrations.
42 According to preliminary data of the National Statistical Institute on the average monthly salary of people employed under contractual or oﬃcial terms 
in 2002.
43 From December 29, 2000.  Order of the Minister of State Administration.
44 Administration Act, Art. 31.
45 PSAAA, promulgated in the State Gazette, issue 52, July 4, 1980. Amended issue 55, July 7, 2000.
46 Art. 29, par. 2 of PSAAA.
47 See NCIOM 2002.
48 Administrative Procedure Act, Art.5
49 TARIFF 1 from the State Fees Acts for the fees collected by Courts, Prosecutor’s Oﬃces, Investigating Bodies and the Ministry of Justice, SG, 15 /1996.
50 Directive 1, October 1999 on the minimal amount of lawyers’ remuneration (prom. State Gazette, issue. 93, October 1999). Remunerations for single-
instance civic and administrative cases.
51 The project is funded by United Nations Development Program, Embassy of the United Kingdom in Bulgaria, the Republic of Bulgaria and other 
donors.
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52 APIA, Art. 18.
53 Issued within the Legal Assistance and Advocacy for Freedom of Information Project, conducted by the Freedom of Information Foundation with the 
ﬁnancial assistance of Open Society Foundation–Soﬁa.
54 LSLAA, Art.22, Art. 23, Art. 27, Art. 28.
55 Municipal Administration of Sliven.
56 http://www.veliko-turnovo.com/obs/. 
57 http://www.ﬂgr.bg/innovations/browseBg.asp. 
58 See http://www.ﬂgr.bg/. National Program Improving the Service to Citizens of the Foundation for Local Government Reform, with the ﬁnancial 
support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
59 According to the survey conducted by the author within the current project.
60 State Gazette, issue 48, May 23, 2003. In force January 2004.
61 Ombudsman Act, Art.3, it.1.
62 Decision, adopted May 23, 2001, Soﬁa municipal council meeting.
63 See http://www.soﬁa.bg
64 Including support from the Open Society Foundation–Soﬁa.
65 Referendum Act, promulgated in the State Gazette issue 100, 1996.
66 Construction of the Territory Act, art.5, para.1, Environment Act, Art.79, 95, and 97.
67 LSLAA, Art. 48.
68 LSLAA, Art. 49, para. 2.
69 Regional Planning Act.
70 Foundation for Local Government Reform, Soﬁa.
71 European Institute, Soﬁa.
72 Center for Social Practices, Center for the Study of Democracy, Soﬁa. 
73 Minutes of Veliko Turnovo Municipal Council under item: “Adoption of statute and rules for the work of the Ombudsman” of the agenda, and under 
the proposal of a non-governmental organization.
74 See IDEA.
75 Open Society Foundation–Soﬁa 2002.
76 See Strategma Agency.
77 Promulgated in the State Gazette 122, 1997.  Last amended by No. 95 from 1999.
78 Promulgated in the State Gazette 92, 1969.  Last amended by No. 25 from 2002.
79 Promulgated in the State Gazette 52, 1980.  Last amended by No. 55 from 2000.
80 According to LSLAA, municipal administrations determine the fees for administrative services on the basis of the actual expenses for their delivery.
81 The proposed elements are developed on the basis of ISO 9004-2 Control and Quality System Elements, Part 2: Guidelines for the sphere of servicing, 
Reference number ISO 9004-2:1991(E), corrected 1993-05-01.
A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  R E M E D I E S  F O R  A B U S E S  I N  L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T:  B U L G A R I A
101
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Access to Information Program. 2003. The Year of the Rational Ignorance. Retrieved on May 10, 2003. http:
//www.aip-bg.org/pdf/ignorance2.pdf.
Bilak, D. and Galligan, D. 2003. Comprehensive review of the system of administrative justice in Bulgaria. Final Re-
port. Soﬁa, Bulgaria: Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, Ministry of Justice, Supreme Administrative 
Court, United Nations Development Program, Embassy of the United Kingdom in Bulgaria.
Brinkerhoﬀ, D. 2001. Taking Account of Accountability: A Conceptual Overview and Strategic Options. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Agency for International Development.
Control and Quality System Elements. 1991. Guidelines for the sphere of servicing, Part 2 ISO 9004-2:1991(E). 
Corrected 1993-05-01.
Delcheva, S. 2003. “Market Links and the International Republican Institute.” The National Public Opinion Poll. 
Soﬁa, Bulgaria.
European Union. 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. Regular Reports. http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/
bulgaria/index.htm.
Gokcekus, O. 2001. Institutional Encirclement and Work Performance in Bulgaria: Conclusions from the Survey 
of Civil Servants. World Bank. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/countries/bulgaria/
index.htm.
Hinna, L. and F. Monteduro. 2003. Trust in Local Authorities: the role of social reporting stakeholder-oriented. Paper 
Abstract, European Group of Public Administration, Study Group on Quality and Productivity in the Public 
Sector. Retrieved May 18, 2003. http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/facdep/social/pol/io/qual/egpa/lisbon/paper_lis-
bon_monteduro.htm.
Initiatives and Civil Activity Foundation, Pazardzhik. June–September 2000. Civil Activity Against Corruption 
Project. Retrieved December 10, 2002. http://www.online.bg/coalition2000/bg/municipalities/Pazardzik.html 
(Bulgarian version only).
International IDEA. 2002. South Eastern Europe Public Agenda Survey, January–February 2002. Bulgaria. 
Retrieved January 15, 2003. http://www.idea.int/balkans/survey_detailed.cfm.
Morgan, Douglas F. 1987. “Varieties of Administrative Abuse: Some Reﬂections on Ethics and Discretion.” 
Administration and Society 19. pp.267–284.
National Centre for Public Opinion Polls (NCIOM) at the National Assembly. 2002. Problems in Adminis-
trative Reform Research. Survey Report. Retrieved February 8, 2003. http://www1.parliament.bg/nciom/
Nciom2003.html. 
OECD. 2000. Trust in Government: Ethics Measures in OECD Countries. Paris: OECD Publications.
Open Society Foundation–Soﬁa, Bulgaria. 2002. The State of Society Project, Survey May–June 2002. Soﬁa.
Romzek, B.S. 2000. “Dynamics of Public Sector Accountability in an Era of  Reform.” International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 66(1). pp.21–44.
Strategma Agency. 2002. Service Standards Improvements Report. PHRD Funded Grant TF026261-BUL, Bul-
garia.
Vitosha Research Agency. 1997. “Problems of the Non-proﬁt Organizations in Bulgaria.” Introductory Report 
for Birks, Sinclair & Associates Ltd. 2001. Reducing Social Exclusion through the Development of Partnerships 
Between the State and Civil Society.
Vitosha Research Agency. 2002. Corruption in SMEs Project. Survey Report. Retrieved December 10, 2002. http:
//www.vitosha-research.com/VitoshaREPORT_eng_ﬁnal.pdf.
102
T H E  V I C I O U S  C I R C L E :  W E A K  S T A T E  I N S T I T U T I O N S ,  U N R E M E D I E D  A B U S E  A N D  D I S T R U S T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
Vitosha Research Agency. 2002. Public poll on the provision of administrative services in Bulgaria. Survey Report. 
Retrieved December 10, 2002. http://www.vitosha-research.com/publicsector/june2002.htm#1.
World Bank. 2001. Country Economic Memorandum. http://www.worldbank.bg/.
APPENDIX
Municipalities in which e-mail interviews were held  
with representatives of the municipal administrations
Blagoevgrad District
 Goce Delchev Municipality
 Bansko Municipality
 Hadjidimovo Municipality
 Garmen Municipality
Lovech District
 Lovech Municipality
 Letnica Municipality
 Jablanica Municipality
 Ugarchin Municipality
Montana District
 Montana Municipality 
 Valchedram Municipality
 Varshec Municipality
Shumen District
 Shumen Municipality
Jambol District
 Jambol Municipality
 Straldza Municipality
Razgrad District
 Razgrad Municipality
 Zavet Municipality
 Kubrat Municipality
 Samuil Municipality
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study reviews various aspects of citizen and local 
government relations in Georgia, within the context 
of decentralization and the status of institutional 
development of local self-governance. It suggests 
that problems in local government performance are 
evidenced by the governments’ lack of institutional 
capacity to provide quality public services and so-
cial assistance professionally and eﬀectively, by a 
high level of corruption in the public sector, and 
by the lack of citizen involvement in local decision-
making. While various external factors contribute to 
the negative character of citizen-local government 
relations, the lack of internal and external account-
ability mechanisms in local government structures 
comprise the major reason for the high incidence and 
severity of administrative abuses. Therefore, increas-
ing the accountability of local governments is looked 
at as a major solution for improving these relations 
and increasing public trust toward local government.
By carefully looking at the ineﬃciency of existing 
mechanisms for handling citizen requests for services 
and information, and for processing complaints, the 
performance of local government structures can be en-
hanced through systems, procedures, and mechanisms 
to create a framework for accountable behaviors and 
actions on the part of local public servants. Based on 
examinations of currently existing systems, procedures, 
and mechanisms in local government, this study sug-
gests feasible recommendations for improvements or 
introduction of new ones and oﬀers speciﬁc policy rec-
ommendations.  These recommendations take the form 
of direct internal strategies for increasing accountability 
of local government, and can be considered remedies 
for making local institutions more accountable and 
responsive to local citizen needs.
1.1 The State of Local Power in Georgia
The demise of the Soviet political system has been 
followed by major changes in the administrative 
structure of government in Georgia, and has been 
associated with the emergence of economic, social, 
and political problems. New governmental roles and 
responsibilities have been accompanied by appar-
ent deﬁciencies in professional, administrative, and 
decision-making capacities, and in the ethical values 
of public sector oﬃcials. In order to deal with new 
problems, public sector institutions, structures, and 
mechanisms have required reorganization to respond 
more eﬀectively and eﬃciently to various realms of 
reform and to impediments to development.  
One major part of post-Soviet transition has been 
decentralization, seen as an inevitable “tool” for the 
development of democratic values and eﬀective systems. 
However, decentralization has proven to be rather slow 
in Georgia, and it is still far from manifesting fully. 
In the 1990s, during the early stages of decentraliza-
tion, various laws and regulations were established to 
determine the redistribution of power, authority, and 
functions of various levels of government, as well as to 
deﬁne the structures, roles, and speciﬁc functions of 
local government and self-government bodies.  
Four tiers of government have been established in 
Georgia (Bolashvili 2002). The two lowest levels are lo-
cal; the third is regional; and the highest is national. The 
ﬁrst local self-government level consists of 966 units: 
villages, agglomerations of villages, village/towns, and 
cities. The second—the local self-government repre-
sentative level—consists of 60 districts and seven special 
status cities. The third level consists of nine regions and 
autonomous republics. Finally, the fourth level is that 
of the state or central government. 
Local self-government is exercised in villages, settle-
ments, towns, and cities incorporated into districts. 
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The local government representative level exists at the 
level of districts; special status cities and executive bodies 
are appointed. Ultimately, there are two sorts of local 
authorities: local self-governments and district govern-
ments. The cities of Tbilisi and Poti have special status, 
and mayors are appointed by the President of Georgia.
Presidential Decree 91 launched the beginning of 
the second stage of decentralization reforms (31 March 
2000). This decree, entitled “On the Second Stage of 
Municipal Development in Georgia,” determined the 
major trends of decentralization and local self-govern-
ance for short-term (2000–2001) and mid-term (until 
2005) periods.  The Organic Law on Self-governance, 
adopted in 1997 and extended in 2001, regulates  the 
activities and responsibilities of local government and 
self-governments. The ﬁrst local elections were held 
in Georgia in 1998; subsequent elections have been 
held since. 
Currently, a major obstacle faced by that the local 
government system in Georgia is the inability of self-
governments to avoid unpopular control and supervi-
sion by higher level, local-territorial administrations 
and central government authorities.  Amendments to 
the Law on Local Government and Self-government of 
2001 expanded the competencies of self-government 
units (especially in small towns and villages); however, 
no necessary competencies, resources, and property 
have been transferred (Table 1).
Table 1.
Local Government: Exclusive and Delegated Authority
Exclusive Competencies  
• Adoption of regulations and statutes of local public 
 institutions
• Management of local property
• Local budgeting and local taxation
• Elaboration and adoption of local development plans
• Management of municipal services and enterprises
• Maintenance of local archives
• Housing and dwelling management
• Dissemination of public information
• Municipal transport management and the maintenance 
 of local roads
• Urban development and design 
• Municipal programs on social protection, healthcare 
 and culture
• Water supply and sanitation
• Electricity and gas supply
• Local parks
Delegated Competencies
• Civil registration
• Environmental protection and sanitation     
• Management of public property
• Procurement support for the military 
Source: Melba 2002.
Overlapping functions and responsibilities of dif-
ferent levels of government, the absence of real decision-
making powers, and the lack of ﬁnancial resources (due 
to deﬁciencies in intergovernmental ﬁscal relations)1 
have created disincentives for local government bodies 
to serve local interests eﬀectively. These problematic ar-
eas have also deterred local civil servants from behaving 
in a professional and ethical manner.  Legal discrepan-
cies and the lack of appropriate systems, procedures, 
and mechanisms have fostered abuses of power at the 
local level, and created opportunities for local oﬃcials 
to illegally consume power at the expense of citizens’ 
interests.  Systemic and widespread corruption has un-
dermined the institutional and procedural foundations 
upon which accountability mechanisms lie.  
Growing social and economic problems in Georgian 
cities have paralleled a decline in the quality of public 
services and the deterioration of public infrastructure. 
Various studies suggest that local government and self-
government in Georgia are not eﬃciently meeting the 
priorities and needs of local populations.  
While a suitable legal environment for participatory 
decision-making does exist, mechanisms for bringing 
governments closer to citizens and for holding local 
leaders accountable for their decisions and actions are 
not employed eﬀectively—if at all.  As such, the abuse 
of power at the local government level is widespread, 
and citizens suﬀer because of it.
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Theorists and practitioners alike argue that vibrant 
local government is crucial for development and reform. 
Improvements in the delivery of public services and the 
quality of infrastructure require governments to strive 
toward providing a reasonable supply of public goods 
in a cost-eﬃcient manner. Certainly, the transition 
from state socialism to democratic government and a 
market economy has been accompanied by a range of 
constraints and complexities. Currently, local govern-
ment units not only lack willingness and incentives 
to encourage public participation in local decision-
making, but also lack the ﬁnancial and professional 
capacity to exercise options that are more agreeable 
with community demands.  
1.2 Accountability and Transparency
  at the Local Level
Individual citizens contact local government agencies 
for a variety of reasons: for services or assistance; to 
obtain information; to complain about the poor qual-
ity of municipal services; to provide feedback on vari-
ous issues of local concern; or to participate in local 
decision-making processes.
In order to communicate with and provide services 
for citizens in an eﬃcient and eﬀective manner, a local 
government should be accountable and transparent. 
Problems of abuse or misuse of power at the local level 
reﬂect a lack of accountability mechanisms within local 
agencies.  That said, before engaging in further analysis, 
it is necessary to discuss what “accountability” is.   
Certainly, accountability is a complex concept with 
various types and dimensions hotly debated among 
theorists and practitioners. The most widely accepted 
understanding of the term refers to the ability of citizens 
to hold those with decision-making power responsible 
for the decisions and actions they undertake. Brinker-
hoﬀ (2001, 2002) discusses accountability as being a 
combination of:
• answerability;
• availability of sanctions for illegal or inappropriate 
actions or behaviors and for violation of citizens’ 
legal rights; and 
• the enforcement of sanctions.  
He suggests that the absence of even one of the 
above undermines accountability; all three components 
are crucial. For instance, sanctions include requirements 
to meet professional standards and ways of punishing 
or rewarding speciﬁc ways of conduct.  However, a lack 
of enforcement and/or selective enforcement threatens 
answerability mechanisms and renders the (mere) exist-
ence of sanctions meaningless.  
Accountability is closely linked to the concept 
of transparency; transparency is, in fact, a necessary 
component of accountability. These two always are evi-
denced together in local government.  Transparency is a 
system in which: laws and regulations are public knowl-
edge and apply equally to everyone; internal procedures 
in local governance structure are clear; performance is 
monitored and reported; a local population is informed 
and involved in decision-making at all levels of the 
process; and there are administrative remedies against 
corruption and abuse.
Georgian legislation requires local authorities to 
be transparent and accountable, and to keep citizens 
informed about their activities and decisions. It also 
empowers citizens with the right to be informed and 
to participate—and thus requires locals agencies and 
oﬃcials to be transparent and accountable. Mechanisms 
for local government transparency are deﬁned in Chap-
ter 3 of the Administrative Code of Georgia, which 
deals with public information. It grants each citizen the 
right to demand and receive public information, which 
should be provided in a timely manner.  Local self-
government agencies must deliver printed information 
to any requeste within ten days, or prepare a reasoned 
refusal for failing to deliver. Current legislation also 
provides for some sanctions, oriented toward promoting 
answerability of local government agencies. However, 
studies conducted by various local and international 
organizations suggest that Georgia’s local agencies are 
far from being transparent and accountable. The fol-
lowing sub-sections oﬀer a brief overview of current 
problematic areas.
1.2.1 Transparency or Opacity
It is diﬃcult to promote accountability when admin-
istrative mechanisms and authorities are not deﬁned 
and the public not well informed. At present, the 
opaque governmental structure enables local oﬃcials 
to avoid certain responsibilities. Local government 
agencies beneﬁt from the lack of information on, 
108
T H E  V I C I O U S  C I R C L E :  W E A K  S T A T E  I N S T I T U T I O N S ,  U N R E M E D I E D  A B U S E  A N D  D I S T R U S T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
and clarity about, what administrative level should be 
providing various services. Generally, citizens are con-
fused about how and from where to ﬁle complaints 
and seek assistance.  
1.2.2 Fiscal Decentralization
Across the board, ﬁscal decentralization is an impor-
tant part of municipal sector reform. In Georgia, the 
allocation of local government responsibilities for 
expenditures, tax sources, budget processes, loans and 
ﬁnancial management has not yet happened in the 
interest of self-government (See Bolashvili 2002, 69). 
As Losaberdize argues, “Local governments face press-
ing ﬁnancial diﬃculties due to lack of funds and their 
obligation to pay high proportion of local revenues to 
central budget” (2001, 290). 
A major source for ﬁnancing local budgets are 
transfers from the central budget. Transfers often are 
signiﬁcantly delayed; local budgets are vulnerable and 
dependent on central government structures and deci-
sions (Shergelashvili 2002). As a result, local institu-
tions are mainly under-funded and are not equipped 
with adequate ﬁnancial resources to provide quality 
services. This contributes to local governments not 
responding eﬀectively to widely recognized demands 
and preferences of the local population.  In short, ﬁscal 
decentralization is a pressing issue for local government 
in Georgia. 
1.2.3 Corruption in Public Service
It is widely recognized that corruption undermines 
the institutional and procedural foundations upon 
which accountability mechanisms lie, while lack of 
accountability creates an enabling environment for an 
increased level of corruption. (Brinkerhoﬀ 2001, 21). 
A high level of corruption is common throughout 
post-socialist space. Numerous studies have evidenced 
that corruption in many ways governs the informal 
relationships that currently exist between various 
institutional players at the local level in Georgia and 
shape the framework for decision-making (UNDP and 
Corruption Research Center 1999; Working Group 
for Elaboration of National Anticorruption Program 
2000). Through neglect of transparency and rule of law, 
corruption has impeded local economic development 
by preventing commitment of resources towards the 
interest of the local population.  
1.2.4 Professional Capacity
The eﬃciency of a local government is determined 
primarily by the performance of local oﬃcials. The 
eﬃciency of public servants can be measured by the 
quality of services they provide, as well as by public 
opinion. As various studies suggest, public opinion 
on the professional capacity of local government 
servants is extremely low in Georgia, and often the 
low qualiﬁcations of local servants is identiﬁed as a 
major reason for ineﬃcient local decision-making (see 
Melua 2003, 5; ICCC 2002).
Proper motivational and incentive mechanisms for 
professional development comprise the bases for the 
development of professional qualities of public servants. 
Currently, there are about 45,000 local public servants 
and elected council members in Georgia. Although 
the Law on Public Service speciﬁes procedures for 
staﬀ examinations, career development, and salary 
beneﬁts for those successfully undertaking testing or 
review, the application of such provisions is virtually 
suspended, due to the lack of ﬁnancial resources and 
the outdated classiﬁcation of local servants and oﬃ-
cials. Public service qualiﬁcation examinations have 
not been conducted, and human resources development 
plans have not been developed. It is important to note 
that there are no administrative sanctions for public 
servants who avoid professional training and the lack of 
such sanctions fully discourages this practice from being 
implemented at all. Certainly, the low pay scale and lack 
of professional standards and incentive mechanisms 
are not sources for professional motivation; they do 
not reinforce accountable or responsive performance 
by local servants. This has lead to abuses of power 
by local oﬃcials at the expense of public interest. As 
well, it contributes to increased administrative abuses 
at the local government level. Similarly, the general 
lack of computer literacy and computer skills among 
municipal employees contribute to the low level of use 
of information technology in management systems 
of local agencies. This prevents the application of 
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information technologies that might promote eﬃcient 
and eﬀective management, or that might increase 
transparency and accountability in local agencies. 
Finally, the unsatisfactory level of professionalism 
among local servants, the lack of human resource 
development plans and incentive systems, and the 
absence of codes of conduct and ethics present major 
challenges for increasing the quality of local government 
output and local government-citizen contact.  
In recent years, international donor and develop-
ment agencies have sponsored various short-term 
training sessions for local oﬃcials.2 However, such 
sessions are not supported by the overall system of 
career development, or by ranking, promotion, or 
incentive systems.  
The Working Group on National Training Strat-
egy (initiated in 2003), sponsored by the Council of 
Europe, plans to increase the visibility of this issue in 
order to promote a policy on the creation of a uniﬁed, 
national approach and standards regarding the issue of 
training for local public servants. As well, this endeavor 
will deﬁne a “minimum level of training” guaranteed 
to local oﬃcials, and establish attestation programs 
and criteria.  
1.2.5 Civic Capacity and Citizen Involvement
  in Local Decision-Making 
Developing the capacity of local governments also 
requires promoting the capacity of civil society to 
participate in local decision-making, priority setting, 
policy development and implementation, and moni-
toring.  Direct participation  is rather high in Georgia. 
Data from 2002 suggests that voting reached 45 
percent in Tbilisi, 52 percent in Gori, 46 percent in 
Zestaponi and 55 percent in Mstkheta.3 However, 
various factors negatively aﬀect civic engagement in 
local aﬀairs and decision-making. These include:
• the lack of political will on the part of local gov-
ernment agencies to promote participatory gov-
ernance;
• the opaque legal framework;
• the lack of public awareness; and
• the lack of institutional opportunities for partici-
pation (Wolman and Goldsmith 1992, 127).
1.3 Roadmap of the Paper
This report is divided into ﬁve major parts. Part 1 has 
presented the background of decentralization and the 
current context and status of local governance in 
Georgia. The following parts uncover the historical 
background and current policy context. These sections 
oﬀer an examination of systems, procedures, and 
mechanisms, particularly those which lack admin-
istrative remedies against abuses at the local govern-
ment level. Speciﬁcally, Part 2 looks at public partici-
pation in local decision-making; access to information 
regarding local decisions; hierarchical control; respon-
siveness and accountability mechanisms; and the 
availability of various enforcement mechanisms and 
sanctions. Part 3 argues for the relationship among var-
ious administrative remedies, public trust and citizen 
satisfaction. Part 4 provides policy options attributed 
to designing new and/or enforcing existing adminis-
trative remedies under current Georgian legislation, 
and suggests an argument for a preferred approach. 
Part 5 provides conclusions and reco mendations for 
policy actions.
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the present study is to address citizen 
abuses at the local government level through analysis 
of the level of accountability and responsiveness of local 
government structures and the nature of citizen–local 
government relationship, and to recommend speciﬁc 
administrative remedies against such abuses. However, 
the paper acknowledges that administrative remedies 
alone will not solve the issue of the lack of accountabil-
ity locally.  In order to be able to exercise powers and 
functions independently and eﬃciently, it is impor-
tant for local authorities to be supported by appropri-
ate legislation, resources, and professional capacities. 
The major question addressed by the study is: 
Which speciﬁc administrative mechanisms and struc-
tures are feasible to introduce and enforce in order to 
make local institutions more accountable and respon-
sive to citizens’ needs, and to serve as administrative 
remedies at the local government level? To answer this, 
this study assumes that solutions for increasing account-
ability are part and parcel of the systems, procedures, 
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and mechanisms that foster accountable behaviors and 
actions on the part of local public servants. Based on 
an examination of existing systems, procedures and 
mechanisms, this study suggests feasible recommen-
dations for improving government at the local level. 
Speciﬁcally, speciﬁc administrative remedies are oﬀered 
that encourage and facilitate:  
• the provision of convenient and eﬀective mecha-
nisms for receiving and (when technically pos-
sible) satisfactorily fulﬁlling citizens’ requests for 
service and/or information; 
• the reporting of legitimate citizen complaints 
(including the accessibility of a complaint system, 
and the ease of ﬁling complaints with a responsi-
ble oﬃce); 
• the resolution of justiﬁable complaints (again, 
when technically possible);
• the improvement of the quality of local services 
and information provided to constituents (in or-
der to reduce or prevent the occurrence of cir-
cumstances which would lead to justiﬁable citizen 
complaints, reported or unreported); and
• the improvement of the quality of treatment pro-
vided to a requeste or complainant.
1.5 Methodology and Limitations  
In order to examine the current systems, procedures, 
and mechanisms that lack administrative remedies 
against abuses at the local government level, this study 
required a thorough (and critical) literature review. As 
well, a survey was conducted in four Georgian cities: 
Tbilisi, Gori, Zestaponi, and Mtskheta. A standard-
ized questionnaire, designed within the scope of this 
research, and in-depth interviews of local govern-
ment oﬃcials and “ordinary” citizens were used as 
survey tools. Exactly 386 citizens were interviewed in 
Mtskheta, Gori, Zestaponi, and Tbilisi.
Survey locations were chosen so as to include 
a range of population sizes and “types” of munici-
palities. Municipalities in Georgia fall into one of two 
categories: 1) those in which both the council (local 
self-government) and mayor are elected; and 2) those 
in which the council is elected and the mayor is ap-
pointed.  Following is a brief introduction to each of 
the four targeted localities. 
• Tbilisi (pop. 1,103,500) is the capital of Georgia. 
It is a special status city, not under any district 
jurisdiction, with an elected self-government and 
appointed mayor. It is the richest municipality in 
the country, with the highest number of NGOs 
(2,573).
• Gori (pop. 66,500) has an elected self-govern-
ment and mayor.  There are a total of 54 NGOs 
registered in Gori Rayon (district).
• Zestaponi (pop. 25,600) is one of the country’s 
largest industrial cities, with an elected self-gov-
ernment and mayor. There are 21 registered 
NGOs in Zestaponi Rayon.
• Mtskheta (pop. 8,000) is a small town near Tbili-
si, with an elected self-government and mayor.  It 
is a religious center, and attracts a high number of 
tourists and special interest visitors from national 
political and business communities. There are 28 
registered NGOs in Mtskheta district. 
It is important to note that the existence of a Local 
Information Center (LIC) was an important criteria for 
locality selection. Speciﬁcally, two of the four selected 
cities (Mtskheta and Zestaponi) have an LIC; the two 
others (Tbilisi and Gori) do not. 
 This research is far from conclusive; it recognizes 
its own limitations.  First, while numerous studies have 
dealt with issues of local government performance, no 
research has been conducted on abuses at the local 
government level in Georgia. As such, there is no sub-
stantial comparative or complementary data available. 
Thus, much of research presented here incorporates 
important assumptions about the way abuses happen 
and how remedies work. A second limitation is related 
to the random selection of respondents. Respondents’ 
proﬁles or backgrounds (social, economic, political, 
and so on) were not taken into account. Third, only 
urban localities were included in the survey, to the 
exclusion of semi-urban and rural areas where proposed 
recommendations may not be applicable.
1.6 Definition of Terms
This study has required clarity in terms. Citizen 
requests for public services and information should 
be distinguished from complaints. Perhaps most 
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importantly, the local government refers in this paper 
to both local self-government and district self-
government. Administrative abuses and administrative 
remedies have been aptly deﬁned in Rekosh (2003, see 
this volume). This deﬁnition diﬀerentiates between 
three types of remedies: internal, external, and prevent-
ive.4 Accountability is a complex concept with various 
types and dimensions (to be discussed).  However, there 
are two main types discussed—internal accountability 
and external accountability. Most frequently in 
this paper the term refers to mechanisms by which 
civil society can hold local government responsible 
for its actions and decisions. Council (Sakrebulo, in 
Georgian) refers to a self-government unit—the repre-
sentative body of local government—while Gamgeoba 
(in Georgian) is an executive branch of local govern-
ment. Local public servant and oﬃcial are used here in 
reference to individuals that work in city municipali-
ties, local councils, or at local executive entities (deter-
mined by Law on Public Service).  Finally, unreported 
complaints are deﬁned as cases in which unsatisﬁed or 
abused clients do not make their complaints known to 
the government by means of ﬁling an oﬃcial complaint. 
2. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CITIZEN ABUSES: 
 INDICATORS OF DYSFUNCTION 
 IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
2.1 Citizen Involvement in Local
  Decision-Making and Budget Affairs
A main indicator of citizen involvement in local 
governance is public attendance at local council meet-
ings.  Various studies previously conducted in Georgia 
suggest a very low local council meeting attendance 
rate (see Urban Institute 2001, 52). This study discov-
ered that only 4.5 percent of all respondents had ever 
attended a public meeting. Compared to data from 
2001 (Urban Institute), however, there has been a 
substantial improvement in the level of citizen partici-
pation through council meeting attendance.
Surveyed localities diﬀered signiﬁcantly in this 
regard. The highest level was observed in Mtskheta, 
where 11 percent had attended council meetings. 
Only 3 percent in Gori and Zestaponi, and just 
1 percent in Tbilisi, had attended meetings (Table 2).
Access to local council meetings and information 
on local government budgets depend largely on the 
availability of an LIC in individual cities/municipalities 
(see Section 2.3.1). Survey results indicate that access 
to quality public information is improving in some 
cities in Georgia. Speciﬁcally, 42 percent of respondents 
from Mtskheta claimed that local authorities provide 
information about the local budget. Compared to 
2001 survey results (Urban Institute), there has been 
a positive change. 
Again, the level of budget information provided to 
citizens locally varies dramatically according to locality: 
42 percent of respondents in Mtskheta, 40 percent in 
Gori, and 30 percent in Zestaponi claimed that local 
authorities provide information about local budget. 
In Tbilisi, all (100%) respondents claimed that there 
is no information about the local budget provided to 
citizens.  
In-depth interviews with respondents revealed that 
local budget information is mainly provided to citizens 
after a budget is approved; typically, it is not presented 
for discussion and comment in advance. Thus, the local 
population is unable to participate in the design process 
and or aﬀect it in a desirable way. 
Table 2. 
Citizens Attendance at Local Council Meetings [%]
Tbilisi Gori Zestaponi Mtskheta
Have attended 1 3 3 11
Have not attended 99 97 97 89
Total 100 100 100 100
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2.2 Institutional Opportunities
  for Participation
The availability and capacity of institutions that pro-
vide opportunities for citizens of diverse backgrounds 
and proﬁles (socioeconomic status, ethnicity, gender 
religion and so on) are important are indicators of 
how democratic a society is. Achieving encompassing, 
inclusive, and democratic relations between citizens 
and local government requires strong local institu-
tions within the private sector, to serve as promoters 
and facilitators of good governance. Labor unions, 
religious groups, community organizations, business 
associations, and the like have not yet been able to 
participate in governing coalitions at the local level 
in a meaningful way. Non-governmental organiza-
Figure 1. 
Citizens Awareness About Local Budget According to Citizens
tions (including unions and foundations) have been 
most active. Despite the fact that over 3,500 NGOs 
have been registered in Georgia over the last decade, 
only a few hundred are functioning (Urban Institute 
2001, 26). Very few have been able to organize their 
capacities and resources in order to represent interest 
groups and communities in a broad sense in local 
decision-making.  
The rapid proliferation of NGOs during the 1990s 
can be seen as a response to democratic changes.  Table 
3 provides data on the number of NGOs and citizens 
per NGO in targeted cities. Data varies according to 
locality, and it is important to highlight that the scope 
and number of NGOs varies by settlement size. Most 
NGOs have been founded in Tbilisi; in many munici-
palities no NGOs have been created at all.  
Table 3.
 Number of Non-governmental Organizations
City Number of NGOs Number of citizens per NGO
Tbilisi 2,573 429
Gori 54 1,231
Zestaponi 21 1,219
Mtskheta 28 286
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2.3 Do Citizens Enjoy Access 
  to Information?
Citizen participation in local decision-making and in 
local aﬀairs depends greatly on access to information 
provided by a local self-government. Various studies 
conducted in Georgia suggest that access to informa-
tion at the local level is extremely poor. 
Interestingly enough, citizens appear not to be 
inclined to contact public agencies with requests for 
information. About 72 percent of the population in 
Mtskheta, 70 percent in Gori, 68 percent in Zestaponi, 
and 80 percent in Tbilisi had never contacted any local 
authorities for information at the time of research (Fig-
ure 2). For most respondents, there was speciﬁc reason 
Figure 3. 
Success in Obtaining Requested Information
Figure 2.
Requests for Information Submitted to Local Government (LG)
for not contacting local government: they thought that 
they would not receive information in a timely manner 
that they would not receive a response for their request 
at all, or that information would be unreliable. 
Data in three cities suggest that the low (or out-
right negative) expectations of respondents are on the 
mark. Speciﬁcally, only 28 percent of respondents in 
Zestaponi, 25 percent in Tbilisi, and 58 percent in Gori 
successfully obtained requested information (Figure 3). 
Over 80 percent of those who had obtained information 
in these cities were unhappy with timeliness, quality of 
information, and quality of service.
In Mtskheta, citizens were more positive about their 
experience with local government entities, suggesting a 
diﬀerent experience with access to local government in-
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Table 4. 
Major Sources of Information on Local Government Activities [%]
Tbilisi Gori Zestaponi Mtskheta
LG information bulletin 0 2 3 42
Local newspapers 0 38 39 17
National press 69 4 5 3
Local radio 0 58 62 —
TV 100 4 3 16
National radio 58 0 0 6
Other sources 0 6 9 7
formation and accountability.  This might be explained 
by the extensive technical assistance provided to the 
local self-government in Mtskheta, and the existence of 
an eﬀective local government information center.  The 
Mtskheta information center is assisted by the Urban In-
stitute and regular publications are widely distributed in 
town. As evidenced by this study, such publications are 
a major source of information on local government ac-
tivities and issues for the local population. Regular local 
government information bulletins (printed or broadcast on 
the radio) are vital in smaller towns, which do not have tele-
vision stations and independent newspapers (Table  4).
2.3.1 Local Government Information Centers 
Over the last four years, local government information 
centers have been created in 13 cities with assistance 
from donors,5 in order to promote models of citizen 
involvement in local decision-making. These establish-
ments should be distinguished from “information 
services” or “press oﬃces” existing in local government 
agen-cies, which mainly act as press centers. Such 
centers do not interact with local populations, and do 
not serve as regular, reliable sources of information. 
Rather, they base their activities more on the needs of 
local government structures, than on citizen demands 
for information.
In contrast to such units, the objective of LICs is 
to facilitate public awareness, public participation in 
decision-making, and participatory governance. Five 
information centers (in Lanchkhuti, Signagi, Zestaponi, 
Telavi, and Zugdidi), created under a grant from the 
Eurasia Foundation, have held 44 public hearings and 
roundtables attended by 1,000 individuals, published 
64,000 bulletins and 8,000 magazines, broadcasted 
22 television programs on local problems, and oﬀered 
various presentations.
Two major experimental LIC models can be found 
in Georgia. The ﬁrst exists within a local council model; 
the second is an independent NGO.  This study sug-
gests the latter model is more eﬃcient, being free from 
political pressure and closer to the local community.
Among surveyed cities, two (Zestaponi and 
Mtskheta) have LICs. These centers were created with 
assistance from the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) by the Urban Institute 
and the Eurasia Foundation.  They publish information 
bulletins, which represent an important source on local 
governance related information.  
Clearly, in cities with eﬀectively functioning LICs, 
local governments’ publicity and reporting to the public 
is more regular and eﬃcient compared to cities without 
such centers.  Research revealed that LICs represent the 
primary mechanism through which citizens can obtain 
information on local government institutions’ structure, 
activities, and services. In other words, LICs partially 
serve as “one-stop-shops.” Speciﬁcally, 42 percent of 
Mtskheta respondents consider the local information 
center—an NGO attached to the local self-government 
unit Sakrebulo—to be such an entity.  
2.4 Internal Accountability: 
  Hierarchical Control Mechanisms 
Accountability requires eﬀective internal and external 
hierarchical control mechanisms. In Georgia, power is 
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not clearly allocated among branches of government 
for oversight, decision-making, revenue mobilization, 
expenditure, and reporting roles. The operation of 
checks and balances in practice is weak, despite their 
formal establishment in the Constitution, agency 
mandates, and legislation.  
Local governments require accessible and conven-
ient mechanisms that permit citizens to ﬁle requests 
for services and information, and to make their com-
plaints known to the proper government agencies.  The 
existence and eﬀectiveness of several such mechanisms 
have been reviewed for this study, with the assumption 
that they facilitate answerability of local public entities 
and simplify the process of obtaining service and infor-
mation.  
These mechanisms include:
• the existence of consultation mechanisms/struc-
tures in administrative services and the disclosure 
of information about the functions of local pubic 
entities, various services and tariﬀs (e.g. one-stop-
shops or registries of all available client services);
• regular publicity and reporting to the public (e.g. 
publicity of various local government reports, in-
formation bulletins, or published budgets); 
• the existence of mechanisms for receiving citizen 
feedback; 
• institutionalized standards of behavior and ethics 
that promote a high quality of provided services;
Table 5.
Accountability Mechanisms and Structures in Surveyed Municipalities
Indicators Tbilisi Mtskheta Gori Zestaponi
1. LICs available No Yes No Yes
2. One-stop-shop available No No No No
3. Centralized registry of all services available No No No No
4. Complaints department/service available No No No No
5. Person assigned to deal with citizen complaints No No No No
6. Written instructions on services available6 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7. Information bulletin published No Yes No Yes
8. Service quality control mechanisms applied No No No No
9. Information quality control mechanisms applied No No No No
10. Feedback mechanisms available No No No No
11. Charter/operations manual available Yes Yes Yes Yes
12. Agency computerized No No No No
13. Electronically-driven document management system designed and applied No No No No
14. Information databases available No No No No
15. Internet access available and used No No No No
16. Programs for improvement of management designed and implemented in 2002 No No No No
17. Human resource development plan available No No No No
18. Performance evaluation indicators designed No No No No
19. Performance evaluation practiced No No No No
20. Employee performance evaluation conducted No No No No
21. Disciplinary sanctions applied No No No No
22. Ethics committee available No No No No
23. Ethics code available No No No No
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• professional capacity (relevant skills and experi-
ence) and competence (ability to apply the capac-
ity to performance of duties) of local oﬃcials; 
• the existence of centralized complaint-handling 
oﬃces and the availability of complaint-handling 
personnel; and
• the availability of electronically-driven document 
management systems.
This study discovered that in the four targeted 
localities, almost none of the above mechanisms has 
been introduced and implemented in local government 
units.  From the list provided in Table 5, only informa-
tion centers, published reports/information bulletins, 
and charter/operations manuals exist.
The organizational procedures for local entities are 
described in their organizational charter. Under the 
Administrative Code of Georgia, local government 
entities are required to have such a charter. The 
behavioral, professional, and ethical standards and 
norms of local government and self-government public 
servants are regulated by the Law on Public Servants. 
The application of speciﬁc disciplinary sanctions for 
unprofessional conduct by a public sector employee is 
deﬁned by the Administrative Code of Georgia, as well 
as by the Law on Public Servants. In addition, every 
local agency is required to adopt an organizational 
charter, stating speciﬁc ethical and professional norms. 
However, the provisions of this charter are not common 
knowledge in local government bodies.
Institutions also possess written instructions about 
the provision of administrative services. Yet, there are 
no internal documents or written instructions made 
available to citizens regarding procedures for obtaining 
speciﬁc services or information from local government 
agencies. That said, information on the functions of 
local public entities, services, and tariﬀs is disclosed 
to diﬀerent degrees, depending on the locality. Local 
executive branches in all four cities possess documented 
lists of all client services available. However, no registry 
of such services is available in these institutions. Moreo-
ver, the lists are not publicly accessible.    
No surveyed city has a one-stop-shop.  However, 
in cities with functioning LICs, citizens do have access 
to such information.
Although all jurisdictions possess written instruc-
tions for the turnover of documents (for public access), 
no ﬁling system appears to exist.  The quality of a re-
sponse to a request or complaint depends largely on the 
extent to which it has been thoroughly and accurately 
documented. For such documentation, the existence of 
an electronically-driven document management system 
is essential. However, none of the jurisdictions surveyed 
possess such a system. All records are manually recorded 
(not in electronic format) and extremely poorly organ-
ized. There are no citizen opinion of feedback mecha-
nisms available within local government institutions, 
and local governments do not exercise any mechanism 
for studying client satisfaction or recommendations for 
service improvement. 
Generally, only in extremely rare cases are electronic 
databases developed or utilized by local governments. 
Even in such cases, there is no public access—nor is 
any access provided for other departments of the same 
institution.  Therefore, information exchange, monitor-
ing, and control mechanisms are weak within agencies, 
just as they are “outside” the administrative world. 
The capacity of local government agencies largely 
depends on the level of information technology utilized 
for agencies’ operations. Lack of accurate (electronic) 
documentation is one of the major challenges in en-
hancing the quality of local government output and 
local government-citizen contact.  The availability of 
advanced information technology (ICT) facilitates in-
stitutional accountability; the level of  ICT in Georgia’s 
public agencies is low in general.  A study conducted 
in ten Georgian cities in 2003 revealed that only 
18 percent of local government servants use ICT in 
their work; of these, over 90 percent reside in Tbilisi 
(Local Government Training Needs Assessment 2003). 
While Tbilisi clearly stands out in regard to ICT use 
in virtually every sector, the level is still extremely low. 
None of the surveyed local governance agencies operates 
an electronic website, uses e-mail for management and 
communication purposes, operates electronic websites, 
or possesses electronically-driven document manage-
ment systems.   
An agency’s eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness greatly de-
pend on the day-to-day activities of individual oﬃcials. 
In this regard, the existence of professional incentives 
is an important component for local government per-
formance. This study examined whether professional 
merit can serve as a basis for promotion  by examining 
the application of employee performance evaluation 
procedures. All surveyed agencies indicated that they 
have implemented procedures to evaluate local public 
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servants’ activities: in Gori and Zestaponi, for instance, 
reviews theoretically occur every six months. However, 
no speciﬁc records were found in research, thus putting 
the validity such internal evaluations into question. 
The eﬀectiveness of complaint-handling mecha-
nisms comprises a key aspect of an agency’s respon-
siveness and accountability. The existence of centralized 
complaint oﬃces, ethical panels, internal quasi-judicial 
systems, or the availability of designated complaint-
handling personnel, represent eﬀorts oriented toward 
promoting accountability. However, none of rhe above 
was found in any local government units. Furthermore, 
it appears as though no employee is speciﬁcally respon-
sible for handling citizen complaints in any surveyed 
agencies; no oﬃcial oﬀers duty hours (e.g., per week) 
for citizens. 
Although attempts were made during interviews, 
this study had no success ﬁnding information on 
the number, type, or issue of requests and complaints. 
Moreover, it is important to note that records of citi-
zens’ requests and complaints are not organized into 
groups reﬂecting how successfully responses had been 
made.
In addition to answerability mechanisms, the avail-
ability and application of ethics and disciplinary sanc-
tions for illegal or inappropriate actions and behaviors 
of municipal agencies and employees are important 
components of any accountability system. Although 
all surveyed organizations operate under oﬃcially 
recognized, basic ethics standards, provided for in the 
organizational charters, no speciﬁc code of ethics nor 
ethics panel was found to exist. International experi-
ence suggests that ethics panels are vital for internal 
accountability—as mechanisms through which, for 
example, sanctions for unprofessional conduct can 
be imposed and enforced. Respectively, no appeal 
to an ethics panel can be considered as an option for 
addressing  the unprofessional or abusive conduct of 
municipal employees.
In short, this study revealed that, despite the exist-
ence of disciplinary sanctions “on paper” in all surveyed 
jurisdictions, no disciplinary sanctions have been used 
in any surveyed local government unit—with the excep-
tions of “warnings” for “being late.” In 2002, in Tbilisi, 
Gori, Zestaponi, and Mtskheta, no employee was ﬁred 
or otherwise reprimanded: a) for violating disciplinary 
regulations; b) for violating ethical norms; or c) due to 
procedural actions connected to citizens’ complaints.
2.5 External Accountability: 
  Judicial Review  
The judicial system in Georgia has undergone an 
extensive reform process in order to improve its ad-
ministrative structure and procedure, as well as profes-
sionalism among judges. Reforms began in the mid-
1990s, with signiﬁcant assistance from the United 
States government. Examinations of judges held in 
1998 proved to be an eﬀective step toward earning 
public trust and improving the institutional “image.”
The existence of a court itself represents an impor-
tant part of control and accountability, by allowing the 
possibility to redress any abuse of power.  That is, courts 
serve as an independent, external security mechanism 
for protecting the rights of citizens. Not surprisingly, 
based on results of this study, the judiciary (courts) 
ﬁgured among the most trusted institutions. Speciﬁ-
cally, out of 10 institutions, respondents’ trust in the 
judiciary ranks third (Figure 4).  
However, despite the high rate of trust towards 
the judiciary, the study found that among those who 
were unhappy with services and information they re-
ceived from local institutions, only a few respondents 
had appealed to courts with charges against an institu-
tion or a speciﬁc public servant who violated the rights 
of citizens by not delivering a service or information, 
or by delivering it in abusive manner. At the time of 
research, only one respondent in Mtsheta, and one in 
Zestaponi, had appealed to court. None of the respond-
ents in Gori and Tbilisi made any appeal to a court for 
such oﬀenses.  
As Rekosh states: “Among the obstacles to the ef-
fectiveness of judicial remedies are procedural barriers, 
such as high court fees, as well as the complexity of the 
proceedings and relevant law, insuﬃcient public under-
standing of how to initiate legal proceedings, lack of legal 
assistance for persons who can’t aﬀord to hire a lawyer 
and low public trust in the courts” (2003). In Georgia, 
there is only one judiciary body which handles appeals 
in each district. The average period of time needed to 
announce a ﬁnal judicial decision is two months. The 
oﬃcial price of judicial appeal is 30 Georgian Lari, which 
is paid by the complainant (USD 14.50). This is nearly 
equivalent to an average monthly salary.
Based on information obtained from the Rayon 
Court of Zestaponi, only 67 appeals were ﬁled in 2002 
regarding the services or activities of local public in-
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stitutions. However, it must be noted that data shows 
a steady growth in the number of appeals over a two-
year period: there were 58 appeals ﬁled in 2001, and 
45 in 2000. Yet, meaningful growth in the number of 
cases resolved satisfactorily has not occurred. This study 
suggests that such cases increased from 64 percent in 
2000 to 88 percent in 2001, but then decreased to 60 
percent.  
Finally, external accountability mechanisms deserve 
further analysis. Such research is beyond the scope of 
this study.
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
 PUBLIC TRUST AND INDICATORS OF 
 DYSFUNCTION
3.1 Do Citizens Trust Their Local 
  Government?
Surveys of public perceptions and opinions are a reliable 
determinant of a local government’s eﬃciency and 
responsiveness. As evidenced by various studies, public 
trust towards local government in Georgia is low.7  
An often-used means to assess public attitudes 
about local government is by comparison with attitudes 
about central government or other agencies (Hajnal 
2001, 130). For the purpose determining if local 
government was a relatively trusted institution, ques-
tionnaires developed for this study contained an item 
to survey the perception of citizens regarding local 
government vis-à-vis other institutions on a scale from 
one (lowest) to 10. Speciﬁcally, public perceptions of 
the following institutions were compared: Parliament, 
Chancellery, local executive branch (Gamgeoba), local 
council (Sakrebulo), judiciary, police, NGOs, and 
popular or citizen initiative groups (Figure 4).
The rating is consistent in all four surveyed cities. 
The survey found that the average rating in each city is 
highest for NGOs, with citizen initiative groups close 
behind.  These results resemble data from studies con-
ducted in other post-socialist countries, which suggest 
that, in general, satisfaction with the performance of 
local government administration is higher than with the 
national bureaucracy or central government  (Swianie-
vicz 2001, 27). However, the level of trust toward local 
councils and local executive branches is modest: on a 
scale from 1 to 10, local councils’ average rating is 4.6; 
local executive branches average 3.9, thus falling in the 
“low trust” range.
A relatively high level of trust toward an elected 
body can be attributed to the fact that people believe 
that self-government is a “victim” of the central govern-
ment; a local government would perform better if not 
impeded by the central government.
It is important to mention that, despite the nonex-
istence of an information center, regular information 
Figure 4.
Public Trust toward Various Institutions (Average Score)
Note: 1–2: Lack of trust; 3–5: Low trust; 6–8: Moderate trust; 9–10: High trust.
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bulletin, or regularly exercised, eﬀective, and eﬃcient 
mechanisms for higher accountability, the highest 
rating of trust in local self-government was found in 
Tbilisi. One potential reason might be the popularity 
of the then-new Tbilisi Council Chairman, Mikhail 
Saakashvili (now President of Georgia). Saakashvili, a 
major political leader, earned this position as a result of 
local elections in 2002, with substantial public support 
at the national level.   
 In order to determine why there is low trust in 
local government and self-government entities, this 
study examined client satisfaction with provided serv-
ices, information, and complaint-handling mecha-
nisms.
3.2 How Do Local Public Agencies 
  Deal with Citizen Complaints 
  and Requests?
The procedure of dealing with requests and com-
plaints is divided into the following major steps: re-
ceiving; referring; resolving/responding; and receiving 
feedback. Inadequate and low quality treatment at any 
step can be read as an abuse. Citizens’ satisfaction with 
responsiveness, as well as with the quality of treatment 
received, speaks volumes about how abusive a given 
procedure is.  
Filing a complaint or request for information or 
a service often represents the only direct contact that 
exists between local government agencies and citizens. 
As Hatry, et al., suggest, “as a result, such contacts 
frequently become the primary basis for citizen 
perceptions of government eﬃciency, eﬀectiveness 
and responsiveness”  (1992, 147). Thus, how well a 
government handles complaints and requests is an 
extremely important factor in the shaping of public 
opinion toward local agencies.  
The willingness and ability of citizens to make their 
complaints known to their government depends on the 
ease with which a citizen can ﬁle a complaint.  As noted, 
this ease itself depends on citizens’ ability to access in-
formation on complaint-handling mechanisms—how 
and where to register a complaint, hours of operation, 
telephone numbers, procedures, and so on. In other 
words, access to information requires clarity in proce-
dures used to identify and reach a person or oﬃce that 
can help with a request or complaint.
In this regard, this study examined citizens who: a) 
ﬁled a request, or b) did not ﬁle a request. In Figure 5, 
this data is presented as the percentage of respondents 
who found it diﬃcult or impossible to request service 
and requests that were disposed of satisfactorily/unsat-
isfactorily (as judged by complainants).
For the purposes of this report, “unreported com-
plaints” refers to those cases in which unsatisﬁed clients 
do not make their potential complaints known to a 
government through oﬃcial ﬁling procedures.  Data 
on unreported complaints and related reasons for not 
reporting provide clues as to how a local government 
handles complaints and requests, and encourages or 
discourages citizen reporting.  
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Figure 5.
Reported and Unreported Complaints (as Percentage of Respondents Not Satisﬁed with Provided Services)
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The study revealed that, although almost all re-
spondents (90 percent in Mtskheta, 92 percent in Gori, 
and 100 percent in Zestaponi and Tbilisi) are unhappy 
with services provided by local government entities, 
only 4 percent in Mtskheta, 6 percent in Gori, 7 percent 
in Zestaponi, and Tbilisi had ﬁled an administrative 
complaint to: the boss of a speciﬁc employee; an insti-
tution itself; a local executive branch; a local council; 
or a court. The study also found that the majority of 
complaints are submitted to local executive branches 
and local councils.  
Based on the above data, the level of unreported 
complaints is extremely high (Figure 5). Despite dissat-
isfaction with received services, 96 percent in Mtskheta, 
94 percent in Gori, 93 percent in Zestaponi, and 93 
percent in Tbilisi never made their potential complaints 
known to any responsible agency or oﬃcial. 
What are the reasons for this striking tendency? 
The data suggests that the inaccessibility and ineﬃcien-
cy of complaint-handling and processing mechanisms 
play a signiﬁcant role in deterring citizens from voicing 
complaints (Figure 6).  
Most respondents contended that “it does not make 
sense to ﬁle a complaint” to local authorities. Speciﬁcal-
ly, respondents suggested that ﬁling a complaint would 
not produce any meaningful outcome. This suggests a 
pervasive sense of powerlessness among the Georgian 
population. Many respondents also found that ﬁling a 
complaint to be “diﬃcult and time-consuming process.” 
This directly reﬂects the complicated (and discouraging) 
structure and procedures of the current complaint-ﬁling 
mechanism.  Finally, some respondents simply do not 
know how to ﬁle a complaint. In Tbilisi, this might be 
explained by the size of the city. There are only a couple 
of agencies and oﬃces in small towns, which simpli-
ﬁes the process for citizens. Tbilisi’s population is close 
to quarter of the country’s population; therefore, the 
number of public and local institutions and agencies 
is high. This likely contributes to confusion about how 
to approach the right institution with speciﬁc requests 
or complaints.
The Administrative Code provides that citizen re-
quests for information or service should be answered in 
written form by the receiving (responsible) jurisdiction 
within 10 days, unless the request calls for special re-
search that requires additional time. According to survey 
results, the median response time for each type of serv-
ice request received, or for the resolution of justiﬁable 
complaints, varied between three days to two months. 
However, interviews with oﬃcials revealed that, due to 
the lack of citizen awareness, complaints are often ﬁled 
inappropriately. For example, many complaints about 
local issues are submitted to central agencies and are 
either re-submitted at the local level to a responsible 
agency or simply ﬁled away and ignored. 
This study was performed with the assumption that 
the improved accessibility of complaint-ﬁling mecha-
nisms will likely result in an increase in the number of 
complaints. In addition, improved accessibility (con-
venience of intake of citizen requests, quality treatment, 
and speedy disposition) will serve to positively aﬀect the 
image of local government and facilitate citizen-local 
government contact and partnership.    
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Figure 6.
Reasons for Failing to File a Complaint
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3.2.1 Client Satisfaction with the Quality
  of Treatment 
In order to survey citizen satisfaction with treatment 
by a local government (when requesting information 
and services, or ﬁling a complaint), this study used the 
following criteria to address public “happiness” with 
the jobs local government institutions provide:  
a) speed of information provision; 
b) simplicity of administrative procedures; 
c) fairness of personnel; 
d) quality of service; 
e) responsiveness of personnel; and 
f ) professionalism of personnel.
Based on the above criteria, in all four localities, it 
appears as though the local population was extremely 
unhappy with local government performance. The 
most dramatic results were observed in Tbilisi, where 
100 percent of respondents voiced dissatisfaction with 
all above-mentioned criteria. Figure 7.1 through 7.6 
show the results of this research. Finally, it is impor-
tant to note that during in-depth interviews, people 
frequently complained about: the readiness of oﬃcials 
to accept or demand a present, bribe, or favor; their 
unprofessional and incompetent approach; and their 
unhelpfulness (such as sending people from one oﬃce 
to another).  
  
               
Figure 7.1
Dissatisﬁed with Speed of Service Provision [%]
Figure 7.2
Dissatisﬁed with Administrative Procedures [%]
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Figure 7.3.
Dissatisﬁed with Level of Fairness in Treatment by Personnel [%]
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Figure 7.4.
Dissatisﬁed with Service Quality [%]
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Figure 7.5.
Dissatisﬁed with Responsiveness of Personnel [%]
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3.2.2 Satisfaction with Response to Complaint
  as Judged by Complainant
In all surveyed cities, a signiﬁcant number of ﬁled 
complaints had not been solved satisfactorily (as 
judged by complainants): 60 percent of ﬁled com-
plaints in Mtskheta, 92 percent in Gori, 60 percent in 
Zestaponi, and 88 percent in Tbilisi (Figure 8).
The study did not seek speciﬁcs on the topics of 
complaints; rather, details on where complaints were 
ﬁled or requested. Data suggests that the highest 
number of complaints was ﬁled with executive oﬃces 
and local councils. In addition, research revealed that 
the highest number of satisfactorily solved complaints 
(as judged by complainants) were accommodated by 
local executive oﬃces.
3.3 Relationship among Availability
  of Effective LIC and Public
  Awareness and Participation
The research revealed a signiﬁcant dearth of those 
internal mechanisms and systems in Georgia’s local 
government structures that could serve as remedies 
against citizen abuses and facilitate eﬀectiveness and 
quality in local government services. Internal account-
ability is weak, and management mechanisms are inef-
fective, providing room for unprofessional practices, 
unresponsiveness among local government employees 
and low-quality services delivered to constituents. As 
a result, citizens are unhappy with local government 
services, and conﬁdence and trust in local government 
structures are low.  
Figure 7.6.
Dissatisﬁed with Professionalism of Personnel [%]
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Figure 8.
Satisfaction with Complaint Response as Judged by Complainants 
(Percent of Total Filed Complaints Identiﬁed by Respondents)
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However, this study discovered that in cities with 
newly created structures—that is, LICs—the situation 
is more promising. The existence of an eﬀective, newly 
created LIC, increased citizen awareness and increased 
public participation are all interrelated. For instance, 
in Mtskheta, the LIC has facilitated the provision of 
quality information to citizens, such that citizens feel 
informed and actively participate in local aﬀairs. The 
level of attendance at council meetings and awareness 
about local budget was highest in Mtskheta, as well. 
Similar results were found in Zestaponi, another city 
with a functioning LIC, and with the second highest 
rate of council meeting attendance and awareness about 
the local budget.  In these two cities, LICs appear as 
major sources of information on local aﬀairs.
Despite the positive role of LICs in two of the 
four surveyed towns, LICs seem to have little eﬀect 
in regard to public trust toward local government in 
these cities, or public opinion on responsiveness and 
accountability of local structures. Based on the fact that 
LICs were the only accountability mechanism found in 
local governments among those examined in this study, 
the design and introduction of other structures and 
mechanisms directed towards increased accountability 
is fundamental for reducing administrative abuses at 
the local government level.
4. POLICY OPTIONS
4.1 Indirect and Direct Strategies
  to Increase Accountability 
In order to minimize abuses at the local level, various 
policies target increasing the accountability of local 
government structures and are oriented toward im-
proving governance. This serves to reduce the overall 
need for complaints, or to reduce the incidence of re-
ported and unreported complaints. More speciﬁcally, 
all required policies imply introducing mechanisms 
oriented toward: 
• making existing answerability structures and pro-
cedures functional;
• establishing new accountability procedures and 
structures; 
• increasing enforcement; and   
• strengthening civil capacity (Brinkerhoﬀ 2001).
As suggested by Brinkerhoﬀ (2001), strategies 
for decreasing citizen abuses at the local government 
level are grouped as “indirect” or “direct” (internal and 
external). Indirect strategies enable and facilitate con-
Figure 9.
Policies Oriented toward Increased Accountability Mechanisms
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ditions necessary for the introduction and eﬀective 
functioning of accountability structures and mecha-
nisms. For instance, they embrace legislative changes to 
empower local governments, anticorruption measures, 
and rule of law eﬀorts. It is extremely important to 
integrate indirect strategies into overall administrative 
reforms; their role cannot be diminished.  
This paper does not focus on external accountability 
mechanisms; rather, the provided policy options address 
making existing internal answerability structures and 
procedures functional, and establishing new account-
ability procedures and structures in local government 
institutions. Speciﬁcally, the paper targets the introduc-
tion of local government information centers and of 
central referral bureaus (CRBs, to be discussed). Such 
institutions (mechanisms) are important for:
• increasing access to information;
• increasing access to services;
• improving quality of services;
• improving eﬃciency of internal management and 
operations; and
• improving the way services are provided to citi-
zens (Figure 10).
The introduction of LICs and CRBs would assist 
in achieving goals of administrative reforms in a short 
period of time, have an immediate eﬀect on the level 
of abuses and character of the citizen-local government 
relationship, uphold the legal framework, and not sig-
niﬁcantly drain ﬁnancial resources.  
4.1.1 Local Information Centers (LIC) 
As this study suggests, LICs have the potential to fa-
cilitate public awareness and public participation at 
the local level eﬀectively and in a short period of time. 
Therefore, LICs should be considered an important 
potential mechanism for decreasing administrative 
abuses at the local government level.  Considering that 
LICs in Georgia are in initial stages of operation and 
that their ﬁnancial resources are extremely limited, it 
is too ambitious to state that their existence has had 
(or not) a substantial impact on the level of account-
ability and transparency of local government agencies. 
However, evidence hints that they do appear to have a 
positive impact in a range of areas.  
Figure 10.
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It is important to emphasize that there is an ena-
bling legal framework for the establishment of LICs 
in Georgia. The establishment of LICs could be based 
on the commitment of individual municipalities and 
communities.  
In short, local government information centers 
should fulﬁll the following functions: 
• serve as a centralized place for citizens to obtain 
information about various issues (available servic-
es, eligibility criteria, service delivery procedures, 
standards);
• support participatory procedures to allow for citi-
zen participation in decision-making on resource 
allocation and planning (public meetings, council 
meetings, budget hearings);
• accumulate and provide citizen feedback to local 
governments (hotline, open forums);
• promote partnerships among local governments, 
civil society organizations, and other groups;
• disseminate of information to citizens and the 
media (bulletins, newsletters, press releases); and
• design and operate a website supplied with vari-
ous local information that will act as a resource 
center for local citizens.
This paper recommends that such centers be based 
in non-governmental organizations, rather than as a 
part of local government agencies. Non-governmental 
organization-based LICs enjoy relative freedom from 
political pressure, and are more likely to serve as impar-
tial mechanisms. As well, unlike impoverished public 
institutions, NGO-based LICs have more opportuni-
ties to raise funds through grants or entrepreneurial 
activities. In addition, the activities of an NGO can be 
monitored by oversight boards, which should include 
local community representatives.
Beyond these recommendations, for an LIC to 
function eﬀectively, commitment from and coop-
eration with local self-government is necessary, as its 
operations are mainly based on information obtained 
from and provided by local government agencies and 
other public agencies at the local level. Any contribu-
tion from the local government side is important, and 
engages local government as a stakeholder. For instance, 
the major in-kind contribution of a local government 
may be oﬃce space. It is highly important for an LIC 
to be physically located within the local government 
oﬃces for two reasons. First, a physical closeness will 
ease tensions and increase the eﬃciency of local gov-
ernment-LIC communication. Second, it will facilitate 
public trust toward local government and individual 
representatives.
Certainly, local information centers will be heav-
ily subsidized, with funding from outside sources, and 
particularly in the initial stage of their activities. A long-
term strategy should focus on ﬁnancial sustainability 
and securing funding from several sources. For instance, 
the local budget could co-fund LIC operations, along 
with non-local donor organizations. It is likely that 
donor funding will be needed, regardless—to  obtain 
computers and other needed technical equipment. 
Currently, various donor agencies and governments 
are targeting local governance and public administra-
tion as part of broad development strategies in Georgia. 
Currently, the governments of the United States and 
Switzerland are signiﬁcant ﬁnancial contributors to 
LICs. In addition, various entrepreneurial activities 
(such as charging nominal fees for consultancy work 
or service provision) should be considered as sources 
of income. Fundraising activities could also focus on 
charity donations from private-sector organizations 
and individuals.
Despite the fact that municipalities can make deci-
sions about the creation of such entities individually, 
the most eﬃcient approach would be for a decision 
to be taken by an association of self-governments, to 
promote shared standards. This would represent a ma-
jor commitment to accountability and transparency on 
behalf of local government. The establishment of LICs 
is feasible in a short period of time, within the current 
legal framework, and with existing resources.
In sum, the beneﬁts of the proposed NGO-based 
LIC model include:
• freedom from political pressure;
• trust among citizens;
• close cooperation with local government, which is 
also an active stakeholder;
• monitoring and oversight by various sector repre-
sentatives;
• eﬃcient information provision to citizens (via 
visits, websites, telephone calls and so on); and
• diverse funding sources. 
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4.1.2 Central Referral Bureaus
Central referral bureaus (CRB) are a viable mecha-
nism to promote accountability and prevent abuses at 
the local government level.  A similar model in Poland 
has proved to be an eﬀective mechanism for local gov-
ernment-citizen communication. This study suggests 
that a CRB take the form of a local government oﬃce, 
which would address citizen requests for service, citi-
zen requests for information, citizen complaints, and 
citizen feedback.
Data indicates that citizens in Georgia do not tend 
to apply for information and services, and are reluctant 
to ﬁle complaints; they generally consider local agen-
cies to be inresponsive, non-transparent, ineﬀective 
and unprofessional. The proposed CRB structure has 
been designed to ease and clarify the administrative 
procedures that customers must follow to apply for and 
obtain information and service and to ﬁle a complaint. 
In eﬀect, the structure necessitates clear time-lines and 
accountability mechanisms, as well as a central database 
of all records, in order to keep track of the status of every 
request, report, and application (Figure 11).
The establishment of CRBs does not require major 
policymaking initiatives. It does, however, change the 
relationship between citizens and their local govern-
ment. Instead of being referred to various oﬃces and 
departments with certain requests and complaints, 
citizens would communicate solely with a CRB. All 
requests and complaints would be ﬁled with a CRB as 
well,  and responses would be addressed uniformly. 
Given the low level of computer use in local govern-
ment structure in Georgia, it is not feasible at this point 
to expect the introduction of electronic complaint or 
request documenting, ﬁling or tracking systems. How-
ever, the creation of centralized computer software for 
recording, processing, and accumulating data on com-
plaints and reports could be made possible with a single 
computer, installed in a CRB, until a comprehensive 
system is launched.  Therefore, “computerizing” a CRB 
would allow for the existence of centralized database 
for all requests, complaints and feedback, and would 
(temporarily) diminish the need to computerize all 
departments immediately.
Another important feature of a CRB is account-
ability: CRBs allow for citizen oversight and monitor-
ing through access to data on requests, complaints, 
and responsesé citizen satisfaction reportsé and other 
feedback. This can be implemented through the de-
velopment of a citizen monitoring committee, which 
would receive monthly (or otherwise regular) data from 
a CRB on requests and complaints. Such a committee 
would also review a local government’s institutional 
performance, according to obtained data.
Central referral bureaus create and promote shared 
standards within and among institutions, such as me-
dian response times, reporting requirements, and ﬁlling 
procedures used by various oﬃces. Through CRBs, con-
Figure 11.
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tact with local governments will be streamlined: CRBs 
will reduce red tape and bureaucratic procedures and 
simplify access to services and information. They also 
promote quality control by facilitating access to infor-
mation and services, and by verifying the accuracy of 
records, accurate documentation of results, and quality 
of responses. By accumulating data on citizen-local gov-
ernment communication, this mechanism would allow 
for monitoring of the performance and responsiveness 
of speciﬁc agencies and public servants, and facilitate 
the enforcement of sanctions against unsatisfactory or 
abusive behavior.
In sum, the proposed CRB model will lead to 
increased internal accountability in local agencies and 
increased responsiveness of local government agencies 
toward citizens, through shared standards, centralized 
monitoring systems, and increased monitoring by 
citizens. The establishment of CRBs does not require 
commitment by a national (central) government or 
long-term planning. It can be formed in a short pe-
riod of time, with local ﬁnancial resources. Although 
each municipality can individually decide to create a 
CRB, it would be most eﬃcient if an association of self-
governments were to decide to pursue such approach 
as shared policy.
5. CONCLUSION AND
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The establishment of local self-government in Georgia 
began in mid-1990s. However, overlaps in the func-
tions and responsibilities of various levels of govern-
ment, the absence of real decision-making authority at 
the local level, major deﬁciencies in intergovernmental 
ﬁscal relations, and the lack of professional capacity in 
local government have led to abuses of power. Op-
portunities for oﬃcials to avoid their responsibilities 
and to illegally consume power at the expense of the 
public interest have also emerged. The current system 
does not promote professional standards, incentive or 
enforcement mechanisms (rewards or sanctions), or 
professionalism (ethical behavior) among local public 
servants. It has fostered a lack of professional capacity 
in local government units, accompanied by corrup-
tion and misadministration. Respectively, poor serv-
ices are being delivered to citizens, negatively aﬀecting 
the well-being of local populations.  
The lack of access to information and access to 
services, ineﬃciencies in complaint-handling mecha-
nisms, and the poor quality of services provided to 
citizens at the local level have been evidenced by this 
research.  Such citizen abuses inculcate mistrust and a 
negative image of local government bodies. Citizens 
are thus discouraged from communicating with their 
local government, and believe that they will not be 
provided desired information, quality service, or ap-
propriate treatment.   
This study examined the functioning of various 
answerability mechanisms in local governments and 
discovered that most have not yet been introduced. 
The ineﬀectiveness and non-transparency (opacity) of 
the request and complaint processing system—the dif-
ﬁculty of ﬁling complaints or requests for information 
and service to responsible oﬃces, and unsatisfactory 
treatment in terms of timing, courtesy, professionalism, 
responsiveness, and quality—have created disincentives 
for citizens to report legitimate complaints or requests 
for legitimate services. Dissatisfaction with the quality 
of services has led to a situation where much of the 
population avoids contacting their local government 
at all—as indicated by the high level of unreported 
complaints in all surveyed towns. This evidence indi-
cates the need for clear procedures, high standards, and 
accountability mechanisms.     
Meanwhile, clear progress has been observed in 
those cities where resources have been committed 
toward increasing transparency and public awareness-
building. In cities with local information centers, and 
especially those with regular information bulletins, 
increased public awareness and improved citizen 
inclusion and participation in local governance have 
been detected. This suggests how speciﬁc administrative 
structures and mechanisms (LICs) can facilitate citi-
zen-local government communication, and encourage 
prospects for participatory decision-making.
While this study suggests the need for internal, 
external, and preventive remedies, it has mainly focused 
on a discussion of internal and preventive remedies: 
First, legislative changes are needed to empower 
local governments with the authority, resources, and 
property to function as meaningful decision-making 
bodies.  Amending and enforcing the existing Law 
on Public Servants to account for professionalism is 
necessary, particularly to account for employment and 
career promotion (incentives). Stipulations (sanctions) 
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regarding public servants’ inability to meet professional 
standards and requirements are also needed. Legislative 
changes should include:
• promotion criteria and mechanisms based on pro-
fessional merit;
• incentive mechanisms;
• alignment of wages of local government servants 
with merit and professional qualiﬁcations;
• eﬀective employee evaluation mechanisms (and 
means of enforcement);
• competitive job application processes;
• uniform job descriptions for various positions of 
local public servants; and
• ethics codes.
Second, local information centers (LIC) should be 
created in municipalities as non-governmental, non-
partisan organizations to facilitate citizens’ access to 
information. Local information centers can be created 
to foster commitment of individual local self-govern-
ment bodies to their work; LICs should be linked by 
common enabling legislation—a collaborative policy 
endeavor to promote good governance nationwide.  The 
establishment of LICs can be accomplished in a short 
period of time and co-funded by local budgets. The 
centers should then serve as an administrative remedy 
to improve the quality of local services and informa-
tion provided to citizens; thus, they reduce or prevent 
the occurrence of circumstances leading to justiﬁable 
citizen complaints, reported or unreported.   
In order to strengthen transparency and access to 
information, the webpage of each municipality should 
be designed by LICs. The pages would oﬀer a sort of 
database of relevant legal, economic, and other informa-
tion. At present, local governments lack, the computer 
technology, know-how, and motivation to accomplish 
this task. 
Third, citizen referral bureaus (CRB) should be 
created in every municipality. Such units, established 
within local self-governments, should act as a center for 
receiving citizen complaints, requests, and referrals and 
for receiving and responding to feedback concerning 
local administration. This would reduce administrative 
abuses at the local government level, improve citizen 
access to services and information and to complaint-
handling mechanisms, and increase the eﬀectiveness of 
mechanisms and quality of response.  
These bureaus can be created within the existing 
legal framework, and can be based on the commitment 
of individual local self-government bodies. This can be 
accomplished in a short period of time and funded by 
local resources (the local budget).  
Finally, it is necessary to promote the develop-
ment of representative bodies of self-government units
—self-government association(s).  These associations of 
governmental units and administrators could play a 
major role in sharing and lobbying for new progressive 
values and for promoting new practices among local 
self-governments nationwide. They are key to LICs, 
to the creation of CRBs, and to the design and intro-
duction of ethical norms; they serve to design ethical 
codes and to introduce ethical “committees”; and they 
act as administrative mechanisms against abuses at the 
local government level. At this stage of the develop-
ment of such associations, their further strengthening 
should be facilitated by technical assistance from the 
international community, based on best practices; they 
require the leadership and commitment of local self-
governments.
NOTES
1 See Shergelashvili 2002 for references on intergovernmental ﬁscal relations.
2 By USAID, through the Urban Institute and National Democratic Institute, Open Society Foundation–Tblisi, Georgia Foundation, the World Bank, 
British Embassy, GTZ, etc.
3 According to the data in National Democratic Institute 2002.
4 Administrative Abuse is an act of enforcement, promulgation of a norm, taking of a decision, or denial of a beneﬁt by a state oﬃcial,  which is: illegal, a 
result of inappropriate exercise of discretion, or procedurally improper, irregular or erroneous. Administrative remedies are measures, mechanisms and 
structures oriented towards preventing or addressing the administrative abuses. The deﬁnition was developed collaboratively by Edwin Rekosh, PILI, 
and fellows of the LGI Fellowship Program, 2002–2003, Administrative Remedies at the Local Government Level.
130
T H E  V I C I O U S  C I R C L E :  W E A K  S T A T E  I N S T I T U T I O N S ,  U N R E M E D I E D  A B U S E  A N D  D I S T R U S T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
5 Mainly from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), though the Eurasia Foundation and the Urban Institute, and GTZ 
through Civitas Georgica.
6 Despite the internal availability of such a mechanism, it is not publicly accessible.
7 WUD 2001; Urban Institute 2001; ICCC 2002.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Project: Assessing
  Administrative Abuse
  and Remedies
This study aims to form a better understanding of 
administrative abuses and remedies in local govern-
ment in Poland since the demise of state socialism. 
Particular areas of focus include: transparency in every 
sphere of local community life; management tools; 
citizen participation in local governance; and means 
of identifying potential administrative problems that 
can adversely aﬀect a given community. Institutional 
development was of primary interest as well. The 
project serves to form a better understanding of pos-
sibilities for development in light of:
• eﬀective and readable administrative and legisla-
tive means against abuse in local government 
performance;
• building and reinforcing the need for an ethical 
code and awareness of ethical standards and val-
ues; and
• clear administrative procedures.
By investigating typical abuses, the project was 
intended to analyze the particular tools to prevent 
abuse, and to formulate appropriate administrative and 
legal regulations (or alterations). The greatest challenge 
was to devise suggestions for eﬀective legal means to 
break abuse-makers’ solidarity and eventually to prevent 
any group abuse alliances.  
Ultimately, this project has been undertaken with 
the intent to help civil or public servants to navigate 
through, or to comprehend, the structure of the 
local government unit (LGU) and the organization of 
work, and to recognize undesirable, corrupt activities in 
context of transition. Conclusions are presented in the 
form of instructions on how to implement a particular 
procedure or tool.
Administrative Remedies for Abuses 
in Local Government: Poland
M a r e k  J e f r e m i e n k o ,  H a l i n a  Wo l s k a
1.2 Local Government in Poland:
  An Overview
Several features characterize the local government sys-
tem in Poland. These include:
• considerably developed formal, legal, and institu-
tional elements;
• a relatively high degree of decentralization, in 
comparison to other Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries;
• extensive interference by politicians in the area of 
local ﬁnancing;
• sustainable techniques of constructing, voting 
on, carrying out and presenting annual activity 
reports of authorities
• poor use of management tools (such as sector strat-
egies, mechanisms to promote local dialogue and 
citizen participation, long-range ﬁnancial analy-
sis, and capital and performance budgeting);
Sample Recommendations:
The labor code of an oﬃce should be clearly formulated 
and easily accessible. For all routine tasks, especially those 
involving individual consideration, written and graphic 
procedures to enable control of work progress should be 
outlined. Procedures should clearly state the range of 
responsibility of a person in a particular job position for a 
particular task at a particular stage. They should also state 
actions to be taken in order to reach a desired eﬀect.
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• lack of transparency in local government ﬁnances;
• an antiquated legal framework;
• inadequate knowledge of public ﬁnance among 
elected oﬃcials; and
• political inﬂuence on local councils.
These features are interrelated, and play a signiﬁcant 
role in creating, changing, and maintaining modes of 
governance in Poland—particularly with regard to the 
development of administrative institutions. Institu-
tional development sits at the heart of local govern-
ment decision-making, planning, and the articulation 
of community values. Failing to address the features 
listed above risks the capacity of local governments to 
provide quality services to its citizens.
Generally, there is a lack of a long-term perspec-
tive in the reform of public administration in Poland. 
This aﬀects relations between administrators (public 
authorities, oﬃcials) and citizens, and hinders a com-
prehensive understanding of roles and responsibilities. 
This is felt most signiﬁcantly within communities, at 
the local level. As well, there is little awareness of indica-
tors that can be used to forecast and develop transpar-
ency, accountability, and so on in local government 
conditions. 
Underlying these issues is an insistence on, or ac-
ceptance of, control, rather than an orientation toward 
more democratic policymaking and management. This 
study argues that progress can and will be made once 
central government and local policymakers, as well as 
citizens, demand timely, accurate and useful informa-
tion upon which to make decisions.
Securing a legal framework for local government 
transparency and the implementation of anti-corrup-
tion tools have proven to be diﬃcult tasks. Diﬃculties, 
importantly, arise from the fact that rules and regula-
tions in public administration are generally made by 
politicians, and not by managers. As such, they reﬂect 
an interest in controlling and reporting, and not in 
management and trends or process analyses. 
The local government legal framework opens a 
broad spectrum of possibilities for intelligent and 
ﬂexible decision-making and for responding to com-
munity needs. But, as politicians, local authorities tend 
to narrow their interests and focus on  “defending their 
posts,” rather than on modern management tools to 
seek out, develop, and make use of new ideas for the 
beneﬁt of a whole community.
1.3 The Significance of Institutional
  Development of Local Government
  in Poland
Institutional development is at the center of local gov-
ernment reform in Poland. The process signiﬁcantly 
inﬂuences the extent to which (how and if ) democ-
racy functions within particular communities. Institu-
tional (and organizational) development and changes 
have a legal basis, are based on decisions and projects 
of local councils, and fall within the competence of 
these councils. 
Currently, there are many obstacles to institutional 
development in the country—some of which are re-
lated to the present proportional (rather than simple 
majority) election system. Municipalities typically 
lack well-rooted principles that link transparency and 
anti-corruption objectives to institutional development 
realities. Procedures to make transparency and anti-
corruption eﬀorts the focal point for determining com-
munity priorities are inadequate, and ethical standards, 
benchmarks and transparency in local ﬁnancing are 
insuﬃcient. Generally, there is little understanding of 
how to make use of tools for eﬀective local government 
management, and much planning is made with little 
foresight; local governments lack long-term perspec-
tive in policymaking, and tend to focus on short-term 
“quick ﬁxes.” Finally, there is little communication 
between central and local government agencies, and 
between local governments and subsidiary organiza-
tions in combating corruption.
1.3.1 The Problem of Corruption
Unlawful activities and mal-administration are formal 
subjects of concern, codiﬁed by Polish legislation. 
They have little bearing, however, on the actual ethi-
cal state of local government performance. Solidarity 
among administrative “abusers,” and an unwillingness 
to jeopardize connections among colleagues, compli-
cates the prosecution process; a great deal of unlawful 
activity is not dealt with formally.
Over the past ten years, the pursuit of democracy 
has not yet achieved a coherent, consensual understand-
ing of values and ethical norms, or of the ethical assess-
ment of events and processes in public life in Poland. 
However, ethical standards and ethical awareness of 
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public servants’ work are crucial for eliminating abuse, 
especially in regard to particular conﬂicts of interests, 
where legislative means do not give clear guidance.
Indeed, ethical standards and awareness are part 
and parcel and eﬀective governance. Eﬀorts to restore 
ethics in governance now comprise a “global” campaign 
waged by central and local governments authorities and 
various non-governmental organizations and associa-
tions. Without ethical standards and awareness, the 
discrepancy between legal regulations and the actual 
(un)lawful course of current aﬀairs will undermine 
democratic development in virtually all spheres of 
public life.
Regrettably, insuﬃcient attention has been paid 
to institutional tools of prevention and responses to 
bribery, the pursuit of private interests, nepotism and 
“favoring,” illicit behavior, or other forms of mal-ad-
ministration in Poland. It is crucial to aﬃrm the value 
of such tools—such as eﬀective prosecution for all forms 
of abuse—within the local government structure.
1.4 Overview of Research
  and Methodology
To assess the performance of local governments in Po-
land, a project-speciﬁc methodology was developed. 
We researched the state of institutional development 
in selected local government units, with a two-fold 
focus. Speciﬁc attention was paid to the organization 
of oﬃce work, and particularly on how this work is 
oriented toward citizens, in regard to the range and 
performance of services and procedures performed. 
As well, citizen perceptions of, and participation in 
local government, along with governance awareness, 
were investigated. The inﬂuence of these areas on ad-
ministrative abuse was then analyzed.
Research was carried out in 10 towns and cities at 
various levels of stages of institutional development. 
The level of institutional development was determined 
by a set of previously deﬁned anti-corruption tools and 
procedures. Data was gathered through extensive sur-
veys and questionnaires of local authorities and citizens 
(Appendices 1 and 7). Data collection involved exten-
sive questionnaires and interviewing, and made use of 
both qualitative and quantitative criteria.  Whereas 
previous research and studies on local government 
in Poland had used only quantitative criteria (such as 
average income, investment ﬁgures, and so on); this 
project used qualitative criteria based on analysis and 
assessment of professionalism in local government 
performance. 
Data assessment—which diﬀered according to local 
government—took the form of a matrix.  The level of 
institutional development was marked individually, on 
a separate matrix, for each local government and scored 
accordingly. This research served to identify relation-
ships between the functioning of diﬀerent tools and 
procedures of governance and the level of abuses, as 
measured by certain parameters.
 Questions for oﬃcials and citizens (customers) 
were clearly and precisely formulated, and covered 
areas such as:
• the quality and level of ﬁnance management;
• the quality and level of local government develop-
ment management;
• relationships and organization between and with-
in local government oﬃces, and how this aﬀects 
service; and
• the level of social communication and citizen par-
ticipation.
For assessment purposes, points (0, 1, 2, or 3) were 
given according to the answer. The total number of 
points indicates the level of professional management 
of a local government. For example, points could be 
gained for introducing tools to make local management 
more eﬃcient, for a certain approach to local govern-
ment development, for a particular attitude to investors 
or for the scope of urban development planning.
2. PRESENTATION OF INSTITUTIONAL
 DEVELOPMENT DATA: MUNICIPALITIES
Municipalities fall into one of four groups, according 
to population size. 
The ﬁrst group consists of Parysów, Lesznowola, 
and Prażmów, all of which are situated in Mazovian 
province, and have from 4,200 to 12,000 inhabitants. 
The Commune of Lesznowola lies next to Warsaw, 
adjoining it on the east side. Low, detached houses 
predominate. The western part of the Lesznowola is 
characterized by exceptional natural and scenic features. 
Its location on the Warsaw-Cracow road and railway 
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line, close to the extensive Warsaw market and with 
access to highly skilled labor, is an important advantage 
in attracting investors. Prażmów is a typical semi-urban 
locality. Economic activity revolves around electrical 
engineering, trade, and tourism. These areas are not 
particularly well developed. 
Grodzisk Mazowiecki, Łomianki, and Konstancin-
Jeziorna comprise the second group. The township of 
Grodzisk has an area of 10,723 hectares (ha) and con-
sists of the town of Grodzisk Mazowiecki (1,319 ha) 
and 33 villages. Łomianki is one of the seven communes 
that lie next to Warsaw. Because of its attractive posi-
tion, Łomianki enjoys economic success in the areas of 
transport, tourism, and recreation.
The third group includes Ciechanów, Piotrków 
Trybunalski, and Tomaszów Mazowiecki. These are 
described as  “middle municipal communes.” 
Finally, the last group consists of the biggest urban 
areas: Warszawa-Ursynów (which is not a commune, 
but a quarter), Płock, and Radom. Płock is a town with 
over 130,000 inhabitants, situated in the center of Po-
land, within the Mazowieckie Voivodship. Mazowieckie 
is the largest voivodship in the country, and oﬀers ideal 
conditions for the largest market in Central Europe. 
Radom is the 14th largest urban center in Poland in 
terms of population. Its convenient location (100 km 
from south Warsaw), with access to an extensive net-
work of roads and railway lines, is one of its signiﬁcant 
advantages.  Radom has plenty of legally secure real 
estate that can be developed for manufacturing. The 
majority of such land is situated in the Special Eco-
nomic Zone (SEZ). Launching new economic acti-
vities in Radom is quite easy, because of the city’s 
reserves of skilled labor trained in taning, footwear 
manufacture, electrical engineering, power engineer-
ing, service industries and trade.The city’s prime 
location, proximity to leisure and recreation opportu-
nities, and its developed network of cultural facilities 
also provide many features attractive to investors and 
visitors.
Table 1.
Group A (<15,000 Inhabitants)
Municipality Points Rank
Lesznowola 32 1
Parysów 27 2
Prażmów 12 3
Table 2.
Group B (15,000–40 000 Inhabitants)
Municipality Points Rank
Grodzisk Mazowiecki 39 1
Konstancin-Jeziorna 35 2
Łomianki 30 3
Table 3.
Group C (40,000–100,000 Inhabitants)
Municipality Points Rank
Piotrków Trybunalski 34 1
Ciechanów 33 2
Tomaszów Mazowiecki 4 3
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3. SURVEY PROCESS AND PARTICIPANTS 
3.1 Respondents: Public Servants
Surveyed respondents:  Adult respondents from admin-
istrative oﬃces of local governments (of various sizes) 
who had served over the previous four years were sur-
veyed. Respondents’ gender, age, and frequency of use 
of public services in municipalities and communes are 
presented in the ﬁgures below (Figures 1, 2, and 3).
3.2 Respondents: Citizens
Data for analysis was gathered through a survey ques-
tionnaire (Appendix 7: Citizen Questionnaire). Ques-
tions 7.1, 8.1, and 9.1, concerning descriptions of cor-
ruptive situations, were not considered in the quanti-
tative analysis of the survey results. Rather, they are 
of merely informative character. The questionnaire 
allowed the interviewer to note the manner in which 
the respondent replied or the comments he or she 
formulated, and thus to develop a more well rounded 
understanding of the context.
Respondents were customers of municipal and 
commune administration oﬃces. In order to avoid 
situations in which the respondent was part of the of-
ﬁce staﬀ, the interviewer ﬁrst explicitly asked, “Are you 
a customer in this oﬃce?” If the answer was positive, 
the interview process would begin.
In some localities, the small number of customers 
required diﬀerent methods. In Parysów, Ciechanów, 
Piotrków Trybunalski, and Konstancin-Jeziorna, the 
poll was carried out in the streets. In such cases, the 
ﬁrst questions were: “Do you live in this municipal-
ity?” and “Have you attended to any business in the 
local administration oﬃce?” With a positive answer, 
the interview process would begin.  
Table 4.
Group D (>100 000 Inhabitants)
Municipality Points Rank
Płock 29 1
Radom 28 2
Warszawa-Ursynów 25 3
Table 5.
All Municipalities Together
Municipality Points Rank
Grodzisk Mazowiecki 39 1
Konstancin-Jeziorna 35 2
Piotrków Trybunalski 34 3
Ciechanów 33 4
Lesznowola 32 5
Łomianki 30 6
Płock 29 7
Radom 28 8
Parysów 27 9
Warszawa-Ursynów 25 10
Prażmów 12 11
Tomaszów Mazowiecki 4 12
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Figure 1.
Respondents by Gender
Figure 2.
Respondents by Date of Birth
Figure 3.
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4. HYPOTHESES
The survey developed for the project was used to 
verify three hypotheses:
1. In municipal and commune administration oﬃces 
of higher institutional development, customers de-
scribe a lower intensity of corruptive behavior.
2. In municipal and commune administration of-
ﬁces of higher institutional development, custom-
ers describe higher satisfaction with the services 
rendered by these oﬃces.
3. In municipal and commune administration oﬃces 
of lower corruptive behavior, customers describe 
higher satisfaction with the services rendered by 
these oﬃces.
4.1 Hypothesis 1
In municipal and commune administration oﬃces of 
higher institutional development, customers describe a 
lower intensity of corrupt behavior. This implies that 
an oﬃce with a high rank with respect to tools for 
management and customer service should also win a 
high rank in the rating assessing corruptive behavior. 
In other words, a high rank in the corruption rating 
means a small number of cases of corruptive behavior.
4.1.1 Results
Hypothesis 1 was not conﬁrmed, which means that 
the survey did not demonstrate an essential relation 
between high institutional development and low cor-
ruption level.
Questions 7, 8, 9, and 10 (below; see also Appendix 
7) were of basic signiﬁcance for the given hypothesis. In 
accordance with these questions, ratings of administra-
tion oﬃces in which customers describe having come 
across corruptive behavior were determined. The rank 
of a given municipality or commune depended on the 
total of indicators.
The indicators were calculated by ﬁrst scoring each 
answer (points are marked in bold).
Question 7. Have you come across situations in 
which bureaucrats abuse their position in order to pro-
vide support to their relatives or friends, or companies 
run by such people?
0 No.
1 Yes, I have heard of such cases from the media 
(papers, radio, TV).
1 Yes, I have heard of such cases from my friends, 
family, and colleagues.
2 Yes, I have personally come across such cases.
Question 8. Have you come across cases of bureau-
crats accepting bribes?
0 No.
1 Yes, I have heard of such cases from the media 
(papers, radio, TV).
1 Yes, I have heard of such cases from my friends, 
family, and colleagues.
2 Yes, I have personally come across such cases.
Question 9. Have you felt obliged over the last 
four yours to bribe a bureaucrat in order to solve your 
problem?
1 Yes.
0 No.
Question 10. We occasionally hear of public oﬃ-
cials who beneﬁt from the position they hold; do you 
think that in your municipal/commune oﬃce:
1 There are such people, though very few.
2 There are many such people.
0 There are no such people employed in this oﬃce.
Second, for all the municipal and commune 
administration oﬃces, the total score (respondents’ 
replies) to particular questions was divided by the 
number of valid answers. Every local administration 
oﬃce was attributed four indicators (one relative to 
each question) that, when added, created the ranking 
(Table 6).
Lesznowola, ranked ﬁrst, had the lowest number 
of corrupt behavior observed by customers of a given 
administrative oﬃce. In contrast, customers of Ursynów 
(Warsaw), Radom, and Prażmów reported numerous 
cases of corrupt activity. The ratio of customers who 
felt obliged to bribe an oﬃcial (Question 9) was the 
same in Ursynów and Radom. No other municipality 
reached anywhere near this score. Ursynów also ranked 
low for Question 8 and Question 10, while Radom had 
the highest corruption rating in Question 7.
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Table 6.
Hypothesis 1a
Municipality Question 7 Question 8 Question 9 Question 10 Total Rank
Lesznowola 0.38 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.76 1
Łomianki 0.43 0.20 0.00 0.73 1.36 2
Parysów 0.61 0.15 0.07 0.58 1.41 3
Ciechanów 0.46 0.13 0.03 0.93 1.55 4
Piotrków 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.89 1.59 5
Tomaszów 0.62 0.26 0.03 0.93 1.84 6
Płock 0.64 0.41 0.06 0.92 2.03 7
Konstancin-Jeziorna 0.66 0.33 0.13 0.93 2.05 8
Grodzisk 0.51 0.48 0.03 1.04 2.06 9
Prażmów 0.82 0.29 0.18 1.17 2.46 10
Radom 0.93 0.33 0.26 1.13 2.65 11
Usynów 0.46 0.63 0.26 1.31 2.66 12
 This ranking was compared to the rank scored by a 
given local administration oﬃce with respect to its 
institutional development (Table 7).
In order to investigate the correlation between the 
intensity of corrupt behavior and the level of institu-
tional development, we made use of Spearman Rank 
Correlation. Spearman Rank Correlation is a statistical 
Table 7.
Hypothesis 1b
Municipality Points Rank
Grodzisk Mazowiecki 39 1
Konstancin-Jeziorna 35 2
Piotrków Trybunalski 34 3
Ciechanów 33 4
Lesznowola 32 5
Łomianki 30 6
Płock 29 7
Radom 28 8
Parysów 27 9
Ursynów 25 10
Prażmów 12 11
Tomaszów Mazowiecki 4 12
analysis, used to investigate a correlation (concurrence) 
of variables. It compares rankings of local administra-
tion oﬃces in order to identify and assess the occurrence 
of a strong a correlation. Correlations range from –1 to 
+1, where 0 stands for a total lack of correlation and 1 
for a full correlation. A positive correlation indicates 
“direction.” 
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4.1.2 Analysis 
The survey has not proved any signiﬁcant relationship 
between corrupt behavior in a local administration 
oﬃce and the level of institutional development. This 
does not prove, however, that such a relationship does 
not exist at all. Survey results might have been inﬂu-
enced by several factors. These include: 
• The polled sample may have been not large 
enough.
• In order to achieve optimal survey objectivity, the 
poll should have been carried out with a random 
selection of the polled customers.
• Corruption is a crime; respondents may have been 
reluctant to admit their involvement.
• Certainly, most people hesitate to speak badly of 
their family and friends. This may also apply to 
their local administrators, particularly in smaller 
municipalities (e.g. Lesznowola, Parysów). In such 
communities, local oﬃcials tend to be either the 
respondents’ relatives or friends. This may be best 
exempliﬁed by responses such as: “There is no 
corruption here. Here all the people are good,” or 
“There has never been corruption here, and there 
never will be.”
In order to gather more reliable data, a project of 
far larger scope is necessary. A random selection of re-
spondents and a bigger number of respondents imply 
very high ﬁnancial costs.  We argue that, due to the im-
portance of these issues for good governance in Poland, 
support for further examination is worthwhile. 
4.1.3 Responses to Question 11
Respondents were also asked to what extent particu-
lar administration oﬃce departments are susceptible 
to corruption. Indicators were calculated in order to 
establish departmental rankings, and to show suscep-
tibility to corruption. Indicators were calculated as 
for Questions 7 to 10—as a total of particular scores 
divided by the number of valid responses. A scale of 
1 to 4 was used, with 1 being “very susceptible” and 
4 being “not susceptible at all.” 
Respondents’ answers suggest that (from most 
to least) the Department of Land Survey and Land 
Development, the Department of Investment and 
Modernization, and the Housing Department are 
most susceptible to corruption. The department least 
susceptible to corruption is the Census Department. 
All the results are shown in Figure 4.
4.2 Hypothesis 2
In municipal and commune administration oﬃces of 
high institutional development, customers describe high-
er satisfaction with the services rendered by these oﬃces. 
This hypothesis implies that a local administration of-
ﬁce that has been ranked high in the rating of admin-
Figure 4.
Susceptibility of Departments to Corruption
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istration oﬃces with respect to the management tools 
used and to customer service should also rank high 
in the rating assessing customers’ satisfaction with the 
services rendered.
4.2.1 Results 
The hypothesis has not been conﬁrmed: no essential 
relationship between a high level of institutional de-
velopment and a low corruption level appears to exist. 
Question 6 (below, also Appendix 7) was important for 
this hypothesis. Answers were attributed the following 
scores:
0. I believe that my local administration oﬃce may 
serve as an example to other such oﬃces.
1. Things are quite good, though a lot still need to be 
changed.
1. I cannot formulate any serious criticism of my 
local administration oﬃce.
2. I receive too limited information on the activity of 
the oﬃce.
2. I feel confused here.
2. I usually have diﬃculties with solving my prob-
lem here.
Responses were divided into two groups: posi-
tive and negative. Positive answers had a score of 1, 
whereas  a score of 2 was read as negative. The answer 
“I believe that my local administration oﬃce may serve 
as an example to other such oﬃces” was considered to 
express maximum satisfaction with the functioning of 
the municipal and commune administration; it was 
attributed a score of 0. Only 16 respondents in the 
whole survey gave such answer.
In order to calculate results, a method identical to 
that used for Hypothesis 1 was applied. The indicator of 
customers’ satisfaction was calculated by dividing the to-
tal of scores by the number of valid answers (Table 8).
Again, Lesznowola ranks highest in terms of cus-
tomer satisfaction with the functioning of the munici-
pal or commune administration.
The above ranking, identical to that used in 
Hypothesis 1, was compared by means of Spearman 
Rank Correlation (to allow a comparison between 
ranks in two diﬀerent rankings), ranking municipal 
and commune administration with respect to their 
institutional development level. The resulting 0.21 
correlations are not statistically signiﬁcant.
4.2.2 Analysis
The survey did not demonstrate any signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between the institutional developments of 
municipal or commune administration oﬃce and the 
Table 8.
Hypothesis 2
Indicator Rank
Lesznowola 1.03 1
Łomianki 1.13 2
Grodzisk 1.22 3
Prażmów 1.23 4
Parysów 1.23 4
Piotrków 1.23 4
Ciechanów 1.36 7
Radom 1.40 8
Ursynów 1.43 9
Tomaszów 1.43 9
Płock 1.46 11
Konstancin-Jeziorna 1.53 12
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level of satisfaction of their customers. Similarly, as 
in the case of Hypothesis 1, a signiﬁcant correlation 
has not been discovered (if it exists), possibly due to 
the size and lack of a representative character of the 
sample.
It is possible that customers of a local adminis-
tration oﬃce are hardly aware whether their oﬃce is 
institutionally developed or not. For such assessment 
they would require some comparison or reference. 
Very often the municipal or commune oﬃce is the 
only oﬃce they deal with. It would have been much 
easier to investigate a possible correlation between an 
institutional development of a given administration 
oﬃce and its customers’ satisfaction if one respondent 
were to use the services of more than one oﬃce, one of 
high institutional development level and one of a low 
institutional development level.
4.3 Hypothesis 3
In municipal and commune administration oﬃces of 
relatively little corrupt behavior, customers describe 
higher levels of satisfaction with the services rendered by 
these oﬃces. This would imply that if a given municipal 
or commune administration oﬃce has ranked high 
for corruptive behavior (meaning that the respond-
ents pointed to a limited number of cases of such 
behavior), it should also rank high for customer 
satisfaction.
4.3.1 Results
The hypothesis has been conﬁrmed. This means that 
the investigation has demonstrated a statistically sig-
niﬁcant relationship between a low level of corruption 
and a high customer satisfaction level. In order to in-
vestigate this correlation, two rankings established for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were used (Table 9).
In the case of the current hypothesis, as in that of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, Spearman Rank Correlation has 
been used. The resulting 0.52 correlations are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
4.3.2 Analysis
The survey demonstrated a relationship between low 
corruption level in local administration oﬃces and 
customer satisfaction. Bearing in mind the results of 
the veriﬁcation of Hypothesis 2, it could be suggested 
that honesty of bureaucrats employed in a given 
administration oﬃce has more of an impact on the 
level of customer satisfaction than does the level of an 
oﬃce’s institutional development.
Table 9.
Hypothesis 3
Satisfaction ranking Corruptive behavior level ranking
Lesznowola 1 1
Łomianki 2 2
Grodzisk 3 9
Prażmów 4 10
Parysów 4 3
Piotrków 4 5
Ciechanów 7 4
Radom 8 11
Ursynów 9 12
Tomaszów 9 6
Płock 11 7
Konstancin-Jeziorna 12 8
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In Poland, people have grown accustomed to a 
certain mode of local administration, and how certain 
oﬃces function.  As such, citizens tend to be neither 
surprised nor indignant if they ﬁnd no central customer 
service or if they wander from one department to an-
other to attend to their needs. However, as Lesznowola 
and Łomianki demonstrate, a lack of corruption (as de-
scribed by the respondents) translates into satisfaction 
with the functioning of an administration oﬃce.
4.4 Recapitulation
The survey did not demonstrate a signiﬁcant relation-
ship among the level of institutional development of 
a municipal or commune administration oﬃce, the 
level of corruption, and customer satisfaction. Impor-
tantly, this research should considered as a preliminary 
poll, providing insuﬃcient data to make substantial, 
meaningful conclusions. In order to conduct a fully 
reliable survey, a random sample of respondents would 
be needed. With the available data, this study thus 
only sketches certain tendencies and trends, which 
should be followed by a much more sophisticated 
survey.
5. POLICY OPTIONS AND
 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Areas of reform and actions needed at the level of lo-
cal government are numerous, and require a range of 
formal, legal, and institutional solutions. This study 
proposes the following:
• Raise professionalism in management through 
institutional procedures;
• Introduce ethical standards and guidance on how 
to carry out responsibilities and build public trust;
• Develop and utilize various benchmarks and 
standards as management tools for assessing mu-
nicipal accountability;
• Develop and implement formal procedures as 
tools to promote citizen participation; 
• Publish, disseminate, and promote access to infor-
mation to increase transparency; and 
• Encourage input from citizens and the business 
community concerning interests and priorities.
Policy options that aim to overcome local admin-
istration abuses can be separated eﬀectively into three 
spheres. The ﬁrst pertains to institutional development. 
The second sphere concerns the identiﬁcation of cor-
ruption in local administrations, and sanctions against 
corrupt bureaucrats. The detection and prevention of 
corrupt activities and individuals might take the form of 
an apolitical monitoring system.  Finally, policy options 
can serve to emphasize the prevention of corruption, 
rather than the detection of corrupted bureaucrats.
As regards the third policy sphere, the above-
described survey proves that, due to an insigniﬁcant 
relationship between institutional development and 
corruption, and due to low levels of corruption detec-
tion and punishment, this third policy option appears 
most eﬀective in the Polish case. This option would 
promote the creation of a more transparent, account-
able municipality; emphasis should be placed on pre-
venting violations of law, rather than on detecting and 
punishing the guilty.
As a ﬁnal note, administrative department or unit 
heads (wójt, mayor, President) will beneﬁt from the 
proposed recommendations, in that their respective 
oﬃces can be reorganized and “freed” from corrupt 
behavior and conﬂicts.  In turn, departments and units 
will function more eﬀectively and eﬃciently. 
5.1 Establishment of Local Standards:
  Procedures and Enforcement
5.1.1 Targets and Tasks
Eﬀectiveness in local administration requires the estab-
lishment of processes that will improve service standards 
and limit corruption. This study proposes four target 
areas to improve local governance. First, complete and 
precise standards and procedures limiting the  arbitrary 
character of decisions made by commune bureaucrats 
must be developed. Second, the professional character 
of local administrations should be emphasized, by pars-
ing decision-making and executive powers. Third, peri-
odic control of the functioning of local governments is 
needed, in light of limiting corrupt practices, through 
state monitoring institutions, NGOs or a free and criti-
cal media. Finally, this study advocates the introduction 
and/or consolidation of local, internal anti-corruption 
control systems.
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To reach these targets, this study recommends 
several activities. Activities at the public level include: 
the introduction of  criteria (roles and responsibilities) 
for particular positions, as well as transparent “hiring 
and ﬁring” procedures (speciﬁcation of professional 
proﬁle, position description, speciﬁcation of required 
skills); and the implementation of mechanisms to 
ensure the fulﬁllment of obligations in keeping with 
Supreme Control Chamber (NIK) requirements. 
Additional activities must serve to introduce execu-
tive-disciplinary mechanisms; to foster transparency 
(particularly in regard to administrators’ possessions 
or holdings); and to introduce standards which limit 
the acceptance of gifts and donations, and which deﬁne 
the groups for which the acceptance of gifts and dona-
tions is inadmissible.
5.1.2 Public Procurement
Activities regarding public procurement should in-
volve introducing standardized tendering documen-
tation at the local level; developing guidelines for 
evaluating tendering bids; analyzing the possibility 
of a two-level decision-making procedure (with the 
ﬁrst level for evaluation and recommendation, and 
the second for decision-making); and introducing a 
“negative list” of corrupting businesses, activities or 
individuals.
5.2 Closing Remarks: 
  Promoting Transparency
This study advocates the model of a transparent loca-
lity elaborated by Swianiewicz (ed.), which includes the 
above-mentioned, quality-improvement procedu-res 
(2001). Speciﬁcally, special emphasis should be put on 
developing a work timetable, regulations and proce-
dures, an employee evaluation system, and access to 
information and legal regulations.
The existence of the above elements (and abiding 
by the “rules of the game”) will safeguard transparency 
and facilitate adherence to principles which promote 
good governance. This will help local bureaucrats to 
systematize their knowledge concerning the organi-
zation of work in a given administration, and to 
understand the centrality of professional behavior to 
eﬀective, eﬃcient relations between citizens and local 
administrators.
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APPENDICES 
1. Survey: Institutional Development Versus Abuses in Local Administration
Within local government…
• Are there written instructions that describe turnover of documents? 
• Is there a registry of all client services available?  
• Is there a procedural or ethical code for all organizational procedures performed?
• Are there ethical codes for individual employees, of diﬀerent positions?
• Is there an electronically-driven, document-management system?
• Has any ISO certiﬁcate been achieved? 
• Have quality management procedures implemented? 
• Does a human resources development program exist?
• How many development and vocational trainings exist? 
• How many staﬀ members have participated in development and vocational training? 
• Is there (in writing) a city development strategy, which has been formally accepted? 
• Are multiyear, ﬁnancial forecasts of city revenues and expenditures formulated and available (by four-year period)? 
• Is there a multiyear Capital Investment Program? If so, was a set of standardized project selection criteria used 
in CIP formulation?
• Is there a task budget in use?    
• Has a set of performance measurement indicators been elaborated?
• To what extent and how is competitive bidding performed?
• How many appeals to bids are registered in a year?
• Have any complaints been voiced against staﬀ members?
• Are regular hours available during which citizens can communicate directly with local oﬃcials? How often, 
and with whom? 
• What is the format of citizen-local government interaction?
• Is there a simpliﬁed (but accurate) city budget made accessible to citizens?
• Is there a Citizens Service Bureau (CSB)?
• How are requirements for submitting complaints, requests, and so forth made accessible to citizens? Are for-
mulated written descriptions of all administrative procedures available for clients in the City Hall Oﬃce?               
• How often do local oﬃcials meet with local businesses?
• Does the municipality maintain its own website?
• Are local government strategies published and made accessible to citizens and to all staﬀ members? 
• How often do local administrators of diﬀerent departments and levels meet?
• Does the administration consider the size of the local population, and the age, socioeconomic, occupational 
and educational proﬁle of citizens, particularly regarding complaints and requests? 
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2. Survey: Overall Results 
Indicator Municipality with population of:
< 15,000 15,000 to 40,000 40,000 to 100,000 > 100,000
Municipality*** 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Competitive bids, 2001 (#) 39 202 18 69 30 94 33 139 47 92 360 5765
Appeals to competitive bids 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 N/a 7 5 3
Meetings with representatives 
of local business organizations 
(per annum)
2–3 3 N/a 3+ 3+ 2-3 3+ 2–3 N/a 3+ 3+ 1
Existence of written 
instructions describing 
document turnover 
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No N/a Yes Yes No
Register of available 
client services 
No No No Yes No No No No N/a Yes No Yes
Code of all organizational 
procedures performed
No No No No No No No No N/a No No No
Electronically-driven 
document management system
No No No No Yes No No No N/a No No No
LG development strategy No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
MThe multiyear ﬁnancial 
forecast of city revenues and 
expenditures
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Multiyear CIP; possibility for 
citizens to propose investment 
project
Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes N/a No No Yes 
Task budgeting No No No No No No No No No No No No
Simpliﬁed city budget for 
citizens
Yes Yes Yes Yes N/a Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No
Website Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Registered for development 
and vocational trainings, 2000
Yes   Yes N/a Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/a Yes Yes Yes
Staﬀ members who participate 
in development and vocational 
training
92 12 20 49 94 59 37 181 N/a 236 346 175
Set of performance 
measurement indicators
No No No No No No No No No No No No
Codes of ethics No No No No No ** No No N/a No No No
Disciplinary sanctions  
Executives with weekly duty 
hours for citizens
Some Some Some All Some All Some All N/a All All Some 
Duty hours per week of each 
individual member of the 
Executive Board  
6 40 12 6 4 5 4 4 N/a 2 11 8
* N/a: lack of data.
** Council’s code of ethics.
*** Municipality: 1 Lesznowola; 2 Parysów; 3 Prażmów; 4 Grodzisk Maz; 5 Łomianki; 6 Konstancin–Jeziorna; 
7 Ciechanów; 8 Piotrków Tryb.; 9 Tomaszów Maz; 10 Płock; 11 Radom; 12 Warszawa-Ursynów.
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3. Group A: < 15,000 inhabitants
Indicator 15,000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Lesznowola Parysów Praz·mów
Competitive bids, 2001 (#) 39 (1) 202 (3) 18 (1)
Appeals to competitive bids 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)
Meetings with representatives of local 
business organizations (per annum)
2–3 (1) More than 3 (3) N/a (-1)
Existence of written instructions 
describing document turnover 
Yes (3) Yes (3) No (0)
Register of available client services No (0) No (0) No (0)
Code of all organizational procedures 
performed
No (0) No (0) No (0)
Electronically-driven 
document management system
No (0) No (0) No (0)
LG development strategy No (0) No (0) No (0)
Multiyear ﬁnancial forecast of city 
revenues and expenditures
Yes (3) No (0) No (0)
Multiyear CIP;  possibility for citizens to 
propose investment project
Yes (3) No (0) No (0)
Task budgeting No (0) No (0) No (0)
Simpliﬁed city budget for citizens Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Website Yes (3) No (0) No (0)
Registered for development and vocational 
trainings, 2000
Yes (3) Yes (3) N/a (1)
Staﬀ members who participate in 
development and vocational training
92 (3) 12 (1) 20 (1)
Set of performance measurement indicators No (0) No (0) No (0)
Codes of ethics No (0) No (0) No (0)
Disciplinary sanctions  No (3) No (3) No (3)
Executives with weekly duty hours for citizens Some (2) Some (2) Some (2)
Duty hours per week of each individual 
member of the Executive Board  
6 (1) 40 (3) 12 (1)
4. Group B: 15,000 to 40,000 inhabitants
Indicator 15,000–40,000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Grodzisk Maz. Łomianki Konstancin–Jeziorna
Competitive bids, 2001 (#) 69 (2) 30 (1) 94 (3)
Appeals to competitive bids 0 (3) 1 (2) 2 (1)
Meetings with representatives of local 
business organizations (per annum)
3 + (3) 3 + (3) 2–3 (2)
Existence of written instructions 
describing document turnover 
Yes (3) No (0) Yes (3)
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Indicator 15,000–40,000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Grodzisk Maz. Łomianki Konstancin–Jeziorna
Register of available client services Yes (3) No (0) No (0)
Code of all organizational procedures 
performed
No (0) No (0) No (0)
Electronically-driven 
document management system
No (0) Yes (3) No (0)
LG development strategy No (0) Yes (3) No (0)
Multiyear ﬁnancial forecast of city 
revenues and expenditures
Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Multiyear CIP;  possibility for citizens to 
propose investment project
Yes (3) No (0) Yes (3)
Task budgeting No (0) No (0) No (0)
Simpliﬁed city budget for citizens Yes (3) N/a (–1) Yes (3)
Website Yes (3) Yes (3) No (0)
Registered for development and vocational 
trainings, 2000
Yes (3)   Yes (3) Yes (3)   
Staﬀ members who participate in 
development and vocational training
49 (1) 94 (3) 59 (2)
Set of performance measurement indicators No (0) No (0) No (0)
Codes of ethics No (0) No (0) Council’s code (3)
Disciplinary sanctions  No (3) No (3) No  (3)
Executives with weekly duty hours for citizens All (3) Some (2) All (3)
Duty hours per week of each individual 
member of the Executive Board  
6 (3) 4 (2) 5 (3)
* Lack of data.
** Council’s code of ethics.
5. Group C: 40,000 to 100,000 inhabitants
Indicator 40,000–100 000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Ciechanów Piotrków Tryb. Tomaszów Maz.
Competitive bids, 2001 (#) 33 (1) 139 (3) 47 (1)
Appeals to competitive bids 0 (3) 2 (2) N/a (–1)
Meetings with representatives of local 
business organizations (per annum)
3 + (3) 2–3 (2) N/a (–1)
Existence of written instructions 
describing document turnover 
Yes (3) No (0) N/a (–1)
Register of available client services No (0) No (0) N/a (–1)
Code of all organizational procedures 
performed
No (0) No (0) N/a (–1)
Electronically-driven 
document management system
No (0) No (0) N/a (–1)
LG development strategy Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
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Indicator 40,000–100 000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Ciechanów Piotrków Tryb. Tomaszów Maz.
Multiyear ﬁnancial forecast of city 
revenues and expenditures
Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Multiyear CIP; possibility for citizens to 
propose investment project
No (0) Yes (3) N/a (–1)
Task budgeting No (0) No (0) No (0)
Simpliﬁed city budget for citizens Yes (3) No (0) Yes (3)
Website Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Registered for development and vocational 
trainings, 2000
Yes (3)   Yes (3)   N/a (–1)
Staﬀ members who participate in 
development and vocational training
37 (1) 181 (3) N/a (–1)
Set of performance measurement indicators No (0) No (0) No (0)
Codes of ethics No (0) No (0) N/a (–1)
Disciplinary sanctions  No (3) No  (3) No (3)
Executives with weekly duty hours the citizens Some (1) All (3) N/a (–1)
Duty hours per week of each individual 
member of the Executive Board  
4 (3) 4 (3) N/a (–1)
6. Group D: > 100,000 inhabitants
Indicator More than 100,000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Płock Radom Warszawa-Ursynów
Competitive bids, 2001 (#) 92 (1) 360 (2) 5765 (3)
Appeals to competitive bids 7 (1) 5 (2) 3 (3)
Meetings with representatives of local 
business organizations (per annum)
3+ (3) 3 + (3) 1 (1)
Existence of written instructions 
describing document turnover 
Yes (3) Yes (3) No (0)
Register of available client services Yes (3) No (0) Yes (3)
Code of all organizational procedures 
performed
No (0) No (0) No (0)
Electronically-driven 
document management system
No (0) No (0) No (0)
LG development strategy Yes (3) No (0) No (0)
Multiyear ﬁnancial forecast of city revenues 
and expenditures
Yes (3) No (0) Yes (3)
Multiyear CIP; possibility for citizens to 
propose investment project
No (0) No (0) Yes (3)
Task budgeting No (0) No (0) No (0)
Simpliﬁed city budget for the citizens No (0) Yes (3) No (0)
Website Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)
Registered for development and vocational 
trainings, 2000
Yes (3) Yes (3) Yes (3)   
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Indicator More than 100,000 inhabitants (points)
Municipality Płock Radom Warszawa-Ursynów
Staﬀ members who participate in 
development and vocational training
236 (2) 346 (3) 175 (1)
Set of performance measurement indicators No (0) No (0) No (0)
Codes of ethics No (0) No (0) No (0)
Disciplinary sanctions  
Executives with weekly duty hours for citizens All (3) All (3) Some (0)
Duty hours per week of each individual 
member of the Executive Board  
2 (1) 11 (3) 8 (2)
7. Citizen Questionnaire
Please read carefully and answer honestly. 
PERSONAL INFORMATION
1. Date of birth: ________   
2. Sex:   Female __   Male __
GENERAL INFORMATION
3. How often do you settle your matters in the City Oﬃce?
 • I am here for the ﬁrst time.
 • Once a year.
 • Twice a year.
 • Several times a year.
 • Once a month.
 • Several times a month.
4. What kind of matters do you settle in the City Oﬃce?
 • Private.
 • Oﬃcial.
5. Which municipal departments do you contact to settle your matters? 
 • Transport.
 • Housekeeping.
 • Geodesy and land-surveying.
 • Architecture.
 • Investment and repairs.
 • Master planning and environmental pollution.
 • Others.
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6. Please underline the phrase that describes best your opinion about the work of your local government.
 • I have no opinion.
 • It is confusing.
 • I have too little information.
 • It works well, but many changes are needed.
 • It is diﬃcult to settle matters with the local government.
 • I believe my City Oﬃce is a paragon for the others.
QUESTIONS CONCERNING CORRUPT BEHAVIOR
7. Have you ever been confronted with a situation when employees left their posts to support or protect their 
families, colleagues, or enterprises? (Underline more than one.)
 • No.
 • Yes, I know about such cases from media (press, radio, TV).
 • Yes, I know about such cases from my colleagues, family, friends.
 • Yes, I had contact with such a case personally.
 • I don’t want to answer this question.
7.1 If yes, please describe the situation:
8. Have you ever come into contact with bribery within a municipal oﬃce? (Underline more than one.)
 • No.
 • Yes, I know about such cases from media (press, radio, TV).
 • Yes, I know about such cases from my colleagues, family, friends.
 • I don’t want to answer this question.
8.1 If yes, please describe the situation: 
9. Have you been obliged to give a bribe in a municipal oﬃce during last four years? 
 • Yes. 
 • No.
 • I don’t want to answer this question.
If yes, please describe the situation: 
10. From time to time, is it considered normal for functionary bribery to occur in your municipal oﬃce? 
 • There are some instances, but few.
 • There are a lot.
 • There is a particular responsible individual.
 • It is diﬃcult to say.
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11. Which department is exposed to corrupt practices? Please rank the following from 1 to 7, with 1 referring to 
the department mostly exposed. 
 • Census (a register of the citizens).
 • Transport.
 • Housekeeping.
 • Geodesy and land-surveying.
 • Architecture.
 • Investment and repairs.
 • Master planning and environmental pollution.
 • Others.
12. If you have some remarks concerning corrupt behaviors, please write about them.     
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Swianiewicz, P. (ed.). 2001. Public Perception of Local Governments. Budapest: OSI/LGI.
157
Index
Abuse 15–22, 27, 39–43, 46–47, 51, 59–66, 68–69, 
71, 75–76, 78, 80–81, 87, 92–93, 98, 105–111, 
117, 119, 123–125, 127–129, 135–137, 141, 
146
Access 20, 27, 39, 41–46, 50–51, 59–60, 65, 69–71, 
75, 85–87, 89, 92, 94–96, 109, 110–111, 113, 
115–116, 119–120, 125, 127–129, 138, 146–147
Accountable; accountability 18–20, 30, 35, 39–43, 
46–48, 50–51, 60, 63, 65, 68-69, 76, 81, 85, 87, 
96, 105–111, 114–119, 123–128, 136, 146
Administrative; administration 15–22, 27–31, 35–44, 
46–51, 59–67, 69–98, 105–111, 115–118, 
120–121, 124–129, 135–137, 139, 141–147
Agency 15–17, 19–20, 22, 42–44, 51, 84, 92, 
107–109, 113–120, 125–128, 136
Armenia 15, 21–22, 27–32, 35, 38–51
Audit 17, 19, 59, 83–84
Authority (authorities) 15, 18, 20–21, 28–32, 34–35, 
38–39, 41, 46–47, 49–52, 59–62, 64–69, 73, 
75–76, 81–82, 84, 86–87, 92–95, 98, 105–107, 
109, 111, 113, 120, 128, 135–137
Budget 22, 30, 35, 41, 43, 46, 49–51, 60, 77, 79, 
83–84, 86, 108, 111–112, 115, 124, 126, 129, 
135
Bulgaria 15, 20–22, 59–63, 65–66, 69, 71, 76, 
78–81, 83, 85–86, 89–90, 92–94, 98
Capacity 22, 27, 42, 44–45, 47–48, 51, 60, 64, 68, 
78–79, 91, 93, 95, 97, 105, 107–109, 112, 116, 
124, 128, 136
Central; centralized 21–22, 27, 29–30, 32, 35, 
38–39, 42, 49–50, 52, 60–61, 66, 70–72, 76, 
78, 81–85, 87, 89, 92, 94, 105–106, 108, 
116–118, 120, 125–128, 136–137, 146–147
Citizen 15–16, 20, 22, 27–28, 31–32, 34–39, 
41–52, 60–69, 71, 73–78, 80–87, 89–98, 
105–121, 123–129, 135–137, 139, 146–147
Civil society 27, 64, 92, 109, 126
Client 15, 19, 27–28, 31, 35, 42–43, 49, 62, 65–66, 
69, 71, 73–75, 78, 94, 96–97, 111, 115–116, 
119, 121
Complaint 19–22, 43, 71, 76, 80, 82–83, 85, 87, 
94–95, 105, 108, 110–111, 115–117, 119–121, 
123–124, 127–129
Control 15, 27–28, 39, 43–44, 47–48, 50–51, 
59–66, 68–69, 73, 74–78, 80–87, 89–90, 92, 
95–98, 106, 109, 114, 116–117, 128, 135–136, 
146–147
Corruption 17, 20, 22, 39, 43, 45–46, 49, 51, 
59–60, 62–63, 65, 69, 71, 75–76, 84–85, 
105–108, 125, 128, 135–137, 139, 141, 143–144
Council 22, 27, 29, 32, 34–36, 40–41, 44, 46, 60, 
66–69, 73, 76, 78, 81–82, 84, 86–87, 89–92, 
94, 108, 110–111, 114, 118–120, 123–124, 
126, 136
Decentralization 21, 27, 30–31, 45, 48–51, 60, 94, 
98, 105–106, 108–109, 135
Decision-making 16, 22, 27, 29, 31–32, 34, 40, 46, 
48–50, 62, 85–86, 93, 96, 105–109, 111–115, 
126, 128, 136, 146–147
Development 15, 18, 22, 28–31, 34–35, 42–43, 48, 
50–51, 61–62, 64–66, 68, 71, 76, 79–81, 86, 
90–93, 95, 97–98, 105–109, 115, 126–127, 
129, 135–137, 141–146
Distrust 15, 20, 44
Eﬀective 15, 19–22, 27–29, 34, 36, 40–43, 47–49, 
51–52, 60–65, 69, 75–76, 79–80, 84–85, 87, 
89, 92–98, 105–110, 114–117, 119, 123–129, 
135–137, 146–147
Election; electoral; electorate; elected 19, 27–28, 
30–32, 35–36, 39, 46–48, 50–51, 59–63, 68, 
76, 89, 93, 106, 108, 110, 118–119, 136
Enforcement 18–19, 22, 42, 44, 47, 107, 109, 124, 
128–129, 146
Ethic; ethical 19–20, 22, 40, 43, 45, 59, 64, 81, 
105–106, 109, 115–117, 128–129, 135–137, 
146
158
T H E  V I C I O U S  C I R C L E :  W E A K  S T A T E  I N S T I T U T I O N S ,  U N R E M E D I E D  A B U S E  A N D  D I S T R U S T
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
Expenditure 41, 84, 108, 115
Fair; fairness 15, 21, 42, 44–46, 63, 79, 95, 121–122
Fees 19, 41–42, 45, 59, 61, 85, 97, 117, 126
Financing; ﬁnance, ﬁnancial 18, 30, 35, 41–43, 45, 
48, 50-51, 59, 65, 72, 81, 83–85, 94, 97, 
106–108, 125–126, 128, 135–136, 143 
Georgia 15, 21–22, 105–114, 116–120, 123, 
125–128
Governance; good governance 15, 19–22, 27–28, 
30–32, 39, 42–46, 48, 50–51, 60, 65, 89, 92, 
96, 109, 112, 114, 124, 129, 136–137, 143, 147
Government (see also: self–government) 15, 17–18, 
20–22, 27–30, 32, 35, 41–43, 45–46, 49–52, 
60–61, 66, 70, 79, 85, 90, 92, 94, 97, 105–108, 
111, 115, 118–119, 126, 128, 136
Hearing 20, 22, 32, 34, 114, 126
Indicator 27–28, 32, 36, 47, 62–63, 68–69, 71, 
73, 76, 80, 92, 97, 111–112, 118, 136, 141, 
143–144
Information (also see access) 15–17, 19–20, 22, 
27–28, 34, 36, 39–43, 46, 48–51, 59–60, 
62, 64–65, 70–73, 75, 78, 83–84, 86–87, 89, 
92–96, 105, 107–111, 113–121, 124–129, 136, 
144, 146–147
Institution 15, 21–22, 27–28, 30, 35–36, 38–39, 
42–48, 51–52, 61–64, 66–69, 71, 76, 78, 
82–83, 86, 89, 91–93, 98, 105, 108–109, 112, 
114, 116–118, 120–121, 125–127, 136–137, 
146
Judicial; justice 19–20, 43, 45, 47–48, 59, 65, 76, 
81, 84–86, 89, 117
Law 15–17, 19–20, 28–30, 32, 35, 40, 43–46, 50, 
59–61, 63–64, 68, 79–80, 82–85, 87, 89–90, 
94–95, 105–108, 111, 116–117, 125, 128, 146
Legal; legality 15–16, 19–22, 27–29, 31–32, 34, 
39–45, 47, 49, 51–52, 59, 61, 63–64, 69, 71, 
75, 77, 80–86, 89, 94–95, 100, 106–107, 109, 
117, 125–126, 128–129, 135–138, 146–147
Legal information centers (LIC) 22
Legislative 28–29, 42–43, 45, 47, 66, 82, 85, 125, 
128–129, 135, 137
Local; local government(al) unit (LGU) 28–30, 32, 
41, 45–46, 49–50, 117, 128, 135, 137
Local self-government 27, 29–30, 34–38, 40, 42, 
45–46, 48, 51–52, 59–61, 75, 81–82, 87, 89, 
92, 105–108, 110–112, 114, 116, 118–119, 
126, 128–129
Local governance 27, 30–31, 43–44, 46, 49, 60, 65, 
68, 89, 93, 107, 109, 111, 114, 116, 126, 128, 
135, 146
Local information centers (LIC) 125–126, 128–129
Manage; management 27, 41–42, 45, 50–51, 62–63, 
69, 73, 76–77, 79–80, 83–84, 94–95, 97, 106, 
108–109, 115–116, 123, 125, 135–137, 141, 
144, 146
Mayor 29, 32, 36, 47–48, 60–61, 66–69, 76–77, 79, 
81–82, 84–87, 90, 92, 94, 106, 110, 146
Measure; measurement 22, 30, 32, 34, 39, 43–49, 
72, 75, 79, 83, 85, 87, 95, 97–98, 108, 125, 137
Media 22, 27, 32–34, 39–42, 46, 48, 51, 64, 86–87, 
126, 141, 146
Ministry (ministries) 27, 29, 42, 69, 78, 84
Municipal, municipality 28, 31, 35–36, 43, 49–51, 
60–61, 63, 66–92, 94–97, 106–108,110–112, 
117, 126, 128–129, 136–139, 141–146
Non-governmental organizations (NGO) 18, 20–22, 
27–28, 40–42, 44–45, 50, 59, 62–63, 66, 87, 
89, 91–92, 110, 112, 114, 118, 126, 129, 137, 
146
Norm 15, 18, 42–43, 45, 59, 64, 66, 78, 90, 93, 96, 
116–117, 129, 136
One-stop-shop 22, 50, 87, 94, 114–116
Openness 32, 40–41, 44, 46, 51, 60, 80
Participation 18, 20–22, 27, 30–32, 34–35, 42–43, 
45, 48–51, 62, 64, 66, 68, 76, 89–93, 107, 109, 
111–114, 123–126, 128, 135, 137, 146
Performance 19, 22, 27–28, 30, 32, 36–37, 45–49, 
60, 62–63, 65, 69–71, 75–81, 83, 86, 92–93, 
96–98, 105, 107–108, 110, 115–116, 118, 121, 
127–128, 135–137
Poland 15, 20–22, 127, 135–138, 143, 146
Policy 18, 21, 28, 35, 42–43, 45, 49–51, 62–63, 79, 
92–94, 97–98, 105, 109, 128–129, 146  
Policymaking 18, 22, 46, 93–94, 127, 136,
Policy options 28, 65, 92–93, 109, 124–125, 146
Prevention; preventive 18, 20–22, 39, 68, 76, 81, 87, 
111, 128, 137, 146
I N D E X
159
Procedure; procedural; procedurally 15–19, 21–22, 
28, 30, 41–42, 45–46, 48, 59, 62, 64–65, 
69–73, 75, 77–79, 81, 83–87, 89–91, 94–98, 
105–110, 116–117, 119–121, 124–128, 
135–137, 146–147
Private; privatization 16, 22, 35–36, 43–45, 50, 61, 
66, 76, 81, 89, 112, 126, 137
Procurement 22, 43, 46, 59, 61, 71, 85, 87, 147
Public 15–17, 19–20, 22, 27–28, 32, 36, 39, 43, 49, 
50–51, 63, 69, 83, 86–67, 92, 96, 107, 114–115
Quality 20, 27, 31–32, 35, 43, 45–47, 60–63, 65, 
69–73, 75–77, 85–86, 92–97, 105–111, 113, 
115–116, 119–121, 123–125, 128–129, 
136–137, 147
Remedy (remedies) 15–16, 18–22, 27–28, 40, 42, 
46–47, 59–66, 68–69, 85, 92–94, 105, 107, 
109–111, 117, 123, 125, 128–129, 135
Representation 29, 31–32, 44, 85
Response; responsiveness 19, 31, 35–36, 42–43, 46, 
50, 71, 93, 105, 108–109, 112–113, 116, 
117–119, 121–124, 127–128, 137, 143–144
Request 15–16, 22, 43, 69–70, 78, 80, 82–84, 
86–87, 97, 105, 107, 110, 113, 115–117, 
119–121, 123, 127–129
Rule; rule–making; rule of law 15–16, 18, 20, 27, 
31, 40, 43–44, 46–48, 50, 60, 69, 75–77, 
80–82, 86, 89, 108, 125, 136, 147
Satisfaction 17, 19, 21, 27–28, 31, 35–37, 39, 46, 
49–50, 62–63, 65, 69, 71–72, 75, 92, 97, 109, 
116, 118–121, 123, 127–128, 141, 143–146
Self–government 27–31, 34–37, 40, 42, 44–46, 48, 
51–52, 60, 75, 81–82, 89–90, 105–108, 110–111, 
113–114, 116, 118–119, 126, 128–129 
Servant 17, 19–22, 39, 51, 59, 61, 63, 76–81, 86, 
95–97, 105–106, 108–111, 116–117, 128–129, 
135, 137, 139
Service; service delivery 15, 17, 19–22, 28–31, 
34–37, 41–51, 59–66, 69–85, 87–98, 92–97, 
105–108, 110–111, 113–123, 125–129, 
136–139, 141, 143–146
Standard 16–18, 22, 28, 42–43, 45, 47, 50, 63, 75, 
77, 81, 92–95, 107–110, 115–117, 126–129, 
135–137, 146–147
State 15, 18, 20–21, 27, 30, 35, 41–42, 44–45, 48, 
60, 62, 65–66, 76, 78–79, 84–86, 89, 92–99, 
105, 146
Subsidy 27, 30, 44, 126
Subsidiary 45, 76, 136
Target 20–21, 30, 110, 112, 116, 124–125, 146–147
Tax 17, 34, 41–43, 46, 49, 61, 108
Transparent; transparency 18–22, 27, 30–31, 36, 
39–44, 46, 50–51, 60–61, 63, 65, 69, 83, 
85–87, 92–93, 96, 98, 107–109, 125–129, 
135–136, 146–147
Trust 15, 19–22, 27, 31–32, 35, 45, 61–63, 65–69, 
76, 82, 92–93, 97–98, 105, 109, 117–119, 
123–126, 128, 146
Vote; voters; voting; voter turnout 35, 39, 46, 50, 
68, 89-90, 93, 109, 135
LGI Policy Fellowship Program
The LGI Fellowship program is about fostering 
positive governmental reform.  Each year LGI selects 
talented professionals to participate in its one-year 
multinational Fellowship program. Fellows work in 
small teams under the guidance of a well-respected 
mentor to produce analytical, policy-oriented studies 
on a given topic. 
The studies, such as this publication, present 
policy options and recommendations and are geared 
towards the policy-making community in Fellows’ 
respective countries.  LGI provides its Fellows with 
training in how to write eﬀective, concise, fact-based, 
practical policy reports.  At the conclusion of the pro-
gram, LGI works with its Fellows to determine what 
steps it can take to support the proposed recommen-
dations in the completed studies. 
• For more on the LGI Fellowship program visit: 
http://lgi.osi.hu/fellowship/
• To learn more about the Open Society Institute 
see: http://www.soros.org/
• To learn more about the Local Government and 
Public Service Reform Initiative see: 
 http://lgi.osi.hu/index.html
Scott Abrams
Project Manager 
Local Government and 
Public Service Reform Initiative
Open Society Institute 
ascott@osieurope.org
July 2004
F o r  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  o t h e r  L G I  p u b  l i  c a  t i o n s ,  p l e a s e  c o n  t a c t :
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM INI TIA TIVE
P.O. Box 519, H–1397 Budapest, Hungary
Phone: (36 1) 327 3100   •   Fax: (36 1) 327 3105
E-mail: lgprog@osi.hu   •   Web Site: http://lgi.osi.hu
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
ISBN 963-9419-79-6
9 419797789639
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY BUDAPEST LAW CENTER
Szent István tér 11/C, H–1051 Budapest, Hungary
Tel: (36 1) 327 3878   •   Fax: (36 1) 327 3879
E-mail: pili@pili.org   •   Web Site: http://www.pili.org
PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW INITIATIVE
The Vicious Circle: Weak State Institutions, Unremedied Abuse and Distrust is the product 
of a collaboration between the Public Interest Law Initiative (PILI) and LGI. 
PILI is a center for learning and innovation that advances human rights principles by 
stimulating the development of a public interest law infrastructure.
Founded at Columbia University in 1997 with the support of the Ford Foundation, 
PILI established its new headquarters in Budapest, Hungary in the spring of 2002. 
PILI continues to maintain a small oﬃce at Columbia, and in 2004 opened a new 
oﬃce in Moscow.  
Working primarily in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Asia, PILI conducts work 
in two principal areas: Institutional Reform and Training and Education. In addition, 
PILI places a priority on the cross-cutting theme of combating discrimination because 
of its fundamental importance to the very notion of public interest work.
PILI’s Institutional Reform Program supports the development of justice sector 
institutions that enhance the participation of a wide range of actors in pursuing the public 
interest. The Institutional Reform Program has three sub-programs: Access to Justice, 
Law and Governance, and Legal Practice.  In each case, the institutional reform 
priorities have been informed by analysis of the greatest institutional impediments 
to the strong and participatory public interest advocacy that PILI seeks to develop 
through the capacity-building activities under its Training and Education Program.
